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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
Educational integrity on the part of teachers is a

much-debated issue today.

The former basis of trust and

respect among parents, students and teachers in elemen
tary and secondary schools as well as institutions of
higher learning is slowly but surely deteriorating.

More

and more demands are being made for a measurable standard

of educational delivery and performance whose effective
ness can be shown by results, as measured by student
performance and a student’s "actually acquired" knowledge .
This dissertation is concerned with litigation that

has already been decided by Federal Courts, State

Appellate Courts, and State Supreme Courts; and the imp
lications thereof for educational institutions,

if and

when educational malpractice becomes a legally accepted

concept.
With increasing litigation by parents and students

claiming that educational institutions are not performing
satisfactorialy to ensure that students are learning the
necessary skills, and considering West Virginia’s Supreme
Court ruling that education is a fundamental right, we

may have moved closer to a legal acceptance of the theory
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of "educational malpractice."

It is imperative, there

fore, to research the significant issues concerning such
a legal concept and the serious implications for educa

tional institutions that are unprepared to deal with that
concept.
Problem Statement

To identify emerging legal elements of educational
malpractice as of December 31, 1983Subproblems of Study

1 .

Research federal and state court decisions relating
to the issue in order to:
a)

determine what constitutes "educational malprac
tice (1) factual; (2) inferential;

b)

identify the important factual and legal issues
involved in these court actions regarding educa
tional malpractice;

c)

determine the kind of deference, and the court’s
attitude toward educational institutions in this

area of concern; and

d)

determine the relative degree of success or
failure in actions charging "educational mal-

practice" and the basis or rationale for such

outcomes.

■
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2.

Review literature on educational malpractice.

3.

Review available West Virginia Court cases and stat
utes relating to educational malpractice.

4.

Research the extent to which other legal fields are
influencing the issue of educational malpractice.

5.

Research, the issue of students’ responsibility to
learn in the educational process for the purpose of:

a.

determining what constitutes comparative (or
contributory) negligence, and

b.

identifying the potential grounds constituting

student negligence.
6.

Develop recommendations for educators and educa
tional units and for further studies.
Justification of Study

According to Black’s Law Dictionary, 1 ’’education”
encompasses the following elements of knowledge and skill
a student is supposed to acquire in school and college:
the student ’’comprehends not merely the instruction

received at school or college, but the whole course of
training; moral,

physical.

.

.

. vocational, intellectual, and

Education may be particularly directed to

either the mental, moral, or physical powers and faculties, but in its broadest and best sense it relates to

1 Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed.,

1979) .
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them all.

Acquisition of all knowledge tending to train

and develop the individual."

In addition, Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E. 2d 859

(1979), decided by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West

Virginia, stated clearly that it is a violation of the
West Virginia Constitution (Article XII, Section I) if a

’’thorough and efficient” education is denied, which was
also considered a denial of the equal protection of the
law.

The court also unequivocally declared (ruled) that

the constitutional requirement of a "thorough and efficient system of free schools’1 made education a funda

mental right in West Virginia, and remanded the case for
a decision in agreement with this opinion.

However, the

courts generally have refused to entertain claims for
educational malpractice on public policy grounds.

Considering the development and expansion of civil
rights legislation in the United States, the public pres-

sure in response to students graduating from educational
institutions lacking the very skills they were supposed

to acquire, and increasing litigation foreshadow an as
sumption that educational malpractice may one day become

an accepted legal basis for litigation.
Malpractice, as defined in Black’s Law Dictionary,
could very well encompass education, since it reads that

malpractice encompasses:
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Failure of one rendering professional services to
exercise that degree of skill and learning com
monly applied under all the circumstances in the
community by the "average prudent reputable mem
ber of the profession with the result of injury,
loss or damage to the recipient of those services
or to those entitled to rely upon them." It is
any professional misconduct, unreasonable lack of
skill or fidelity in professional or fiduciary
duties, evil practice, or illegal or-immoral
conduct" (emphasis added) (Mathews v. Walker, 296
N.E. 2d, 569, 571, 1973).2
As the research further shows, contract law will

play a role in this area as well.

A breach of contract

might be declared educational malpractice based on an

analogy to medical malpractice.

Additionally, the area

of tort law will find application and can therefore not
be neglected.

The word "torts" is derived from the Latin

’’tortus" or "twisted."

The metaphor is obvious:

A tort

is conduct that is twisted or crooked, just not straight,

and causes harm (cause and effect relationship).

Con

cepts and principles of tort law pervade the entire field

of conduct and law.
Thus, the justification for this study encompasses
the following points:

1 .

To the writer’s knowledge, educational malpractice has not been studied previously.

2.

The educational process and existing policies
are being affected by the increasing number of

2 Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed., 1979).
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legal actions brought by parents and students
against educational administrative bodies.

3.

Increased litigation in the area of educational
malpractice will probably have a sizeable impact
on education in the future.

4.

Based on these examinations and results, educa-

tional administrative bodies may develop poli-

cies, procedures, and decisions to provide a
more productive educational environment, which
will result in greater protection to the insti

tution by reducing its exposure to liability.
5.

This study will also enable parents and students

to better understand their own required inputs
into the educational process to avoid litigation

or to have a greater degree of protection in

this area.
If and when the courts recognize suits on "educa-

tional malpractice," educational institutions must be

aware of and, even more important, be prepared for such

an eventuality.

If they are not, such litigation may

inflict a great amount of financial damage on an institut ion.

Also to be considered are the damage to the

institution’s reputation and the stress of having to
readjust policies, contracts, faculty and administrative
procedures in a rather short amount of time.

Such a
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result could prove to be quite damaging in a time of
scarce resources as we are experiencing right now.
Regardless of their outcome, the fact that suits
have been filed and litigated demonstrates a real need

for addressing this.problem.

The question of the "proper

forum" for dealing with such a problem is quite signifi

cant .
Because little has been written about this important

area, administrators and educators do not have sufficient
knowledge and awareness to maintain an institution free
of "educational malpractice."
Research Procedure

The descriptive method of research was used in this

study because it is best suited for answering the general
research questions of "what was," ’’what is,” and ’’what

will be," and is also very well suited for answering the
problem statement.

This analytical type of descriptive

research was employed to identify and analyze the impera

tive legal and factual issues and elements involved in
the total question of educational malpractice.

The

method was used to develop a policy model based upon a

combination of the legal rationale of courts, related
legal fields, and the literature.

Since the objective of the analytical method was

bifurcated, separate research procedures were adopted.
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To identify the important legal issues and the laws in

volved , the customary sources of legal research were
employed.

These included, among others, a review of

federal and state court reports, federal and state cons-

titutions, statutes, law review, legal texts and, f inally, the research method of Shepardizing was employed

to locate all relevant decisions.
The cases are presented as abstracts (see Appendix).

Research literature as well as research studies and arti
cles concerning educational malpractice were investigated
and used in this study also.

Two very traditional effective pressures have so far
been influential in preparing the way for an ultimate

recognition of educational malpractice.

First, contin-

uous public dissatisfaction, followed by news reports,
commentaries, published results of national polls, and

articles in professional education and law journals; and,
second, an increase in litigation.

Although the com

plaints have been addressed foremost to public schools,
other institutions of learning are being targeted more

and more.

At a conference sponsored by the International Coun
cil on the Future of the University, several speakers

mentioned the "egalitarianism doctrine" which,' they maintained, had led to a decrease in standards as well as
quality.

9

The Ohio Board of Regents appointed a study commis

sion in fall of 1980 to study the problems of students

entering college lacking basic skills in reading, writing
and mathematics.

The commission found the problem to be

nationwide; it called for a preparatory curriculum for

all college-bound high school students, for improved
teacher education, and better preparatory information for
parents and students.
In his book, Educational Malpractice, Dan Stewart

observes that educational institutions are mandated to
prepare students to be able to take full advantage of

society’s opportunities, and to benefit society as well
as benefit from society.

Educational institutions are

receiving taxpayers1 money for the purpose of using it

wisely and beneficially to educate students.

They are

also charged to develop each student to his maximum capabilities and potential.

This function of educational

institutions is written in almost every charter or con

stitution of AmericaTs schools.
This all should be accomplished by design and not by

chance, Stewart explains.

He states that today much

seems to be left to the individual teacher, who struggles

on the one hand with the many educational theories on how

to teach and, on the other hand, with a diverse student
group having a number of inherent problems.

Thus,
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teachers experience quite a bit of defeat.

Stewart men-

tions that nothing breeds more failure than failure.

He

further notes that failure basically is not acceptable to
the healthy human mind; therefore, he concludes that

students who fail are eventually going to reject the
concept of success and with it the very environment and/
or society that supports it.
Quoting Somerset Maugham who once said, "Failure

makes people bitter and cruel," Stewart sees a dim future
if no change occurs.

At this time, he states,

it seems

that maintaining the status quo in our educational sys-

terns can only result in losing money to unemployment, job
programs, manpower development programs, and eventually,

welf are.

This trend explains to some extent the increas-

ing number of lawsuits by parents who discover that their

children are not able to function successfully in society
because they lack basic skills.3
Definition of Terms^

Accountability—a means to hold an individual or
group of individuals responsible for performance

Stewart, D. Educational Malpractices:
The Big
Gamble in our Schools^ Westminster* Company. State
Services Publishers C1 971)•
The definitions of terms are taken from BlackT s
Law Dictionary (5th ed., 1 9 7 9 ) •

I
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at a certain, specified level.
Action—a lawsuit or proceeding taken in a court of
law to enforce or protect the rights of an indi-

victual.
Breach of Contract—failure, without legal excuse,

to perform any promise within a contract or the

contract itself.
Cause of Action--the fact or facts which give a

person a right to judicial relief.

A situation or

state of facts which would entitle party to sus

tain action and give him right to seek a judicial
remedy in his behalf (Thompson v. Zurich Ms. Co. ,

D.C. Minn., 309 F. Supp. 1178, 1181).

Compensatory Relief—relief or compensation for
damages caused or debts owed.
Contract—a promise made by one person (entity) to

another.
Court of Appeals—the United States Court of

Appeals.

Damages—monetary reimbursement for any harm caused

resulting from a breach of contract or from commission of tort.

Declaratory relief--a judicial declaration of the
existing rights of parties under a statute or
other document.
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District Court—the United States District Court.
Element —mater ial; substance; ingredient; factor.

Injunctive relief—an injunction or order issued by
a court of equity commanding a person or institu

tion to do or refrain from doing, an act, or con-

tinuing with an act which would injure another by
violating his legal rights.

Legal duty—obligation.
Legal right—right against some person who is under
a duty to the one who has the right.

Mandamus (Lat.)—We command.

This is the name of

writ which issues from a court of superior juris

diction , and is directed to an inferior court or

agency.

.

. to compel performance of a ministerial

act or a mandatory duty when there is a clear

legal right in plaintiff, a corresponding duty in

defendant, and a want of any other appropriatwe
and adequate remedy (Cohen v. Ford,

417, 339 A.2d 175, 177).

19 Pa. Cmwlth

To take or not to take

some action—mandamus will lie.
Res ipsa loquitur—The thing speaks for itself.

Rule of evidence, whereby negligency of alleged

wrongdoer may be inferred from the mere fact that

an accident happened, provided character of accident (event) and circumstances attending it lead
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reasonably to belief that in absence of negligence
it would not have occurred and that thing which

caused injury is shown to have been under manage
ment and control of alleged wrongdoer (Hillen v.

Hooker Const. Co., Tex. Civ. App. 484 S.W. 2d 1i3,

115).
Happening of injury permits an inference of negli

gence where plaintiff produces substantial evi
dence that injury was caused by an agency or

instrumentality under exclusive control and man
agement of defendant, and that the occurrence was

such that in the ordinary cause of things it would
not happen if reasonable care had been used.

Res judicata--a matter adjudged, a thing judicially
acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled
by judgment.
Social problems in Education:

In an increasingly

technological society "non-education" or "under-

education" has severe social, economical and
psychological consequences in the lives of indi
viduals and the society as a whole. (Stewart, D. ;

See footnote 3 supra).

Supreme Court--Supreme Court of the United States.
Theory of case--facts on which the right of action
is claimed to exist.

The basis of liability or

II. 1
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grounds of defense (Higgins v. Fuller, 48 N.U.

218,

148 P. 2d 575, 57S)•

Theory of law--the legal premise or set of prin
ciples on which a case rests.
Torts—conduct which is twisted, or crooked, not
straight.

It is a civil wrong, other than breach

of contract, for which the court will provide a

remedy in the form of an action for damages.

■
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CHAPTER TWO
Educational Malpractice and Related Issues
History
In our early American history the family had major

responsibility for education.

With the Industrial Revo-

lution, the family as an all-providing, self-sufficient

unit slowly disappeared, and state and local governments

gradually assumed the task of providing compulsory, taxsupported school systems.

In Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court

recognized that education has become one of the most

significant functions of government. 5

Before Brown,

public education, rather than being a right, was more a
privilege enjoyed mainly by an elite group.

Privilege implies something that is bestowed, and so
were the conditions and terms of education established by

the State.

Students could be denied schooling because

of, for instance, race or mental/physical handicap.

Schools were operated at the will and pleasure of the

State.

The Brown decision changed that.

It enunciated a

limitation on the power of the State in regard to oper
ating schools.

5 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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The court-established Brown principle was that when

a State undertakes education it must be made equally

available to all.

The court stated:

Today, education is perhaps the most important
function of state and local governments. Compul
sory school attendance laws and the great expend
itures for education both demonstrate our recog
nition of the importance of education to our
democratic society. It is required in the per
formance of our most basic public responsibili
ties, even service in the armed forces.
It is
the very foundation of good citizenship.
Today
it is a principal instrument in awakening the
child to cultural values, in preparing him for
later professional training, and in helping him
In these
to adjust normally to his environment,
days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life, if he is
denied the opportunity of an education, Such an
opportunity, where the State has undertaken to
provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.
The argument regarding a right to education has been

supported and strengthened by a fairly recent Supreme
7
Here, students were
Court decision in Goss v. Lopez. '
suspended for misbehavior.

The claim brought by the

students regarding a right to education was based on the
State’s compulsory education law.

They argued that since

the State had created the right, it could not deprive any

6 Id.

483-493.

7 Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975); see also
noted in 44 U. Cin. L. Rev. 393 (1975); see Mills v.
Board of Education, 348 I. Supp. 866 (D.D.C.) (1972).
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student of it without constitutional due process guaran

tees (prior notice and right to be heard).
This court held that the right to education was both
a property interest as well as a liberty interest granted

by the Constitution itself.

It needs to be noted, how

ever, that Goss does not address the quality of education

at all.

The court also reasoned that the principle of

equal protection requires the provision of education to
all children, and concluded that, based on the assumption

that once students/children are guaranteed equal access

to the educational system, equal opportunity to learn is

assured as well.

However, this is not the case because

of such variables as mental and physical handicaps, en

vironment , the student himself, and so forth.

The fol-

lowing cases as noted by Patricia Wright Morrison 8 in the

Right to Education are examples:

Terna v. Portales, 351 F. Supp. 1279 (E.N.U.)
( 1972) and Lau v.~ Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 ( 1974)
are illustrative.
In these cases the children had been accepted
into school. However, the parents claimed that
the children's right to education was denied
because the education they received was meaning
less; the children spoke only Spanish or Chinese,
yet no effort was made to teach them English.
The court found that the system discriminated on
the basis of national origin insofar as they did
not offer a meaningful education and ordered the
districts to provide English language instruction.

8 44 U. Cin. L. Rev. 803-804 (1975).
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The cases are significant in that they recapture
the emphasis in Brown on the quality of educa
tion. Brown assumed that equal education was
guaranteed by equal access.

Terna and Lau stood for the proposition that
acces must be in fact, not just in form.
But note that even though all states provide free

public schooling, there is no federal constitutional
requirement for them to do so.

In addition to the fact

that all states must admit children on equal terms, the
U.S. Supreme Court has held that the quality of education

need not be uniform within a state.
In the Rodri guez case^ parents claimed that the
children who were poor (those living in poorer areas)
were discriminated against and received less education

since less money was spent on their education.

The par

ents further argued that education was a fundamental
right .

The court, however, while emphasizing that

schooling plays a vital role in a democratic society,
nevertheless concluded that education was not a funda
mental right because it was not guaranteed by the Consti-

tution.

The court stated:

The key to discovering whether education is
’’fundamental’’ is not to be found in comparisons
of the relative societal significance of educa
tion as opposed to subsistence or housing.
Nor

9 San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1 (1973).
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is it to be found by weighing whether education
is as important as the right to travel.
Rather,
the answer lies in assessing whether there is a
right to education explicitv or implicitly guar
anteed by the Constitution. 0

Nevertheless, Rodriguez provides some authority,

since Justice Powell indicated that in the opinion of the

court, the plaintiffs did not establish that the children
had been denied a "minimal education."

This implies that

a state has an obligation to provide "minimal education"
for its school-age citizens.

The question of what con

stitutes a "minimal education" standard remains.
However,

it is important to note a West Virginia

case, Pauley v. Kelly,1 in which the parents of five

children attending public school in Lincoln County
brought an action on behalf of themselves and as a class.
They claimed that the financing system for public schools

violated the West Virginia Constitution, Article XII,

Section I, because a "thorough and efficient" education
was denied to students living in property-poor counties

that had less monies available.
In this case the Supreme Court of Appeals of West

Virginia held that the state's constitutional require
ments of a "thorough and efficient system of free

10 411 U.S.

1-33 (1973).

1 1 255 S.E. 2d 859 (1979)■

20

schools” did indeed make education a fundamental right in
West Virginia.

This opinion indicates that an action for

educational malpractice in West Virginia may have a good
chance for success, since the constitutional "strict

scrutiny” principle could be invoked when a constitu

tional right is denied.
There are two standards or principles of judgment

available to the courts.

One is the "strict scrutiny" or

the "rational relationship" test.

In a strict scrutiny a

state must justify its action by showing a compelling
interest worthy of the violoation of a person’s constitu

tional rights.

The other standard is the "traditional

standard , ” in which a state has only to show a rational

relationship between its action and a legitimate state
purpose .

The strict scrutiny test applies whenever a right

that has been violated is a fundamental right.

probably not applicable except in West Virginia.

This is

The

West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Pauley v.
Kelly, 255 S.E. 2d 859 (1979) held that education was a

fundamental right in that state.

Therefore, it is rea-

sonable to argue that a fundamental right was formed

based on the West Virginia constitutional standard of a

"thorough and efficient" system of free schools (W.V.
Const. Art. XII , § 1 ).
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Public education in the United States is based on a

delicate balance of fulfilling the needs and interests of
the student, the parents and the state.

Historically, a

relationship of trust and faith in the educational system

and its educators was presumed.

Trust was vested in

state authorities’ proper exercise of their powers in a

reasonable manner to the benefit of all parties involved.
And courts deferred to the expertise and discretion of

school administrators and professionals.
However, many of the bases for these premises have
changed drastically.

Public dissatisfaction has emerged

and increased over the years. 12

At the same time, par-

ents have become more aware of the variety of available

cho ices in method and style of education, ranging from
private education to many different programs within the
school system. 13

Thus, parents who earlier left educa-

tion to the authorities and professional educators now
are increasingly inclined to question the educational
process and product, especially in view of discovering
illiterate students with high school diplomas.

12 Frazier, "Wanted: Rx for the Equitable
Management of Paraent-School Conflict," 70 Elementary
School Journal, 239 (1970).

^3 Stewart, D., Educational Malpractices:
The Big
Gamble in Our Schools, Westminister Company, State
Services Publishers C1971)*

1
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Today, parents have three alternatives to pursue.

One, they can select a private educational institution

which agrees with their philosophy; two, privately tutor
their children at home; and three, seek ways to influence

the educational system (public schools).
The first choice is available only to parents who

have sufficient financial resources to meet the costs of

private education.

The second approach has limitations

also; not only is money a factor but parents also are
required to show that their children are receiving an
education equivalent to public schooling in accordance

with state law. 14

This leaves the majority of parents

without any other choice but to attempt to influence the
public school system.

Thus, parents can try to influence

school boards by working through local interest and power
groups, but today’s parents do not share a common phi-

losophy or common goals. 15

They can attempt to achieve

change through legislation, or, lastly, they can involve

the judicial system.

In using court action to influence

the school system and its educational processes, several

People v. Turner, 212 Cal. App. 2d 861, 263 P. 2d
685, appeal dismissed, 347 U.S. 972 (1953); State v.
Vaughn, 44 N.J. 142, 207 A 2d 537 (1965); State ex rel.
Shoreline School Div. v. Superior Court, 55 Wash. 2d 177,
346 P. 2d 999 (1959).

15 U.S. News and World Report, September 1,
42.

1975, at

■
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options may be considered:

professional negligence (mis

feasance or nonfeasance), breach of contract, misrepresentation, breach of a state constitutional statutory or

common law duty, breach of a federal statutory duty, or
vindication of a federal constitutional right.

As will

be seen later, all of these alternatives are fraught with

difficulties, and past attempts in bringing educational

malpractice actions have failed dismally.

We will have to ask ourselves if successful litiga
tion would actually improve the quality of education in

general.

For the sake of argument, let us take the Four-

teenth Amendment’s equal protection allegation.

Such

argument would be based on inequality, and hence, dis
crimination, but the real issue is "quality in educat ion, " misrepresentation to a student, and professional
negligence of various kinds. 16 Other matters need to be

taken into account, such as:

defining the legally recog

nized professional obligations schools have to their

respective students; determining measurable educational
standards; deciding whether the courts are the appro

priate forum to assess negligence regarding the attain
ment of these obligations; and asking if the tort remedy

of "remuneration" for accrued damages such as illiteracy,

16 83 Harv. L. Rev. 7-13 (1969).
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misplacement, and similar charges, is the proper remedy
the court should award if educational malpractice were

proven.?

According to Hogan, 18 a review of historical and
present court actions in education showed five stages:
1 .

First Period, prior to 185Q--Strict judicialla i zzez- f a ire
'
Education was seen as a purely local matter.

2.

Second Period, 1850-1950—"Stage of State
Control"
A body of case law developed at the State
level, which sanctioned educational policies
and practices regardless of little involve
ment of the U. S. Supreme Court.

3.

Third Period, 1 950-on--"Reformation Stage"
This stage is ongoing. Courts enter into
suits which bring policies and practices into
agreement with consitutional provisions.

4.

Fourth Period, parallel stage to the third
period—"Education under Court Supervision"
Federal courts have taken on the responsi
bility to make sure that "minimum reform
standards for school administrator and pro
grams are carried out.

5.

Fifth Period, 1973—"Strict Construction"
Initiated through the Supreme Court’s

J.J. Harris, III.
"Educational Malpractice and
Intentional Student Misrepresentation (April 1979)-"
Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American
Educational Research Association, San Francisco, CA
(April 8-12, 1979).
Daniel B.Hogan. A Review of Malpractice Suits in
the United States, Ballinger Pub. Co., Cambridge, MA,

1979.
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Rodriguez decision 19,20 (emphasis supplied).

Such analysis implied that courts would eagerly step
in and provide remedies tc cure ills within the American

school system, but this is not so.

The public school

system in the United States is a creature of the indi
vidual states.

Every state but Connecticut has a provi

sion in its constitution for establishing a public school
system.

A state legislature has a wide range of discre-

tion in determining the procedural and substantive struc-

ture of public education, including the financing of
schools, the curriculum, the qualifications required of

teachers and students, and the duties and compensation of

teachers as well as other school personnel. 21
Educational Malpractice

Richard Vacca in his unpublished paper, "Legal

Issues of the 1980s," notes that:

Ronald Campbell, Laverne Cunningham, Raphael
Nystrand and Michael Usdam. The Organization and Control
of American Schools.
Columbus, Ohio:
Charles E. Merrill
Publishing Company at 148 (1975).

20 Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School
District, 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex., 1971), revrd 441
U.S. 1,
1 , 93, S. Ct. 1278, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16 (1973).

Patricia Wright Morrison.
"The Right to
Education," 44 U. Cin. L. Rev. 800-806 (1975).
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Educational malpractice is considered an issue of
"quality of education" which has been addressed
by the courts, particularly in regard to possible
liability claims against the public school
districts for failure to adequately educate a
student (emphasis supplied).
The lawsuit approach to remedy educational malprac

tice is seen to be due increasingly to the demand for

accountability in the face of the growing problem of
"functional illiteracy."

Looking at the declining scores

on nationally standardized tests, it appears that an

ever-increasing number of students are learning less and
less.

It seems not to be a rarity for a student enrolled

in public school to move through the system (grades K-12)

without acquiring the necessary skills such as reading

and writing, which are essential for him to be integrated
into society’s socioeconomic process. 23

Due to the trend, quite extensive legal and general

literature on the subject of educational malpractice has

22 Richard Vacca.
"Legal Issues of the 1980s:
Student Competencies, Educational Malpractice, the
Implications of P. L. 94-132 in Education for the
Handicapped," unpublished paper presented at the Annual
Superintendents1 Conference, State of West Virginia,
Canaan Valley State Park (June 24, 1980).
23 Comment, "Educational Negligence:
A Student’s
Cause of Action for Incompetent Academic Instruction," 58
N.C.L. Rev. 561 (1980).
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emerged and is suggested reading.

24 General
Stull.
"Why Johnny Can’t Read His Own Diploma,”
10 Pac. L.J. 647 (1979).
The Big
Don Stewart. Educational Malpractice:_______
Gamble in our School, Westminster, CA, State Services

Publisher (1971).
"Suing for Not Learning," Time, March 3, 1975, at
73.
Teacher Can’t Teach,” Time, June 16,
"Help!
1980.
Remarks of Senator Proxmire, 124 Cong. Rec.
S14862, daily ed., September 11, 1978.
Change, "A Quest for Common Learning, it April
1981 .
Chronicle of Higher Education, Vol. XXII, No. 11,
"Doctrinaire Egalitarianism of the 1960s Has Weakened
Academia, Scholars Warn," May 4, 1981.
Chronicle of Higher Education, Vol. XXII, No. 10,
"Retrenchment in High School Lower Skills of Freshmen,
Ohio Commission Finds," April 27, 1981.
Chronicle of Higher Education, Vol. XXII, No. 2,
Schools of Education Tightening Programs in Response to
Attacks on Teacher Training," March 2, 1981.
0. Kramer.
The Negligent Doctor:
Medical
Malpractice In and Out of Hospitals and What Can be Done
About It.
New York:
Crown Publishers, Inc. (1968).
Pat Lynch.
Legal Implications of Models of
Individual and Group Treatment by Professonals, 9 No 1 pe
School Law J. 38 (1980).
Moskosvitz. Parental Rights and State Education,
50 Was. Law. Rev. 623 ( 1975).
Phi Delta Kappan, Vol. 62, No. 3, p. 193.
Petterson, A.
"Professional Malpractice: Small Cloub,
but Growing Bigger (November 1980).
Don Stewart. The Changing Role of the
Educator;
A Behavioral Learning Systems Approach to
Instruction.
Richard Vacca. "Legal Issues of the 1980s:
Student Competencies, Educational Malpractice, the
Implications of P.L. 94-142 on Education for the
Handicapped.
"Unpublished paper presented at the annual
Superintendents’ Conference, State of West Virginia,
Canaan Valley State Park (June 24, 1980).
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However, this mass of legal and general writings

Legal
Comment, "Educational Malpractice: When Can
Johnny Sue?" 7 Ford Urb. L.J. 117 (1979).
Comment, "Educational Malpractice, 124 U. Pa. L
Rev. 755 (1976).
Note, "Educational Malpractice: Can the
Judiciary Remedy the Growing Problem of Functional
Illiteracy?"
13 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 27 (1979).
Comment, "Educational Negligence:
A Student’s
58
Cause of Action for Incompetent Academic Instruction.
N.C.L. Rev. 561 (1980).
Comment, "Schools and School Districts:
Doe v.
San Francisco Unified School District; Tort Liability for
Failure to Educate." 6 Loyola U.L.J. 462, Chicago (1975).
Comment, "Damages Actions for Denial of Equal
Educational Opportunities." 45 Missouri L. Rev. 281
(1980).
Claque, "Competency Testing and Potential
28
Constitutional Challenges of ’ Everyday. Student.’"
Cath. U. Law Rev. 469 (1979).
Dugan, "Teacher’s Tort Liability.
11 Cleveland
Marshall L. Rev. 512, 520 (1962).
Elson, "A Common Law Remedy for the Educational
Harms Caused by Incompetent or Careless Teaching." 73
Northwestern U.S. Rev. 641 (1978).
Hagenau, "Penumbras of Care Beyond the
Schoolhouse Gate." 9 Journal of L. and Educ. 201 (1980).
Halligan, "The Function of Schools, the Status of
Teachers, and the Claims of the Handicapped: An Inquiry
into Special Education Malpractice." 45 Miss. L. Rev.
667 (1980).
Jorgenson, "Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School
District:
New York Chooses Not to Recognize ’Educational
Malpractice.’" 43 Albany L. Rev. 339 (1979).
Lynch "Legal Implications of Models of Individual
and Group Tretment by Professionals." 9 Nolpe School
L.J. 38 (1980).
Moskov itz, "Parental Rights and State Education."
50 Was. L. Rev. 623 (1975).
Nordin, "The Contract to Educate: Toward a More
workable Theory of the Student-University
Relationship." 8 College and University L. Journal. 141
( 1981-82) .
A New Cause of
Notes, "Educational Malfeasance:
14 Tulsa L. Journal. 383
Action for Failure to Educate?"
( 1978) .
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seems totally disproportionate, compared with the few
decided cases (ten total).

The other surprising fact is

that the commentary, with only very few exceptions, is

unanimously enthusiastic for asking the judiciary,
through educational malpractice actions, to solve the

problem of failure to educate.
The assumption is becoming prevalent that somehow
the concept of educational failure should be legally

compensable, much as is failure in the professions of
medicine and law.^5

The writers seem to maintain the

idea that educators have a legal obligation to carry out
their educational function in such a manner that the
respective student(s) retain a minimal level of compe

tency in the basic subjects of reading, writing, and
mathematics.

Thus far, commentators as well as counsel

have found it difficult to identify the source of that

Notes, "Educational Malpractice and Minimal
Competency Testing:
Is There a Legal Remedy at Last?"
15 New England L. Rev. 101 (1979).
Notes, "Implementation Problems in Institutional
Reform Litigation."
91 Harvard L. Rev. 428 (1977).
Notes, "The Right of Handicapped Children to an
Education:
The Phoenix of Rodriguez." 59 Cornell L.
Rev. 519 (1974).
Remz, "Legal Remedies for the Misclassification
or Wrongful Placement of Educationally Handicapped
Children."
14 Columbia Journal of Law and Social
Problems 339 (1979).

25 Wood, "Educational Malfeasance: A New Cause of
Action for Fairlure to Educate?
14 Tulsa L.J. 383
(1978) .
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obligation.

The claims that have reached the courts,

however, do not deal only with this area.

The cause of

action seems based on a much wider range of deficient
treatment, including social promotion, ° or a student not

being advanced to a leveljof competency that he would
have been able, to master.

Another cause of action is

based on misrepresentation of the student’s accomplishment to the parents or to the student himself. °

Even

though it is not yet established, educational malpractice

could be considered as being misfeasance, the improper
performance of the professional function; or nonfeasance,
the omission of an educational performance.

Note how-

ever, that the cases of Hoffman, Donohue, and Peter W.

were based on claims of acts of both commission and omission.
The elements of educational malpractice are also

26 A student is moved from one grade to another for
the sake of convenience, not because he has mastered the
subjects.
Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School
Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976).

27 Hoffman v. Bd. of Educ. 64 App. Div. 2d 369, 410
N.Y.S. 2d 99 (1978); rev’d 49 N.Y. 2d 121, 400 N.E. 2d
317, 414 N.Y.S. 2d 376 (1979).
28 Id.
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fraught with problems in establishing liability.29

One

must ask if a teacher/school district teaches the wrong

subject^O or if wrong or inappropriate pedagogy is
used.1

Thus, the real unanswered issues are whether a

school district teaches the wrong subjects (curriculum),
or whether a proper curriculum is taught by ineffective
or inappropriate means, or perhaps both, or perhaps other

combinations.

In fact, among other reasons, this very

ambiguous state regarding the proposed cause of action
renders educational malpractice suits ineffectual.

And then there is the question of who should be

sued.

Educational malpractice can be likened to medical

malpractice, an area to which reference is often made.
In medical malpractice suits, the individual physician is

named most of the time, although that does not necessarily preclude an action against a nurse and/or hospital

as well.

Even though individual teachers may have been

negligent, school districts and school officials are

29 Hoffman v. Board of Educ. 64 App. Div. 2d 369,
387-90, 410 N.Y.S. 2d 99, 118-19 (1978) (dissent by Judge
Damiani), Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 64
App. Div. 2d 29-40, 407 N.Y.S. 2d 874-80. Peter W. v.
San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 81424, 131 Cal. Rptr.

30 Comment, "Educational Malpractice," 124 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 755, 801-01 (1976).
31 Elson, supra, note 19, at 745-55*

I

32

usually named in educational malpractice suits, either
under the doctrine of respondeat superior or for improper

hiring.32

However, if for some reason, such as immunity from

liability,33 a school district could not be held liable,

32 Keeton, W. Page, Dan B. Dobbs, Robert E. Keeton,
Prosser and Keeton on The Law of
and David G. Owen, ____
Torts, 160-66 (5th ed., 1984).

33 Comment,
Comment, "Educational Malpractice,
Rev. 755-805 (1976).

124 U. Pa. L.

In the reported cases of educational malpractice,
governmental immunity was not an issue. It may be
assumed that immunity will not become a bar to ducational
malpractice suits. For further reading on the doctrine
of governmental immjunity in regard to education, see
alsoAnnot., 33 A.L.R. 3d 703 (1970).

See e.g. Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist., 55 Cal.
The
2d 211, 11 Cal. Rptr.
89, 359 P. 2d 457 (1961).
modern stance has been to abrogate governmental and
related immunities.
These usually were brought about by
legislation and, in some jurisdictions, made contingent
on available insurance. In some states, the doctrine of
governmental immunity has been abolished by the courts.

Note e.g. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308-20
(1975).
The United States Supreme Court has also
supported this trend through its decisions of rejection
of immunity for school officials when those had violated
the civil rights of student. The Court stated:

"(l)mmunity would not be justified since it would
not sufficiently increase the ability of school
right manner to warrant the absence of a remedy for
students subjected to intentional or otherwise
inexcusable deprivations."
Pipps in "The Tort Liability of the classroom
Teacher," 9 Akron L. Rev. 19-20 (1975) notes that there
are a very few states who statutorily made it possible to
bring direct actions against districts for damages caused

33

damages might then be awarded against the individual

teacher or teachers (a student meets a number of teachers
while passing through school) and questions that must be
answered are, who was negligent, when and how.

Of

course , suing a teacher would present a problem in that
teahcers could not afford to pay substantial amounts as

awards.

A byproduct of such suits could be a flood of

resignations or a marked drop in young people entering
the teaching profession.

It could also have an unpleas

ant tax effect if public school teachers would be compel-

led to carry malpractice insurance for which they would

be compensated by an increase in salary.

Nevertheless,

as the individual physician can be sued, so can a
teacher.3^

by their respective boards, officers, agents, teachers,
and employees.
Ohio Valley Contractors v. Board of Education of
Wetzel County, Joseph A. Baker & Associates, ETC 293 S.E.
2d 437.
West Virginia e.g. is one of the States where
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals rendered a
decision which established that:
"Local Boards in W.V.
do not have State constitutional immunity nor common law,
governmental immunity from suit." Therefore, school
districts and their administrative units can be sued
without being able to claim that particular protection.

34 Elson, "A Common Law Remedy for the Educational
Harms Caused by Incompetent or Careless Teaching." 73
N.U.L. Dev. 648-67 (1978).
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Medical Malpractice
Two large groups of factors are distinguishable in

medical malpractice.

This division is used also by the

courts:
1 .

The action is based solely upon an unsuccessful

diagnosis or treatment or bad results from a
diagnosis or treatment, and
2.

The action is based upon distinctive acts or

omissions by the physician.
Thus , misdiagnosis is a cause of a substantial number of

malpractice suits.

Such a diagnosis may involve the

f oilowing:

a)

The physician fails to discover a disease which
the patient has,

b)

The physician tells the patient he has a certain

disease but does not diagnose the real disease,
c)

The physician tells a patient who is free of
disease that he has a condition from which he

does not actually suffer,

d)

The physician administers the wrong medication
or fails to prescribe medication or other spec-

ific treatment, and

e)

The physician fails at any point in the medical

process, that is in diagnosis, prescription or

R
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treatment.

Even with failure at any point there

may be no malpractice if the physician applied
the best knowledge available and/or the pre
vailing standard of care.

The standard of care requires "the use of the same
degree of skill, care, and knowledge as would be used by

the average prudent physician with the same or
similartraining in the same or similar geographical
area. h35
The plaintiff is required to prove that standard and

the deviation from it.

He is also held to prove it

through expert testimony (which is difficult to do) .

The

defendant has the right and must be given the opportunity

to defend himself on the ground that he was not negli

gent .

If he so desires, he also can present an affirma

tive defense , which includes:

1 .

a defense that he had not been negligent, and

2.

a showing that the plaintiff caused the problem
himself.

It is general practice of the courts to not allow a
verdict without expert testimony to establish the stan-

dard of care and its breach, since the judges and juries
have no medical training and such findings require the

35 Alden v. Providence Hospital, 382 F. 2d 163,

1967.
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application of scientific knowledge and experience to

complicated and scientific facts.
On the other hand, courts have found that some areas
of negligence are so clear and understandable that a
layman can comprehend them without expert help.

In those

cases, the doctrine of res ispa loquitur is applicable.
Black's Law Dictionary^ defines the doctrine of res

ipsa loquitur as follows:
The thing speaks for itself. Rebuttable presump
tion or inference that defendant was negligent,
which arises upon proof that the cause of the
injury was in defendant's exclusive control, and
that the accident was one which ordinarily does
not happen in absence of negiligence.
Res ipsa loquitur is the rule of evidence wherby

negligence of an alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from

the mere fact that the incident happened, provided that
he character of the incident and the circumstances at-

tending it lead reasonably to belief that in the absence

of negligence it would not have occurred and that the
thing which caused the injury is shown to have been under

the management and control of the alleged wrongdoer.^7
Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the hap

pening of an injury permits an inference of negligence in

36 Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.,

1979).

37 Hillen v. Hooker Const. Col, Tex. Cir. App.,484
S.W. 2d 113, 115.
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which the plaintiff produces substantial evidence that
the injury was caused by an agency or person under exclu-

sive control and management of the defendant, and that

the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of
things,

it would not have happened if reasonable care had

been used.33

In other words, this doctrine may be used

in malpractice suits and is acceptable to the courts if
the factor that caused the injury was under the sole

control and management of the defendant and if the act

would not have happened if the person or persons in con-

trol of that factor would have used proper care.

In such

a situation, if the defendant cannot rebut the allega-

tions, courts find that the injury was caused by a "lack

of care. h39
Note , however, that mere unsuccessful treatment or

mere termination of treatment with poor or negative out-

comes does not invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

It is generally and universally recognized that a poor
outcome does not raise a presumption•or inference of

negligence.

Such outcomes could, and often do, have

various causes outside of any negligent behavior.
a poor outcome,

in itself, does not establish evidence of

38 Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed.,

1979) .

35 "Medical Malpractice,’’ 162 A.L. Rev. 805.
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a negligent action or acts.

Nevertheless, in certain

recurring and common situations, some courts have applied

the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur with respect to spec
ific negligent acts or omissions.
In medicine, the doctrine is applied in situations

where an injury occurs which would not have occurred if

proper, skillful care and treatment had been applied.1***
In Quinley, the court made the following statement:

While the authorities are in conflict,-we think
the cases generally hold that res ipsa loquitur
applied where, during the performance of surgical
or other skilled operations, an ulterior act or
omission occurs, the judgment of which does not
require scientific opinion to throw light upon
the subject; while it would not apply in cases
involving the diagnosis and scientific
treatment.242
In summary, when res ipsa loquitur is used, the

jury usually infers negligence from the circumstances.

It may also raise the preseumption of negligence; that
is, the jury must find for the plaintiff, unless the

defendant is able to show causes for the injury other

than negligence.^3

no

Mitchell v. Saunders,

41 Calhoun v. Fraser,

13 S.E. 2d 242 (1941).

126 S.W. 2d 381 ( 1938) .

42 Quinley v. Cocke, 192 S.W. 2d 992 ( 1946) .
^3 Carruthers v. Phillips, 131 P. 2d 193 (1942) as
cited in Holden Rodders, Medical Malpractice Law, N.Y.
(2d ed., 1918) .
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In regard to malpractice the rule of respondeat

superior is also sometimes a consideration.
Dictionary states it as follows:

answer.”

Black’s Law

’’Let the master

This means that a master is liable in certain

cases for the wrongful acts of his servant, and a principal for those of his agent.

This liability is basically

an exception to the general law of negligence.

It iro

poses responsibility on a person who may not have been
present at the actual scene or participated in causing
the injury.
This respondeat superior rule would be applicable in

any situation where a master-servant relationship has

been established through:
1 .

Selection and engagement of a servant,

2.

Payment of wages,

3.

Power of dismissal, and

4.

Control over a servant’s conduct and performance.

In Wheatley, the court defined malpractice as fol
lows:

’’Malpractice may consist of lack of skill and care

in diagnosis as well as in treatment.

„44

The cases

indicate that due care in regard to examinations and

44 Wheatley v. Heideman, 102 N.W. 2d 343 (I960) .
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diagnosis requires more than just a superficial, cursory
examination .

As far as tests are involved in the diagnostic pro-

cess, the general rule is that failure to utilize the
appropriate tests on which a correct diagnosis would
depend may be considered negligent as well.

However,

liability would not be incurred, as long as the physician
made the diagnosis in good faith; that is, he made it on

the basis of all available and reasonable facts, even
u
•
when
in
error. 46u

The basic argument of the proponents of educational

malpractice is that since malpractice in other profes
sions , such as medicine, is legally compensable, educa-

tional malpractice should be treated no differently. The

assumption is that the educator has a duty (obligation)
to carry out specific academic instruction, resulting in
the .student’s achieving a certain basic -competency in the

respective disciplines.

Yet, the difficulty counsel is

struggling with is to establish the source out of which
such an obligation would come.
Claims of educational malpractice, based on the

reported cases, show that the causes of action are di-

45 Hicks v. United States, 368 F. 2d 626 (1966).

^Pugh v. Swiontec, 253 N.E. 2d 3 ( 1969) .
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verse.

In some instances, the allegation was that it was

educational malpractice to fail to advance a student to a
level of instruction which he could have comprehended
and mastered. 47'

In other cases, educational malpractice was seen as

promoting a student from grade to grade until he grad.uated, allowing said student to graduate although he had

not mastered such basic academic skills as reading,

writing, and mathematics, which is called "social promo
tion. m48
The fundamental question is, whether the essence of

educational malpractice rests on an act of "misfeasance,"
improper or negligent performance of the assigned educa-

tional function; or on an act of "nonf easance, the omission of certain acts or performances within the educa-

tional function.

However, it can be both; a single act

may constitute a misfeasance and a nonfeasance at the
. •
497
same time.
Other problems as already mentioned regarding educa

tional malpractice suits are found in defining or deline-

47 See note 27 supra.
48 Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist.,
60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976).

49 Comment, "Educational Malpractice:
Johnny Sue?” 7 Ford Urb. L.J. 117-19.

When Can
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ating the elements of educational malpractice.

For in-

stance , it is sometimes alleged that schools are teaching
the wrong subjects,50 or that the school adopted the
wrong pedagogical strategies, even though it adhered to a

proper curriculum.

And, of course, it is absolutely

possible that both instances may apply at the same
t ime.1
This amorphous and ambiguous nature of the proposed

cause of action is an argument the courts note and one

which prevents recognition by the courts. 52

So far, the

courts have been extremely reluctant to recognize "a
cause of action" for educational malpractice, since they
do not recognize a "legal duty" for public policy rea-

sons .

That is, there has been no recognized standard of

good educational practice analogous to "good medical

practice" or "good legal practice."

There is also some

judicial language expressing apprehension that such re

cognition would bring a flood of litigation and that the
awarding of damages might stress the financial situation

of the school districts and society to an unacceptable

50 Comment, "Educational Malpractice," 124 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 755-8-2 (1976).

51 Elson, "A Common Law Remedy for the Educational
Harms Caused by Incompetent or Careless Teaching," 73
N.W.U.L. Rev. 746-54 (1978).
52 See notes 43 and 47 supra.
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level, probably to the point of hampering the execution

of their duties.

And last but not least, the courts have

expressed the opinion that they are not the proper forum
for testing and evaluating school programs and educa

tional methods and theories or for deciding which ones
would be the best, most effective and appropriate.^3
Theories and Elements as Presented by the Cases

So far, counsel and proponents of educational malpractice are still searching for workable theories of

recovery.

The most prevalent theories are ’’negligence”

and ’’misrepresentation.”
The failure to educate, either through misfeasance

(improper performance) or nonfeasance (lack of performance), constitutes some form of professional negligence

which would be compensable under traditional tort principles .

The theory of negligent or intentional misrepre-

sentation is more promising, however.

One could argue

that if a student’s achievements are inaccurately repre-

sented, he could suffer damages and the school district

53 "Educational Malpractice,124 U. Pa. L. Rev. 782
(1976); Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist.,
60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976); Donohue
v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47 N.Y. 2d 440, 391
N.E. 2d 1352, 418 N.Y. 2d 375 (1979), aff’g 64 App. Div.
2d 29, 407 N.Y.S. 2d 874 (1978), affTg 95 Misc. 2d 1, 408
N.Y.S. 2d 584 ( 1977); Hoffman v. Board of Educ. , 64 App.
Div. 2d 369, 410 N.Y.S. 2d 99 (1978), rev!d 49 N.Y. 2d
121, 400 N.E. 2d 317, 424 N.Y.S. 2d 376 (1979).
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and/or the respective teacher(s) should be liable. 54

Attempts have been made to argue that schools are
comparable to mental hospitals, because the students are

involuntarily confined to a classroom setting and thus,
if they do not receive proper instruction (resp. treatment), their confinement represents an unconstitutional

deprivation of liberty without due process of law.55
A contract-based theory has also been argued, al
leging that a contract exists either between the student -

and the school, or between the school and the taxpayer

with the student becoming a third party beneficiary.56

It must be emphasized that, as of today, the courts
have not generally recognized any of the alleged causes

of action for various' reasons, the exceptions are found
in a passing remark in Hunter 57 where the Court of

Appeals of Maryland stated that a claim can be brought

5^ Elson, note 51 supra at 693-768. Comment,
"Educational Negligence: A Student’s Cause of Action for
Incompetent Academic Instruction, 58 N.C.L. rev. 561
(1980).

55 ’’Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist.:
N.Y. Chooses not to Recognize ’Education Malpractice.’
43 Neb. L. Rev. 339-59 (1979).
Note, ’’Educational Malfeasance: A New Cause of
14 Tulsa L.J. 383-401
Action for Failure to Educate?”
( 1978) .

57 Hunter v. Board of Education of Montgomery
County, MD et al 439 A. 2d 583, Court of Appeals of
Maryland ( 1982) .
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against an elementary school principal and a teacher for

intentional and malicious misplacement of a child, and

relief can be claimed.

The Court stated, however, that

it was in agreement with the cases of Donahue,5$ Peter

W. 59 and Hoffman^O that public policy considerations
generally preclude liability, but distinguished the
Hunter case as being an alleged willful, malicious and

outrageous conduct by the educational system.
Hoffman,&

In

the court noted that the case, although not so

stated, sounded in educational malpractice; but that the

public policy considerations in the Donohue case applied

in the Hoffman case to educational malpractice actions—
based on allegations of educational misfeasance or non
feasance—were equally applicable here.
It may be reasonable to suggest that a more persua

sive stance to take would be a theory analogous to "prod
ucts liability."

Here, due to societal demands and

58 47 N.Y. 2d 440, 391 N.E. 2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S. 2d
375 (1979), aff'g 64 App. Div. 2d 29, 407 N.Y.S. 2d 874
(1978), aff'g 95 Miso. 2d 1, 408 N.Y.S. 2d 584 (1977).
(For a brief of the case see Appendix page 000).
59 Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School
District, 131 Ca. Rpt. 854, Court of Appeals, First
District, Division 4 (1976).

6° Hoffman v. Board of Education of City of New
York, 49 N.Y. 2d 121, 424 N.Y. S. 2d 376, 400 N.E. 2d
317, 320 (1979).

61 Id.
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emerging needs, the courts have in the past been willing
to fashion a new "cause of action.”

It started out with

a number of theories such as negligence, misrepresen-

tation fraud, etc.

But today, the products liability

cause of action is established and accepted univer

sally . 62
This theory is an example of the evolutionary nature
of the law of torts.

The theory, however, does not offer

any guidelines as to how, when, where, and who, and some
people may argue that its value to the topic at hand is
However , never before have educational institu-

minimal.

tions been under attack as they currently are because of

their defective output in the academic area.
One can argue reasonably easily that this is as

severe a situation as the situation which existed prior
to product liability.

Education is a monopoly public

service and has a definable product (an educated grad-

uate) .

It is present judgment that our modern society

with universal outreach and involvement is more than ever
dependent on well-functioning and contributing citizens
because of the greater demands of a technologically

oriented,

increasingly competitive world.

62 Keeton, W. Page, Dan B. Dobbs, Robert E. Keeton,
prosser and Keeton on The Law of
and David G. Owen, ___________
Torts, 160-66 (5th ed., 1984).
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Robins,

in chapters on Socialization, Personality,

and Special Development in the Handbook of Child

Psychology states clearly that ’’adult antisocial behavior
virtually requires childhood antisocial behavior.

It is noteworthy to consider that a teacher’s lack
of ability to perform may perpetuate antisocial behavior
in young people, which in turns burdens society as a

whole.
As already mentioned, the courts consi.stently have
been reluctant to recognize a cause of action for educa-

tional malpractice, regardless of which theory was the

basis for the respective claims.
In the case of Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified
School District,

one of the ma jor ,v most widely publi-

cized cases involving nonlearning, the court held that a

public school district could not be held liable for educational malpractice.

The case was dismissed by the

California Appellate Court (affr. the trial court’s
decision) .

Peter W. had attended elementary and secondary

schools of the San Francisco Unified School District in

63 Robins, Handbook of Child Psychology, Vol. IV,
4th Ed., H. Mussen, ed., John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New
York, 1983, p. 822.
64 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr., 854 (1976).
(For a brief of the case, see Appendix page 191).
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California.

When he graduated form high school he was

unable to read beyond the eighth grade level.

In his

lawsuit, he alleged that the school district and its
teachers had negligently failed to provide him with ade

quate instruction, guidance, supervision, and counseling
in basic academic skills, such as reading and writing.
He further claimed that his teachers, despite his lack of

ability in reading and writing, had promoted him from one
grade level to another, full well knowing that he lacked

the necessary and required skills to do so.

Despite his

teachers’ knowledge, he was allowed to graduate from high

school.

Accordingly, Peter W., the plaintiff, claimed

that he had suffered a ’’permanent disability" which pre

vented his entering gainful and meaningful employment.
He sought to recover damages for this permanent injury.
The court ruled that the plaintiff had failed to

state a cause of action in tort against the authorities

in charge of the respective public school systems that
had inadequately educated the student.

The court stated

further that these officials had no duty of care upon
which to base a cause of action for negligence, that they

were not liable by reason of statute and that the facts
did not support a cause of action for either negligence
or intentional misrepresentation.

■
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Regarding the negligence causes of actions based on
an alleged breach of a duty to adequately educate, the

court reasoned:
that it did not conceive at present the workability

of a rule of care against which the officials’
alleged wrong conduct might be measured.

that no reasonable degree of certainty was shown by
which it could be found that the student suffered an
injury within the meaning of the law of neglignce.
that also no perceptible connections could be estab

lished between the educational institution’s conduct
in this case and the injuries suffered as alleged

which would establish a causal link between the two

within the meaning of the law of negligence.
The court continued to say that recognized public

policy considerations alone negated any actionable
’’duty of care” in persons and agencies who are ad-

ministering the academic phase of the public educational process, and added:
If such persons and agencies would be held to an
actionable duty of care in the discharge of their
academic functions, numerous real or imagined
tort claims would arise; the consequences would
be that public monies and time as well as per
sonal consequences would burden them and society
beyond any calculation.

The plaintiff’s claim based on a statutory educa
tion code enactment providing for protection
against the risk of a specific injury for which
the public entity is liable, if caused by its

50

failure to discharge the duty, was answered by
the court saying that some enactments were not
designed to protect against the risk of a par
ticular kind of injury but, rather, were provi
sions directed to the attainment of the benefit
of optimum educational results. For that reason,
a violation would not create a liability under
such a statute.
The claim of intentional and/or negligent misrepresentation was denied as well, since according to the

court no facts were found showing the requisite
element of reliance upon the misrepresentation asserted. 6 AJ
Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District 66 was

a case in which the plaintiff, Edward Donohue, sued his
school district for alleged educational malpractice and a

negligent breach of a constitutionally imposed duty to
educate , claiming that although he had received a certificate of graduation from high school, he lacked the
rudimentary skills to comprehend written English to such
a degree that he could not fill out an application for

gainful employment.

He sought damages for knowledge

deficiency allegedly resulting from a failure by the

defendant school district to perform its duties and obli
gations to educate.

65 Id.

66 See note 58 supra.
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The court responded to the claims, saying that there

were:
1 .

no cause of action for educational malpractice,
and

2.

no cause for a negligent breach of a constitu
tionally imposed duty to educate.

Further, even though a section of the respective
state constitution commands that the legislature provide

for the maintenance and support of a system of free and

common schools wherein all children may be educated, the
court stated that even a terse reading of this provision

demonstrated that the obligations of maintaining and
supporting a system of public schools did not also impose

a duty upon a local school district to ensure that each
student received a minimum level of education.

The court

conceded that the breach of such a contract would entitle
a student to compensatory damages, and continued to say
that within the structures of a traditional negligence or

malpractice action, a complaint of educational malpractice might be formally pleaded; but that the heart of the

matter was whether, assuming such a cause of action might
be stated, the courts should entertain such a claim as a

matter of public policy.
The court concluded that such a claim should not be

entertained, because recognizing such a claim would require the courts to (1) enter into judgments of the

li
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validity of broad educational policies, and (2) sit in
review of the day-to-day implementation of these poli
cies.

The court viewed this as a blatant interference

with the responsibilities of the administration of a

public school system—responsibilities which were expressly lodged with that very system by the state consti

tution and statute.

The court’s directive was that

plaintiffs in this type of-suit should take advantage of

administrative processes provided by statute and enlist
the aid of the commission on education to ensure that

such students received a proper education.
In Pietro v. St. Joseph’s School^? the court also

held that no cause of action existed for educational

malpractice against a private school, but did recognize
that a parent may be entitled to recover tuition if an

express agreement had been entered between the parent and

a school, such as, e.g., the school contracting that the
student would reach a certain proficiency after completing specific studies.

The major claims made by plaintiffs are found in the
following two of the three leading cases in the area of
education malpractice.

67 48 U.S.L.W. 2229 (1979).
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In Donohue^ and Peter W. , ^9 the plaintiffs claimed

that the respective schools their children attended had a
duty to educate their children and therefore were ac
countable for the results, as measured by the students’

actual achievements, or lack thereof.
termed ’’non-feasance” cases.

Both cases can be

In other words, the plain

tiffs maintained that the school districts had breached
their legal duty to educate by failing to do what their
duty required, thereby producing nonfunctioning,

illit

erate high school graduates unable to lead productive and

useful lives in the community, as it was contemplated

they could do had the duty been performed.

Each alleged

that there was a presumptive causal relation between
their child’s illiterate condition and the respective

school district’s negligent administration and per-

formance of teaching and conveying academic knowledge.
Analysis of -Cases

Peter W. sought general damage for the injury suffered as well as special damages for tutoring services.

The plaintiff charged that the .school district’s negli-

gence or misrepresentation resulted in his apparent
injury.

However, the court stated that the school dis-

68 See note 55 supra at 1352-55.

69 See note 54 supra at 856.
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trict owed no duty of care toward the plaintiff-student.
Since this conclusion negated any negligence action,

other negligence issues were not addressed.

In its opin-

ion, however, the court indicated that it doubted if a

workable standard of care could ever be established in
regard to educational malpractice.

It questioned that

the plaintiff had ever suffered an injury within the

meaning of tort law and stated that a sufficient causal
link (nexus) was missing between the injury claimed and

the school district’s negligence.? 1
In discussing the legal question of an existing duty
of care owed to the plaintiff-student, the court linked

the duty with its deliberations and considerations of
issues of public policy:
(l)t should be recognized that "duty” is not
sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of
the sum total of those considerations of policy
which lead the law to say that the pp^jjt icular
plaintiff is entitled to protection.

Thus, the court made the establishment of a duty of
care dependent upon public policy considerations.

The

Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist.,
131 Cal. Rptr. at 860.

71 Id. at 861.

72Id., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
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court cited Rowland v. Christian,73 which supported its

stance. Rowland says that the fundamental principle of

tort liability requires all persons to use ’’ordinary
care ” to prevent injury to others through their conduct,
but there is an equally fundamental exception, stated as
being

H

except where a deviation” was clearly supported by

public policy.

Reasoning from these citations of prior authority,

the Peter W. court spelled out the public policy factors
it considered pertinent to the determination of a duty of

care .

The sociability of the activity out of which
the injury arises, compared with the risks
involved in its conduct;
the kind of person with whom the act is
dealing;
the workability of a rule of care, especially
in terms of the parties’ relative ability to
adopt practical means of preventing injury;

the relative ability of the parties to bear
the financial burden of injury and the avail
ability of means by which the loss may be
shifted or spread;
the body of statutes and judicial precedents
which color the parties’ relationship;
the prophylactic effect of a rule of lia
bility;

73 69 Cal. 2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 2d 561
( 1968) .
74 Id., 443 P. 2d at 564.
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in the case of a public agency defendant, the
extent of its powers, the role imposed upon it
by law and the limitations imposed upon it by
budget;
and, finally, the moral imperatives which
judges share with their fellow citizens—such
are the factors which play a role in the
determination of duty.

According to this court, the issue of whether a
respective defendant owes the requisite "duty of care” in
a given situation presents a "question of law" and therefore will be determined by the courts alone. 76

Furthermore, the court umistakably stated that the very
basis out of which such suits emerged spoke against sustaining them, and to hold school districts, administra-

tors, and teachers responsible to an "actionable duty of

care" regarding the performance and execution of their
academic resposibilities, would bring about "burdened
public schools and society beyond calculation."

The

court continued:

Rightly or wrongly, but widely, they are charged
with outright failure in the achievement of their
educational objectives; according to some
critics, they bear responsibility for many of the
social and moral problems of our society at
large.

Their public plight in these respects is attested
in the daily media, in bitter governing board

75 131 Cal. Rptr. at 858-59.
76 131 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
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elections, in wholesale rejections of school bond
proposals, and in survey upon survey. To hold
them to an actionable ’duty of care’ in the dis
charge of their academic functions, would expose
them to the tort claims--real or imagined—of
disaffected students and parents in countless
numbers. They are already beset by social and
financial problems which have gone to major liti
gations, but for which no permanent solution has
yet appeared. . . . The ultimate consequences in
terms of public time and money would burden them—
and society—beyond calculation.''

Thus the court in Peter W. was adamant in saying

that a cause of action for educational malpractice would
be disastrous to the schools and to society as a whole

and therefore should not be recognized.

The court also

touched on the evolutionary character of tort law and
noted that from time to time additional areas of lia-

bility had been accepted (see development of products
liability in The Law of Torts78) .

However, the court

also cautioned that certain conditions had been present

in these areas to justify the sanction of these new
torts:
the wrongs and injuries involved were both com
prehensible and assessable within the existing
judicial framework. . . . This is simply not true
of wrongful conduct and injuries allegedly
involved in educational malfeasance. Unlike the
activity of the highway or the marketplace,
classroom methodology affords no readily accept
able standards of care, or cause, or injury. The
science of pedagogy itself is fraught with

77 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
78 See note 62 supra, at 640-82.
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different and conflicting theories of how or what
a child should be taught, and any layman might—
commonly does--have his own emphatic views on the
subject.

The "injury" claimed here is the plaintiff’s
inability to read and write. Substantive pro
fessional authority attests that the achievement
of literacy in the schools, or its failure, are
influenced by a host of factors which affect the
pupil subjectively, from outside the formal
teaching process, and beyond the control of its
ministers. They may be physical, neurological,
emotional, cultural, environmental; they may be
present but not perceived, recognized but not
identified.'

In regard to the cause of action on misrepresen-

tation, the court held that the claim of negligent mis
representation was immaterial based on the former
findings rejecting the negligence cause of action.^0

Intentional misrepresentation was insufficient as a cause

of action, the court held, since it did not disclose any
facts showing the "requisite element" of reliance upon
it.81

But, public policy still was the central theme of

the court’s findings.

79 id., at 860-61.
Id., Footnote 6—From among innumerable
authorities to these effects, defendants cite Gagne, The
Conditions of Learning, Holt, Rinehard & Winston (1965);
Schubert andd Fdi^ciouii,
Fargerson Improving the Reading Programs,
Company ( 1 968); Flesch, Why Johnny Can’t
William C. Brach
1
Read, Harper (1965).

80 Id., at 862.
81 Id., at 863.
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’’Public policy” considerations were emphasized even
more and relied upon in the case of Donohue v. Copiague
Union Free School District.

The New York Court of

Appeals saw the possibility that ’’within the structures

of a traditional negligence or malpractice action, a
complaint sounding in ’educational malpractice’ might be

formally pleaded."^3

The court accepted a legal duty

inherent in the educator, if educators were viewed as
professionals, and conceded that a proximate cause could
be established with a judicially recognizable injury.

Halligan, however, maintains that teachers are not pro
fessionals, because he says they must teach subjects and

use methods and materials by requirement, not by their
,
•
84
own design.

Yet, although teachers may teach partially

by requirements, they also teach by their own design in
terms of teaching methods and various approaches to

teaching.

However, the court also noted emphatically that even
if such a cause of action could and would be legally
framed,

it should be rejected on the basis of public

82 See note 58 supra.
83 391 N.E. 2d at 1353-

T. Halligan, "The Function of Schools, the .Status
of Teacher, and the Claims of the Handicapped: An
Inquiry into Special Education Malpractice," 45 Misc. L.
J. 667 (1980).
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policy considerations alone.

The court reiterated that

the undue burden this would place on the courts and their

lack of expertise in educational policy matters would be
enough of a deterrent to entertaining educational mal

practice suits.

However, this reasoning seems insup-

portable for the reason that courts decide many medical

malpractice cases without having expertise in medicine.
In medical malpractice cases, the profession itself pro
vides the standard through expert testimony defining the

standard, how it was breached and how it caused the sub

ject harm.

On the other hand, the teaching profession

has no such standard, and the court in Peter W. empha-

sized this clearly in its opinion:

Unlike the activity of the highway or the market
place, classroom methodology affords no readily
acceptable standards of care, or cause, or
injury.
The science of pedagogy itself is
fraught with different and conflicting theories
of how or what a child should be taught, and any
layman might—commonly does--have his own em
phatic views on the subject.

It is obvious that the courts are shying away from the
issue of educational malpractice due to the lack of a

standard and the far-reaching consequences a positive
decision for the plaintiff would have.

Yet, the court suggested that students and their
parents could and should use the available "administra-

85 See note 77 supra.

$
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tive procedures to enlist support and/or aid of the State

Commissioner of Education,” and also to search for a
’’standard of professional care, because of the adminis

trative law doctrine of primary jurisdication, to estab

lish their educational rights and to remedy the suffered
wrongs . „86

With that, the New York Court of Appeals

summarily dismissed the plaintiff’s claim of a constitu

tionally created duty to educate.
However it is important to mention the dissenting
opinion in the Donohue case, written by Justice Suozzi.
The opinion is significant and has great depth.

He com

mented that the complaint clearly states a valid cause of
action.

Justice Suozzi noted that the reasons for the

plaintiff not achieving a basic level of literacy were
truly a question of fact to be resolved at a trial.

He

termed as unpersuasive the feared flood of litigation and

the problem of framing an appropriate measure of damages.
He continued that the complaint was not based solely on

educationl malpractice but that the plaintiff also failed
various subjects, that the defendant knew about this

fact, and that the defendant failed 'in its duty to ascertain the causes of these failures.

86 N.E. 2d at 1354-55.

87 Id., 391 N.E. 2d 1352.

Relying on a then-
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existing statute mandating a board of education of each

school district to use suitable examinations to ascertain
the physical, mental, and social causes of underachieve-

ment, Justice Suozzi found a true statutory duty, which
flowed from the defendant to the plaintiff, and which the

defendant obviously violated.

Justice Suozzi summarized

his opinion as follows:
In my view, the negligence alleged in the case at
bar is not unlike that of a doctor who, although
confronted with a patient with a cancerous condi
tion, fails to pursue medically accepted pro
cedures to (1) diagnose the specific condition,
and (2) treat the condition, and instead allows
the patient to suffer the invevitable conse
quences of the disease. Such medical malpractice
would never be tolerated. At the very least, a
complaint alleging same would not be dismissed
upon motion. In the case at bar, the plaintiff
displayed, through his failing grades, a serious
condition with respect to his ability to earn.
Although mindful of this learning disability, the
school authorities made no attempt, as they were
required to do, by appropriate and educationally
accepted testing procedures, to diagnose the
nature and extent of his learning problem and
thereafter to take or recommend remedial measures
to deal with this problem. Instead, the plain
tiff was just pushed through the educational
system without any attempt made to help him.
Under these circumstances, the cause of action at
bar is no different from the analogous cause of
action for medical malpractice and like the lat
ter, is sufficient to withstand a motion to dis
miss .

Finally, it should be noted that even in Peter W.
v. San Francisco Unified School District, 60 Ca.
App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, supra, the Cali
fornia appellate court recognized that a cause of
action for intentional and fraudulent misrepre
sentation, if properly pleaded, could withstand a
motion to dismiss. Accordingly, even though the
majority has chosen to affirm the dismissal of

1
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the complaint, the affirmance should be without
prejudice to replead a cause of action for inten
tional misrepresentation.
For the reasons heretofore set forth, I dissent
and vote to deny that branch of the defendant’s
motion which sought to dismiss the complaint for
failure to state a cause of action. It should be
noted that the defendant also moved to dismiss
the complaint based upon the plaintiff’s failure
to file a timely notice of claim pursuant to
section 3813 of the Education Law. Since the
Special Term dismissed the complaint for failure
to state a cause of action, it did not deal at
all with the second branch of the defendant’s
motion, i.e., the plaintiff’s failure to serve a
timely notice of claim. Accordingly, I would
remandoto Special Term for determination of that
issue.°

The most extreme statement of reluctance to recognize a cause of action in educational malpractice is

illustrated in the case of Hoffman v. Board of
Education.^9

This case followed the Donohue case within

about six months.

It was an arguably distinguishable

case, one in which there had been a monetary award for

damages suffered due to nonfeasance, but which, neverthe
less , the New York Court of Appeals reversed.^

Daniel Hoffman, who had once spoken clearly, lost

88 47 N.Y. 2d 440, 391 N.E. 2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S. 2d
375 (1979), aff'g 64 App. Div. 2d 29, 407 N.Y.S. 2d 874
(1978), aff'g 95 Misc. 2d 1, 408 N.Y.S. 2d 584 (1977).
89 64 App. Div. 2d 369, 410 N.Y.S. 2d 99 (1978), 49
N.Y. 2d 121, 400 N.E. 2d 317, 424 N.Y.S. 2d 376 (1979).

90 Hoffman v. Board of Educaton, 49 N.Y. 2d 121, 400
N.E. 2d 317, 424 N.Y.S. 2d 376.
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his father when he was about age two.

After the death of

his father, Daniel ceased speaking and when he began to

speak again, he had developed a serious speech defect of
probable psychosomatic origin.

Daniel was enrolled in

kindergarten in the fall of 1956 in the New York City

school system.

He was tested by a clinical psychologist.

On his intelligence quotient test Daniel scored 74, while
75 had been established by the New York City Board of

Education as the cutoff point distinguishing children of
normal intelligence from retarded children.

On the basis

of this test, Daniel was placed in a class for children
of retarded mental development.

It is noteworthy that the examining clinical psy

chologist was uncertain of his findings and qualified his
report by stating two conditions to be followed by the

school.

He said that Daniel should (1) receive speech

therapy, and (2) be reevaluated within bwo years in order
to obtain a more accurate reading of his intellectual
capacity and abilities. 91
ever took place.

However, no such retesting

The plaintiff, Daniel, remained in

classes with mentally retarded children until he was
graduated at the end of the twelfth grade; he was by then

seventeen years old.
He was transferred to a Pace-Center at his mother’s

91 See note 89 supra.
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request and received a second IQ test.
reached 94 •

His overall score

Because he was not retarded, he was exluded

from that facility, where he was supposed to receive
vocational training.

The plaintiff and his mother were

informed that he was unqualified since he showed normal
intelligence .

The plaintiff, according to his mother,

was unable to work and earn money.
hold a job as a delivery boy.

He could not even

His mother related that he

was depressed, sitting most of the time in his room be
hind closed doors.
The plaintiff then brought an action against the New

York Board of Education, claiming negligence because it

had failed to follow the clinical psychologist’s recommendation to retest him.

He therefore was misclassified

and misplaced in a class for mentally retarded children.

He further claimed that severe emotional and intellectual

injury had taken place.

And finally, the plaintiff

claimed that all this had diminished his ability to ob

tain employment.

The jury at the trial court awarded him $750,000 in
damages.

The defendants appealed and a closely divided

appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision of

liability, but reduced the amount of damages to
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$500,000.92

The majority's opinion rested on the fact

that the board of education's failure to follow its psy
chologist's recommendation and retest the plaintiff represented an "affirmative act of negligence" and thus was

actionable.
However, the New York Court of Appeals reversed both
the liability and the damage award decisions made by the
lower court.93

The courts' votes show the complexity of

the Hoffman case as compared with the Donohue case:

Case

Intermediate
Appellate Court

Court of
Appeals

Donohue

Virtual
unanimity

V irtual
unanimity

Hoffman

3:2
Liable (aff.)

4:3
Reversal

Thus, one may be inclined to think that the court's
stance regarding educational malpractice is a strong one,

92 Hoffman v. Board of Education, 64 App. Div. 2d
369, 410 N.Y.S. 2d 99 (1978).
93 Hoffman v. Board of Education, 49 N.Y. 2d 121,
400 N.E. 2d 317, 424 N.Y.S. 2d 376 ( 1979) .
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although Hoffman might be looked upon as distinguished.
However, even though Hoffman can be seen as a case of
nonfeasance as compared to a charge of misfeasance, the

distinguishing factors do not seem very significant.
Nonfeasance is the omission of a required act, while

misfeasance is the improper execution of an act required

in performing one's professional duties.

A single act

can represent both a misfeasance and a nonfeasance at the

same time.

Therefore, to distinguish Hoffman to the

point of saying that the case does not fall under educa

tional malpractice may seem like splitting hairs.
In Donohue and Peter W., the boards of education had

failed to take steps to detect and correct their academic

deficiencies .

In Hoffman, the board of education failed

to follow its rules of retesting based on its own psy-

chologist’s recommendation, which in turn was nothing
more than to establish the plaintiff’s academic ability.
In so doing, the board committed affirmative acts of
negligence.

On the other hand, in Donohue and Peter W.,

a legal duty of care claim could not be so easily supported, since a teacher (professional) must be allowed

some descretion in choosing pedagogical theory and strat-

egies to use in the classroom.

Hoffman , however, was definitely a nonfeasance,
which burdened and neglected the plaintiff to such a

r
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degree that he could not lead a productive and happy life

after the error was discovered twelve years later.

Here,

it would seem a clear duty could be established, a breach
thereof had taken place, and his quite obvious injury had
been caused by the neglectful action.

Not even remedial

training would be helpful to the plaintiff at that point.

In order to undo some of the damage resulting from the
committed nonfeasance by the school authorities, a longrange counseling and therapeutic program would be neces
sary and even then the outcome would be unpredictable.^

But even such a strong basis for an educational

malpractice claim did not convince the court.

Thus, the •

New York Court of Appeals, relying heavily on Donohue,
dismissed Hoffman for failure to state a cause of action,

noting that even though a cause of action for educational
malpractice could be quite possible and cognizable under

traditional notions of tort law, it nevertheless should

not be recognized as a matter of public policy. 95
Until now, there have been ten cases, three of which

9^ Diamond, "Education Law," 29 Syracuse L. Rev.
103, 79-160 (1978).
95 See note 90 supra at 376-79.
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are unreported educational malpractice decisions.^6

In all of these cases the courts ruled that educational
malpractice should not be recognized on grounds of public

96 Reported decisions:
Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47
N.Y. 2d 440, 391 N.E. 2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S. 2d 375 <1979),
aff'g 64 App. Div. 2d 29, 407 N.Y.S. 2d 874 (1978),
( 1978) , aff'g
95 Misc. 2d 1, 408 N.Y.S. 2d 584 (1977).
D.S.W. v. Fairbanks North Star Borough School
District, and L.A.H. v. Fairbanks North Star Borough
School District, 628 P. 2d 554, Supreme Court of Alaska
(1981); cases were joined by the Court.
Hoffman v. Board of Educaton, 49 N.Y. 2d 121,
400 N.E. 2d 317, 424 N.Y.S. 2d 376 ( 1979) .
Hunter v. Board of Education of Montgomery
County et al. 439 A. 2d 583, Court of Appeals of Maryland
(1982) .
Peter W. v.
v. San Francisco Unified School Dist.,
60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854.
In re Peter H. 3323 N.Y.S. 2d 302, Westchester
County Family Court (1971).
Pietro v. St. Joseph's School, 48 U.S.L.W. 2229,
New York Supreme Court, Suffolk City (1979).

Unreported decisions:
Doe v. Board of Educ., No 48277, Cir. Ct. Montgomery County, Md (July 6, 1979) reported in Comment,
"Educational Negligence: A Student's Cause of Action for
Incompetent Academic Instruction," 58 N.C.L. Rev. 561
(1980).
Carvell v. School Bd. of Broward County, No. 778703, Cir. Ct., Fla. (Dec. 5, 1977) reported in Richard
Funston, "Educational Malpractice: A Cause of Action in
Search of a Theory, 18 San Diego L. Rev. 743-812 (1981).
McNeil v. Board of Education, No. L-17207-74,
Super. Ct. Law Div., N.J. (May 31, 1974); a finding of
failure to state a cause of action, reported in Elson, ”A
Common Law Remedy for the Educational Harms Caused by
Incompetent or Careless Teaching," 73 N.W.U.L. Rev. 641
( 1978) .
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policy, even though a possibly cognizable cause of action
was stated or might be stated.
So far, courts in the following states have refused

to recognize educational malpractice as an acceptable

cause of action, primarily due to public policy consider-

ations: 'Alaska, California, Florida, Maryland, New
Jersey, and New York.

In view of these decisions, one is

hard pressed to understand the expressed beliefs of

critics and commentators who have suggested that such a
cause of action may be recognized in the near future.

Additionally, the general posture of the courts has
been not to interfere in "academic affairs," meaning

controversies between students and the faculty concerning

academic achievements, grading, instruction, etc.

Hamilton,

In

97 the U.S. Supreme Court did set a precedent

for such a stance by declaring that administrators

(regents) possessed inherent authority to establish
98
internal organizational standards for instruction.
In recent years, courts have entered into contro
versies between students and institutions of higher edu

cation when a clear violation of constitutional rights

97 Hamilton v. Regents of the University of
California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
98 Id.

i
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was involved.

In contrast, however, courts still feel

unqualified to judge matters of a purely academic nature.
Many courts have recognized the doctrine of academic

freedom, which upholds the philosophy that teaching and
learning must be free of outside control.99

In Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District

the court held that ’’courts cannot decide the curriculum
or degree of proficiency needed to advance from grade to

grade in the school system. h100

It also stated that:

The field of education is simply too fraught with
unanswered questions for the courts to consitute
themselves as a proper forum for resolution of
these questions.

Thus , public policy of this state (New York) bars
an action for educational malpractice.
The courts still maintain that they should not be

directly involved in the inner workings, policy deci

sions, or questions of an educational nature regarding
public schools.

Furthermore, judges are also convinced

that school administrators possess an expertise in their

respective fields enabling them to deal with teacher

99 Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 ff
( 1968) and Walman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 ff ( 1977).

*100 Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District,
47 N.Y. 2d 440, 391 N.E. 2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S. 2d 375
(1979) aff’g 64 App. Div. 2d 29, 407 N.Y.S. 2d 874 (1978)
aff'g 95 Misc. 2d 1, 408 N.Y.S. 2d 854 ( 1977).
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incompetence much better than the courts could.

The

court in Donohue”*^ stated:
(T)he recognition of a cause of action sounding
in negligence to recover for "educational mal
practice" would impermissibly require the courts
to oversee the administration of the State’s
public school system.
The court thinks that an inherent expertise makes
administrators better equipped to deal with incompetent

teachers.

Incompetent teachers traditionally have dis-

missed, and administrators still use this very slow and

ineffective remedy.
tenured teachers.

Dismissal cannot be used against

On the other hand, the dismissal of a

teacher does not compensate the injured student in need

of remedial aid but unable to afford it.
Legal Considerations
Courts also fear that a flood of litigation may

occur, once they recognize educational malpractice.

This

belief and attitude were expressed in Peter W. v. San

Francisco Unified School District. 103

Competencey testing is seen as another solution.

Tests are being designed and implemented to detect
learning difficulties of students in mathematics,

101 Id .
102 Appelbaum v. Wulff, 95 N.E. 2d 14 ff ( 1950).

103 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976).

I
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reading, and writing, with results being passed on to
parents and teachers.

For instance, the Massachusetts

Department of Education in 1978 proposed a basic skills
improvement program for grades K-3, 4-6, and 7-12. 104

Massachusetts requires that the tests be developed on the
local level with the involvement of everyone, meaning

teachers, administrators, parents, employees, and stu
dents .105

This definitely will reduce the possibility of

class action suits^^ and induce across-the-board commu-

nication and cooperation.

Such tests should entail at

least two, and probably three, components:

1 .

early identification of learning problems,

2

suggestions and direction for remedial aid,

and

3.

retesting of students to see if they have
reached minimal required competency or if

1°^ Bureau of Research and Asssessment,
Massachusetts Department of Education: Questions and
Answers on the Basic Skills Improvement Policy and Pro
posed Regulations, at I (1978)Ascribed in Notes,
’’Educational Malpractice and Minimal Competency Testing:
Is There a Legal Remedy at Last?” 151 New England L.
Rev. 116.

105 Id .
1°6 Robinson v. School Board of Palm Beach County,
No. 78-2137, Cir. Ct. (June 8, 1978).

I
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other learning programs have to be induced. 107

Competency testing may be part of an answer to the
problem of educational malpractice.
vital purposes:

It could serve two

(1 ) to form a basis the courts can work

with, and (2) to decrease educational malpractice.

How-

ever , a number of problems are inherent in such an ap

proach.

The student may not have the ability to attain

the minimum competency level he or she is required to
reach.

Responsibility would have to be placed perma-

nently on the student, the teacher, and/or the school
district.

Again, this emphasizes the court's point:

there is no standard by which to measure ’’successful or

proper educational professional competence.”

A standard will be needed for determining how to

measure variables other than IQ, who should perform such

measurements and what instruments should be used.

Peter

107 The University of the State of New York, The
State Education Department; The Regents Competency
Testing Program Information Brochure (September 1978) at
1, ascribed in Notes, ’’Educational Malpractice and
Minimal Competency Testing: Is There a Legal Remedy at
Last?”
15:1 New England L. Rev. 116.
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W. 108 and Donohue10^ as well as Hoffman110 showed that
intelligence was not the problem.

And there are addi-

tional social and economic variables, such as home environment and educational and social exposure.

Additional

reading is suggested.111

Several major considerations need to be addressed by

the courts, including the recognition of educational
malpractice suits despite policy considerations, the
inherent expertise doctrine, or the doctrines of academic

freedom and exhaustion of administrative remedies, and

108 Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School
District., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976).
109 Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District,
47 N*.Y. 2d 440, 391 N.E. 2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S. 2d 375
( 1979) .
1 10 Hoffman v. Board of Education of City of New
York, 49 N.Y. 2d 121, 400 N.E. 2d 317, 424 N.Y.S. 2d 376
(1979) .
11 1 Additional Suggested Reading

A. Washco, Jr., A Dissertation Submitted in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Education at Temple University, Philadelphia

(1933) .

M. Schoen, Editor, The Effects of Music,
Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc. , New York ( 1927) •
R. Lundin, An Objective Psychology of Music,
The Ronald Press Company, New York ( 1967) ~
—
C. Diserens, A Psychology of Music, The
Influence of Music on Behavior, College of Music,
Cincinnati, Ohio (1939).

I I
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the fear of a flood of litigation.11

If the courts

decide to deal with the issue, they will need to consider
a problem solving approach that would aid the schools and

do justice to a deserving and injured plaintiff.

Robinson11^ in Psychology and Law notes:
To the extent that every civilization begins to
collapse first from within—and this is only
partly true — the earliest signs of internal
weakness are institutional for it is institutions
that give a civilization its defining properties.
In this regard none is more basic than the insti
tutions of law (I would like to add the institu
tion of Education) "for none speaks more directly
and diffusely to the people at large."

The civilizations that have earned our respect
and our love are those in which the laws were not
only just — for this can happen as a result of
fear or rebellion or habit or even accident—but
were intented to be just. They reveal their ■
intentions to us by their devotion to principle
and their resistance to unreasoning clamor.
Aristotle spoke for one of these civilizations
when he wrote:
"He therefore that recommends that the law
shall govern seems to recommend that God and
reason alone shall govern, but he that would
have man govern adds a wild animal also; for
appetite is like a wild animal and also
passion warps the rule of even the best men.
Therefore, the law is wisdom without
passion." (emphasis supplied)

112 Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District;
Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School District;
Hoffman v. Board of Education of City of New York. See
also notes 108 and 110 supra.

113 p. n . Robinson, Psychology and Law, Oxford
University Press, Oxford ( 1980 F*
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The United States District Court for the Western
District of Missouri made the most comprehensive and

significant statement regarding the relationship between
courts and education in The General Order on Judicial

Standards of Procedure and Substance in Review of Student
Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher
Education. 114

This statement spelled out the situtation

necessary for a court to enter into controversies, down

to the obligations of students.

The court provided addi-

tional understanding of courts1 deference in regard to
educational institutions.

Although this applies mainly

to institutions of higher learning, inference can be made
to public education, since primary and secondary schools

are the undergirding structure that makes higher education possible.
These standards, which grew out of the Kent State
uprisings in the 1960s, are for reviewing disciplinary

actions , suspension or dismissal for misconduct, disrupting school activities, and the need for mainstreaming

discipline (not necessarily an educational result).

Inference can be made to the educational process, espe
cially since the statement itself mentions the processes

of education and teaching.

114 45 F.R.D.

However, today’s schools are

133 at 134-41

(September 18,

1968).
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fraught with disciplinary problems and it would seem that

educational problems should be dealt with in conjunction

with disciplinary standards.

The following summary quote of the major points
provides guideposts in an otherwise little spelled out
area:

Achieving the ideal of justice is the highest
goal of humanity.
Justice is not the sole concern of the courts.

Education is euqally concerned with the achieve
ment of ideal justice.

Higher education is the primary source of study
and support of improvement in the courts.
Therefore, courts should exercise caution when
importuned to intervene in the important
processes and functions of education.

A court should never intervene in the processes
of education without understanding the nature of
education. . . .

Education is the living and growing source of our
progressive civilization, of our open repository
of increasing knowledge, culture and our salutary
democratic traditions. As such, education de
serves the highest respect and the fullest pro
tection of the courts in the performance of its
lawful mission.
There have been . . . there will be instances of
erroneous and unwise misuse of power by those
invested with power of management and teaching in
the academic community as in the case of all
human fallible institutions.

When misuse of power is threatened or occurs, our
political and social order has made available a
wide variety of lawful non-violent, political,
economic, and social means to prevent or end the
misuse of power.
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These same lawful, non-violent, political eco
nomic and social means are available to correct
an unwise but lawful choice of educational policy
or action by those charged with the powers of
management and teaching in the academic com
munity .
Only where erroneous and unwise actions in the
field of education deprive students of federal
protected rights or privileges does a federal
court have power to intervene in the educational
process.

Lawful Missions of an Educational Institution
To maintain, support, critically examine, and to
improve the existing social and political system.
To train students and faculty for leadership and
superior service in public service, science,
agriculture, commerce and industry.

To develop students to well rounded maturity,
physically, socially, emotionally, spiritually,
intellectually and vocationally.
To develop, refine and teach ethical and cultural
values.
To provide fullest possible realization of democ
racy in every phase of living.
To teach principles of patriotism, civil obliga
tion and respect for the law.
To teach the practice of excellence in thought,
behavior and performance.
To develop, cultivate and stimulate the use of
imagination .
To stimulate reasoning and critical faculties of
students and to encourage their use in improve
ment of the existing political and social order.
To teach and develop lawful methods of change and
improvements in the existing political and social
order .
To provide by study and research for increase of
knowledge.
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To provide by study and research for development
and improvement of technology, production and
distribution for increased national production of
goods and services desirable for national
civilian consumption, for export, for explora
tion, and for national military purposes.
To teach methods of experiment in meeting the
problems of a changing environment.
To promote directly and explicitly international
understanding and cooperation.
To provide the knowledge, personnel and policy
for planning and managing the destiny of our
society with a maximum of individual freedom, and

To transfer the wealth of knowledge and tradition
from one generation to another.
The tax supported educational insitution is an
agency of the national and state governments.
Its missions include teaching, research and
action, assisting in the declared purposes of
government in this nation, namely:

To form a more perfect union,
To establish justice,
To insure domestic tranquility,
To provide for the common defense,

To promote the general welfare, and

To secure the blessing of liberty to our
selves and to posterity.

The nihilist and the anarchist, determined to
destroy the existing political and social order,
who direct their primary attacks on the educa
tional institutions, understand fully the mis
sions of education in the United States.
The court continued to stress the power and influence of

115 Id.

7
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these institutions which were the reason for the court’s

reluctance to interfere:

Federal law recognizes the powers of the tax
supported institutions to accomplish these mis
sions and has frequently furnished economic
assistance for these purposes.
The genius of American education, employing the
manifold ideas and works of the great Jefferson,
has made the United States the most powerful
nation in history. In so doing it has in a rela
tively few years expanded the area of knowledge
at a revolutionary rate.
With education the primary force, the means to
provide the necessities of life and many luxuries
to all our national population and to many other
peoples, has been created.

This great progress has been accomplished by the
provision to the educational community of general
support, accompanied by diminishing interference
in educational processes by political agencies
outside the academic community.

If it be true, as it well may be, that man is in
a race between education and catastrophe, it is
imperative that educational institutions not be
limited in the performance of their lawful mis
sions by unwarranted judicial interference.
This court’s strong stance even in regard to courts1

interference in disciplinary processes supports the
hands-off policy the courts have shown in relation to

educational malpractice suits.

The court stated that

education deserves the highest respect and the fullest
protection of the courts in the performance of its lawful

1 16 Id.
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mission.

The court spelled out those lawful missions, 117

saying, among other things, that students are to be
developed into well rounded maturity—physically,

socially, emotionally, spiritually, intellectually and
vocationally—provided by study for increase of a ’’well
rounded” knowledge. 118

In case a lawful mission is not

being carried out, interference or rectification of the

wrong and/or the mission will be required.
This would not be ’’limiting, II or ’’unwarranted judi-

cial interference,” as the court stated, if the inter-

ference occurs because of the violation of these very
lawful missions, by allowing students to graduate without

the necessary reading, mathematical and writing skills.
The most appropriate bodies available to deal with these

problems are the legislature, the courts, and administrative entities (agencies).

seems somewhat incomplete.

The court’s reasoning here

On the one hand it claims the

importance of education but it does not want to deal with

the wrongs and problems of the educational system that
may weaken its very importance, existence, and mission.

117 See note 114 supra at 441.
118 See note 115 supra.
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CHAPTER THREE
Student Responsibilities and Obligations

in the Educational System

Until recently, a student was not necessarily con
sidered to carry an obligation in the total learning
process.

The teacher was seen more as the one respon-

sible for student learning and student discipline. This

trend, however, is changing rapidly.

So far, there seems

to be little hesitation to spell out students1 rights.

It is very difficult, however, to come up with students’
obligations in the learning process.

Perhaps one reason

for this may be found in the vulnerability of students
because of their dependency on a complex educational and

bureaucratic system with its many intricacies.

The question of contributory (now called compara
tive) negligence is to be considered, however, when we

ask what responsibility a student has in the area of

educational malpractice.

Some states have a minimum age

below which it is assumed that a child can not commit
negligence; others do not.

Some states take the age of

seven as the cut-off age; others use the age of
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fourteen.1 u

Although most rulings on age and compara

tive negligence are related to physical injury, inference

can be made to other areas of injury, such as a suit of
educational malpractice would incur.
Note that typically a child is held "to the .

degree of care which ordinary children of his age,
intelligence and experience ordinarily exercise under
similar circumstances.”
precise.

But even this standard is not

We cannot define an ordinary child or the

parameters of experience.

The courts have not attached

meaning to these terms but have used them interchange-

ably.121
Thus, one can assume that since considerable diver-

sity and ambiguity exist in regard to a young child’s

’’standard of care,” will take some time to set a standard
of care for older students up to the age of eighteen;

students above that age would come under the adult stand-

ard of care, known as the one held by the "reasonable
mor, ff122
man
.”

Nevertheless, intelligence tests, tests mea-

suring maturity, level of responsibility and so forth,
would contribute to the determination of such standards,

119 Swanson v. Wesley College, 402 A. 2d 401 (1979)-

120 Perry v. Linderman, 408 U.S. 593 ( 1972).

121 N.L.R.B. v. Yeshiva, 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
122 Id.
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which could, and probably would, vary according to age

bracket.

If such standards would be applied, a seven-year-old

could be held responsible.

"Contributory negligence" is

a factor courts may need to consider.

Of course, psy-

chological tests and examinations would be used to de
velop a factual standard or standards of responsibility

for the various ages.

Such examinations would assure

defense attorneys and courts of having factual evidence
with which to work.
tice, for example,

A major defense in medical malpracis "lack of cooperation" by the

patient, which causes poor results and is considered to
be "contributory negligence."

What constitutes contrib-

utory negligence in educational malpractice has not yet
been determined.

Some defense is probable—almost cer-

tain--if a cause for educational malpractice is ever

recognized.
Up to now, the courts have not formed a legal theory

on educational responsibility and duty by students.

They

have stated no clear, legal directions, formula, or
theory regarding such standard.

Nevertheless, increasing

litigations may bring about the development of such a
standard and/or theory.

The standard of assessment applied would be basic
(procedural) fairness; the very key to that standard,
according to the courts, is "reasonableness"

r
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(constitutional).

"Reasonable expectations,” as part

of contract theory, bind both parties to the performance

of obligations spelled out beforehand. The contract and
the ascribed acts of the student would provide some

evidence of prior setting up of such obligations.

However, the additional factor of academic custom would
become involved.

Academic custom, in tradition as well

as in practice, will be considered by the courts in (1>

developing mutual expectations, and (2) evaluating the
results or achievements (e.g., in case of litigation, a
disinterested party or parties may be used to evaluate
results) .

All legal theories take such considerations

into account «

The U.S. Supreme Court referred to "usages

124 and in the very
of the past” in Perry v. Sinderman,

recent Yeshiva case 125 spoke of the ’’historical evolution

of .
employees.

and then ruled that faculty are managerial
In DeMarco 126 the court held that a contract

confers mutual duties on a university and on the student,

which must not be overlooked.

123 Swanson v. Wesley College 402 A. 2d 401 ( 1979) •
124 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
125 N.L.R.B. v. Yeshiva, 444 U.S. 672 (1980).

126 DeMarco v. Univ, of Health Sciences, The Chicago Medical
jchool, 40 Ill. App. 3d 474, 352, N.E. 2d, 356.
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So far, this can be considered the major basis for
assessing comparative negligence on the part of a stu
dent .

Proving a student’s negligence as a factor in his

or her not achieving will rest on a contract spelling out

the duties, activities, and level of performance required
in order to obtain a degree or to graduate.

If it is

proven that the student has the ability to learn or
understand, nonperformance of these duties and activities
could constitute student negligence and may offer posi

tive defenses for the institution.

It is important to

point out that such a defense is a major one in medical

malpractice suits.
In an article on competency testing, McClung, 127

emphasized his firm belief that learning involves both

teachers and students.

If so, it should follow that each

should share the responsibility of educating the student.

Thus, if students are evaluated, teachers must be tested,
too.

He also said that administrators must perform their

role well and be willing to make the necessary changes

within the school structure.

Such a position necessarily

involves the public as well, since changes and improve

ments cost money and the public would have to provide the
necessary finances.

12? McClung, ’’Are Competency Testing Programs Fair? Legal?”
Phi Delta Kappan, at 397 (February 1978).

i
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The aforementioned General Order on Judicial
Standards of Procedure and Substance in Review of Student
Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher

Education by the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Missouri also spelled out the "obligation of
students attending an institution of learning":

The voluntary attendance of a student in such
institutions is a voluntary entrance into the
academic community. By such voluntary entrance,
the student voluntarily assumes obligations of
performance and behavior reasonably imposed by
the institution of choice relevant to its lawful
missions, processes, and functions. These obli
gations are generally much higher than those
imposed on all citizens by the civil and criminal
law. So long as there is no invidious discrimi
nation, no deprival of due process, no abridge
ment of a right protected in the circumstances,
and no capricious, clearly unreasonable or unlaw
ful action employed, the institution may disci
pline students to secure compliance with these
higher obligations as a teaching method or to
sever the student from the academic community.
No student may, without liability to lawful dis
cipline, intentionally act to impair or prevent
the accomplishment of any lawful mission, pro
cess, or functi on of an educational
institution. '

Although the court addressed higher education and
stressed voluntary attendance, an analogy can be made to

public institutions.

There is an obligation and a

responsibility on a student’s part from the moment he/she
can be declared capable of contributory (now comparative)

negligence.

To argue that the public schools’ compulsory

128 45 F.R.D.

133, at 141 (September 18, 1968).

F
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attendance requirement relieves a student of his disci

plinary and academic duties seems especially out of line.
It seems axiomatic that when a person enters an institu

tion or simply takes a driver’s test, for instance, he/

she. is responsible for acting in accordance with and
adherance to well-understood rules and regulations.

Professor John Grote suggested as far back as 1862 a
role for the student in the learning process:

"Success

in teaching is a function of the recipient as well as the

communicator. »129

However, schools can not wash their

hands of all responsibility and thus avoid liability by

saying that schools promise opportunities, but not
results.
At this moment, it looks like the "window to future

educational malpractice claims has now been

barricaded. " 1 30

The courts rely on public policy as a

justification for the refusal to charge liability.

It

has been stated that if certain public policy considera

tions outbalance the need for protection from injury,

129 a. Small, "Accountability in Victorian England," III Phi
Delta Kappan at 439 (March 1972).
m. A. McGhehey, ed., School Law in Contemporary Society,
Topeka, Kansas, National Organization on Legal Problems of
Education ( 1982) .
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educational malpractice claims are possible and justifiable. 131
Another reason the court did not recognize a cause

of action for educational malpractice was that the court
had determined that any dispute or controversy regarding

placement of children in a particular educational program

could best be resolved within the school system and its
review mechanism or through established administrative

processes. 1 32

131 Policy considerations, according to Rowland v.
Christian, 443 P. 2d 561 ( 1968) can include the following:
Foresee ability of harm; degree of certainty of injury; closeness
)f connection between defendent’s conduct and the injury; moral
)lame; prevention of future harm.
Extent of burden on defendant; consequences to community of
.imposing a duty of care; cost; prevalence of insurance.

132 Hoffman v. Board of Education, 410 N.Y.S. 2d 99-119
1978) .
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CHAPTER FOUR
Summary of Theories of Educational Malpractice

and Their Viability

Introduction
Several theories of educational malpractice have

been presented in court cases and in legal literature.
Among the major theories are:

contract theory, third

party beneficiary, misrepresentation, negligent

misrepresentation, intentional misrepresentation,
constitutional right, involuntary confinement, right to

an education, and negligence.

The major legal and

educational considerations are presented in the following
sections.

Contract Theory

Courts have recognized previously that a contractual

relationship exists between private schools and their
students.133

Some proponents of educational malpractice

would extend this holding to the public school sector and

find the contract approach advantageous in cases where

the plaintiff claimed a failure of learning due to

133 Pietro v. St. Joseph’s School, 48 U.S.L.W. 2229,
Sup.
Ct., Suffolk Cith (September 21, 1979) •
N.Y.
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teacher negligence.

The advantages claimed are as

follows:

1.

the unavailability in contract of various
defenses barring recovery in tort;

2.

governmental immunity would be less likely to
hinder recovery under contract than under tort;

3.

there are longer running statutes of limita
tions under contract;

4.

there might be a possibility that courts
would be more willing to grant recovery for
an expectancy.

It is doubtful if a contract approach would work simply

because no proof can be offered of any "bargained-for"
exchange.

It would be very difficult to come up with

negotiations on which to base a finding of consideration.
There is, however, one avenue that could be pursued.

A plaintiff could plead promissory estoppel, arguing that
he did forego attending a private school on the explicit

promise of the public school to avoid negligent instruction.

However, a plaintiff would need to prove that he

had the money to actually attend a private school.

In

turn, this would benefit only, or mainly, children of

well-to-do parents who could afford private education

while others would have no recourse.

But even here a

problem arises, because recovery under such a suit would

13^ r. Funston, "Educational Malpractice:
A Course
of Action in Search of a Theory," 18 San Diego L. Rev.
743 ff (1981 ) .
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depend solely on an implied term of an implied
contract.35

And it is doubtful if the courts would be

willing to do much contractual construction to support
such a claim.

The doctrine of quasi-contract was developed to
avoid undue enrichment of parties. 136

This does not

apply to education at all because the school district or
educator is not likely to get unduly enriched because a

graduating student cannot read or write.

Contract Theory—Third Party Beneficiary
Here a student plaintiff could argue that he was the
third party beneficiary of a contract existing between
the teacher and the school district or between the tax
payers and the school district, in which it was implied

that the teacher or school district promised to properly
educate its students.

In order to recover, however, a

student plaintiff would need to show that the parties had

contracted and intended to benefit him (third party).

If a plaintiff would attempt to claim recovery as a
third party under an implied contract between the respec

tive school district (state) and the taxpayer, his

135 Id. at 761.

136 Id.
137 Id. at 762.

1
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attempt might not be successful, because the majority of
jurisdiction takes the position that when a governmental

agency contracts to benefit a total community, an indi

vidual has no enforcement rights.

So far, contract

cases have required an explicit promise to the claiming
part (individual);

a statute or a constitutional rule

does not satisfy the requirement.
Theory of Misrepresentation

A more clearcut, tangible and promising approach for
establishing a cause of action in educational malpractice
would be a claim of misrepresentation.

That is, a stu-

dent plaintiff could argue that by misrepresenting his
academic progress or lack thereof to his parents or

guardians who relied on such communications, education

officials refrained from otherwise necessary actions that

would have been beneficial to the student’s educational
progress.

Note that the court dismissed a claim of

intentional misrepresentation in Peter W. for not

alleging the "requisite element" of reliance. 139

In

Donohue the court simply refused to accept such an

138 Id.
139 Peter W. v
v.. San Francisco Unified School
District, 60 Cal. App. 3d 814-24, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854-60.
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issue.1^0

This could imply that proper pleading might

produce a different result.

Cause of Action for Negligent Misrepresentation
Under this theory, a student plaintiff would seek to
show that the school was under a ”duty” to provide accu-

rate information based on evaluations of performance.
Further, he would seek to show that the school had

breached that duty in failing to take reasonable care to

make sure of the facts and the truth and that this breach
was causally related to the injury suffered by the

student. 141

In states that have statutes mandating that

their school districts keep parents/guardians informed of •

their children’s academic progress, there may be a prob

able basis for finding the required duty.
The problem with such an approach is that under this

type of negligence (ordinary negligence) the plaintiff

might encounter difficulties in showing that he suffered
an injury cognizable by law. 142

Another problem would be

establishing the required causal link because a variety

mo Donanue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 64
App. Div. 2d 29-40, 407 N.Y.S. 2d 874-81.
mi r. Funston, ’’Educational Malpractice:
A Cause
18
San
Diego
L.
Rev.
of Action in Search of a Theory,”
743 ff.

142 Id. at 764.
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of extraneous variables affecting education and learning

can be identified as probable or likely causes of a stu

dent’s failure to learn, as discussed previously.
The ordinary negligence defenses, e.g., contributory
negligence or misrepresentation of opinion as opposed to
misrepresentation of fact, also supply barriers to
recovery .

It is hoped that misrepresentation of opinion

would not apply when

relating test scores, although that

action can be looked upon as opinion also. ^3

Cause of Action for Intentional Misrepresentation

This cause of action is very rare and hard to prove.
In such cases

9

the student plaintiff would be required to

prove that the defendant had intended to deceive him; 144
e.g., a teacher misrepresented a student’s inability to
reach certain grades in order to keep parents from going

to the respective authorities.

But if a teacher errs in

his assessment, any malicious or fraudulent intentions

will be dispelled immediately.

Even assuming an intent to deceive can be shown, the
plaintiff still must prove the following elements:

1^3 W. Page Keeton, Dan B. Dobbs, Robert E. Keeton,
David G. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts,
5th ed. , 161-6 6 ( 1971 ).
144 Id. at 706.
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1.

that he and his parents relied upon the educa
tor’s misrepresentation;

2.

that he and his parents had a right to rely on
said misrepresentation; and

3.

that it was reasonable for them to rely on

it. 145

Finally

it must be demonstrated by the plaintiff

that but for the misrepresentation, they (he and his

parents) would have chosen a different course of action
in regard to his educational situation (put him in pri-

vate school, provided tutors, etc.).
At present, defendant school districts can argue
that the parents should be able to judge for themselves

if their child lacks rudimentary academic skills, by

maintaining that such assessment does not require any

particular expertise.

This may cause the court to find

the whole argument immaterial.

These arguments demon

strate how important it is to develop a "professional

standard of care” for public school educators, for the
purpose of improvement and growth on the job; to educate

properly, on the one hand, and to provide guidelines for
the courts if necessary, on the other hand.

145 Id. at 710-16.

In fact,
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such a ’’professional standard” would benefit all parties

involved.
Constitutional Right

Propenents of educational malpractice also consider

suits based on constitutional rights.

Such claims try to

invoke liability for educators and educational adminis
trators under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

But because there is no

federal guarantee of a constitutional right to education,
§ 1983 may not be relevant.

The section states:

Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State ot Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper pro
ceeding for redress.
The principal points to be considered in bringing § 1983
actions are:
1.

the sources and nature of federal rights

allegedly infringed;

2.

the determination of whether the 11th Amendment

bars action against a public school district;
3.

the presentation of justifiable questions;

4.

the nature of the mental state required for

146 42 U.S.C. S 1983 (1976).
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liability and the availability of qualified

immunity to school officials; and

5.

the nature and proof of damages.^1*?

"Under Color of Law"

Ih considering the possibility of § 1983 litiga-

tions, the one issue that must be clarified is whether
the person/institution involved acted ’’under color of any

statute, ordinance and/or regulation.

First, it must be

determined whether the person/institution is a public one

or whether the person/institution is acting under the

color of state law.
To act under color of law means that the person/
institution has obtained its power by virtue of state
law; it does not mean that a person acts within the law.

State action exists where an institution is owned, established and controlled by the state.

Public institutions

of learning that are "state related" or "state linked"

have a close nexus to the state and the challenged action

so that the action can be treated as that of the state
itself.

1^7 45 Missouri L. Rev. 288, Comment, "Damages
Actions for Denial of Equal Educational Opportunities"
(1980).
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Sovereign Immunity and Section 1983

An institution of learning, as an agency of the
state, enjoys ’’sovereign immunity," according to the

United States Constitution:
The Judicial Power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the Unite^^tates by Citizens of another
State....
In Scheuer v. Rhodes, the U. S. Supreme Court

stated:

"It is well established that the Amendment bars

suits not only against the State when it is the named

party but also when it is the party in fact. h149
While the 11th Amendment would be an absolute bar to

suits under § 1983, many states have waived their sovereign immunity through statutory provision.

Others, like

West Virginia which enacted H.B. 1271 , have taken out
malpractice insurance for its teachers.

Thus, suits in

both state and federal courts are allowed in these
states.

However, "a clear declaration in the statutory

language that the state intended to waive its 11th Amend

ment immunity as well as its sovereign immunity under

148 United States Constitution, Amendment XI.
149 416 U.S. 232-37 (1974).
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state law" must be present.^0

It is to be noted, how-

ever, that immunity provided by the 11th Amendment does

not bar federal court action for prospective injunctive
relief from unconstitutional state actions. 151

This

immunity, enjoyed by institutions of learning, does not
apply to individuals, according to a Supreme Court deci

sion in Scheuer v. Rhodes:

"It has been settled that the

11th Amendment provides no shield for a state official

confronted by a claim that he had deprived another of a
federal right under color of law. „ 152 It is therefore
possible in some instances to skirt the issue of the 11th

Amendment immunity by entering a suit against an individual rather than against the institution itself.

It has not been suggested that § 1983 was intended
to create a waiver of a state's 11th Amendment immunity
merely because an action could be brought under that
section against state officers, rather than against the

state itself.1^3
The 11th Amendment itself does not bar suits against

the state by its own citizens.

150 Id. at 487 (1974).
151 Id. at 445-52 (1974).

152 Id. at 232-37 (1974).

153 Id.

The U. S. Supreme Court
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has consistently held that an "unconsenting State is not

immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own
citizens .

„ 154

It is also well established that

even though a state is not a named party to the action,
the suit may nonetheless be barred by the 11th Amendment.

In Ford Motor Company v. Department of Treasury, the
court said:

(w)hen the action is in essence one for the
recovery of money from the state, the state is
entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from
suit even though individual officials are nominal
defendants . '55

Thus, the rule has evolved that 11th Amendment bars
private parties seeking to impose a liability which must
be paid from public funds in the state treasury. 156

The court also quoted Rothstein v. Wyman:
It is not pretended that these sources are to
. come from the personal resources of these appelAppellees expressly contemplate that they
lants.
will, rather,
rather, involve substantial expenditures
from the public funds of the state. . . .

It is one thing to tell the Commissioner of
Social Services that he must comply with the
federal standards for the future if the state is
to have the benefit of federal funds in the

154 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
Employees
v. Department of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279
(1973).

155 Ford Motor Compnay v. Department of Treasury,
323 U.S. 459 ( 1945).
156 Kennecott Copper Corporation v. State Tax
Commission, 327 U.S. 573, 1946.
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programs he administers. It is quite another
thing to force the Commissioner to use state
funds to make reparation for the past. The lat
ter would appear to us to fall afoul of the 11th
Amendment if that basic constitutional provision
is to ^g^conceived
of as having any present
^7
f orce.

The "Every Person" Interpretation
According to its very clear and plain language, §
1983 appears to apply to all persons.

However, the

Supreme Court has drastically narrowed the scope of the

act by "recognizing various immunities through judicial

i nt erprotation.

Thus, the executive branch of govern-

ft

ment has been designated as the only group to which §
1983 applies; both the legislative and judicial branches

have absolute immunity.

Nevertheless, the executive

branch did receive some immunity, called "qualified

immunity."

Scheuer v.

This point was clarified by two cases:
0

q

g

158

nn

LTo
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and Wood v. Strickland.

159

In

Scheuer, the Court held that there was no absolute execu-

tive immunity available under Section 1983 but a speci

fied immunity under the following test:
(l)n varying scope, a qualified immunity is
available to officers of the executive branch of

157 Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F. 2d 236-37 CA 2
(1972) .
158 See note 150 supra.

159 420 U.S. 308 (1975).

I
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government, the variation being dependent upon
the scope of discretion and reponsibilities of
the office and all the circumstances as they
reasonably appeared at the time of the action on
which liability is sought to be based. It is the
existence of reasonable grounds for the belief
formed at the time and in light of all circum
stances, coupled with good-faith belief that
affords a basis for qualified immunity of execu
tive officers for acts performed in the course of
official conduct.160

Total immunity for the executive branch would drain
§ 1983 of its meaning, the court reasoned, while at the

same time recognizing that some freedom of action and

descretion was needed.

The court, however, rejected

’’absolute immunity” by reasoning that it would not im

prove the ability of school executives to fulfill their
responsibilities .

test of

H

The court formulated a sliding scale

good faith” through objective and subjective

means.162
We think there must be a degree of immunity if
the work of the schools is to go forward; and
however worded, the immunity must be such that
public school officials understand that action
taken in the good-faith fulfillment of their
responsibilities and within the bounds of reason
under all th e circumstances will not be
punished. ’

160 See note 150 supra.

161 Id.
162 Id.

163 Id.
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However, no immunity whatsoever—even where good
faith was shown--would be granted because of ignorance of
constitutional rights:

The official himself must be acting sincerely and
with a belief that he is doing right, but an act
violating a student’s constitutional rights can
be no more justified-by ignorance or disregard of
settled, indisputable law.

The court also held that the official is bound by:
"a standard of conduct based not only on permissable

inventions, but also on knowledge of the basic, unques

tioned constitutional, rights of his charges.^5

It also ruled that a school board member is not
immune from liability under § 1983, "if he knew or should
have known .

.

. (certain act or situation) would violate

the constitutional rights of the students. !! 166
Pulling it all together, it can be stated that:
1 .

Total immunity for the executive branch is not
granted, since it would drain § 1983 of its

meaning.
2.

Thus, Scheuer, recognized that all executive
officials could be liable under § 1983*

164 Id.
165 Id .
166 Id.
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3.

Absolute personal.liability is rejected by the
court due to the heavy financial burden which

would deter people from seeking office, from
teaching, and from fulfilling their responsi

bilities.
But the court formultated a sliding scale test

for responsibility called-good faith through (a)

objective, and (b) subjective means.

4.

No immunity even under a showing of good faith
would be granted because of ignorance of the

law/constitutional rights.

5.

Thus, local governing bodies can be sued
directly under § 1983 for (a) monetary, (b)

declaratory, or (c) injunctive relief.

This

includes teacher, school boards, and school
districts.
6.

The U.S. Supreme Court, however, stated quite
clearly that local governing bodies cannot be
held liable under th doctrine of respondeat
superior, except for deliberate indifference on

the respective superior’s part.
As can be seen by these rulings, officials and pro
fessionals need to familiarize themselves with the constitutional rights of their students.

Wood definitely

implies that all institutional officials, including
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faculty, must possess a certain degree of knowledge
(legal knowledge not yet specified by courts) about their

responsibilities, duties, functions and powers.

Courts will respond to a claim of action if gross

negligence and deliberate indifference are involved.

Actions under § 1983 are seen by some authors as the
future channel for obtaining damages from educational

systems and/or their officials/professionals .

For ex

ample, constitutional causes of actions might be given by
alleging a right to an equal educational opportunity.

’’Social promotion” violates this right, because if a

student with failing grades is put into the next grade,

he will not have an equal opportunity at that higher

level.

A cause of action under the 14th Amendment has

not been tried yet and could only be based on a confine
ment without due process of law.

However, these actions

are standing on shaky ground, as this paper will discuss

later.

Education at this point is not a constitutional

right, 167 and all cases in this area deal with equal
access. 168
Although the court in Rodriguez 169 indicated that

when a state chooses to provide public education it is

167 San Antonio School District v. Rodriquez, 411
U.S. 1 , 35 (1973).
168 Id.

169 Id. at 24.
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bound to provide a minimally adequate one, it neverthe-

less seems that this opinion alone may not be sufficient
to establish any liability under the Civil Rights Act.
The Rodriguez case was a class action and therefore it is

questionable whether the court’s established "minimum

standard" would be available to an individual student.
Rodriguez also holds that the quality of instruction does
not have to be absolutely equal, which gives some leeway

for treating students differently, within acceptable

limits, in the classroom.1
Involuntary Confinement Theory
Even though courts have not been enthusiastic about
the idea, a claim of involuntary confinement may have

merit.^71

In Gregory B. , the defendants argued that

their habitual truancy was justified since the
educational institution did not teach them anything. 172

In the so-called "right to treatment" cases which
involve people involuntarily committed to prisons or

state institutions, the courts have held that the confinement—a deprivation of liberty—took place for the
sole purpose of nonnegligent treatment, and if such

170 Id.

171 88 Misc. 2d 313, 387 N.Y.S. 2d 380, Fam. Ct.
( 1976) .
172 Id.
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treatment was not provided, the commitment constituted a
deprivation of liberty and a violation of due process of

law.

In addition, strength is added to such a cause of

action since

it

due process" already has been used to

govern a variety of student-school interactions. 173

An

analogy could be drawn here to sustain an educational

malpractice case on a theory of due process, but it would
not be without analytical problems.

A plaintiff would

need to show that he was truly under compulsory confinement; that is, that compulsory attendance also consti

tuted compulsory confinement at the same time.

However,

confinement in an institution is different from compulsory school attendance.

Confinement in an institution

includes 24-hour-a-day confinement twelve months a year,

while school attendance encompasses only certain hours
during a number of months annually.

Thus, it would be

difficult to consider schools even as ’’in-kind" total
institutions such as mental hospitals and prisons.

In

addition to this obstacle, the right to treatment cases

173 Tinker v. Des Moines, Inc. Community School
Dist., 393, U.S. 503 ( 1969) (to suspend a student from
school for wearing black arm bands to protest the Vietnam
War is violative of due process guarantees. . . .).
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (a student is
entitled to public education. Such entitlement consti
tutes a property interest, therefore a suspension from a
public school requires due process proceedings.). But
not Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (a state can
substantively limit the extent of an entitlement; it
therefore can also set procedural limitations).
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showed that no treatment at all was administered, while
educational institutions provide some education to stu-

dents each day. 174

A final problem here would be in

developing an educational standard that could measure the
quality of education provided and set prodedures for

conveying such education.

Neither is available at this

time, which also is true in the right to treatment cases.
Thus , an involuntary confinement action contains

many difficulties and shows little promise for success in

the area of educational malpractice.

The Right to an Education
Brown v. Board of Education^^5 is the case

addressing individual rights and public education.

This

suit attacked discriminatory racial segregation of public
school children based on 14th Amendment grounds. 176

The

U. S. Supreme Court unmistakably spelled out the basic

value of education in our society, a noteworthy statement

174 Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, M.D. Ala.,
(1972) and 0. Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
175 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, S 1, states:
” N or
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.
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which has been quoted in a large number of public educa

tion cases . 1
Today, education is perhaps the most important
function of state and local governments. Compul
sory school attendance laws and the great expend
itures for education both demonstrate our recog
nition of the importance of education to our
democratic society. It is required in the
responsibilities, even service in the armed
forces.
It is the very foundation of good citi
zenship.
Today it is a principal instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values, in pre
paring him for later professional training and in
helping him to adjust normally to his environ
ment.
In these days, it is doubtful that any
child may reasonably be expected to succeed in
life if he is denied the opportunity of an edu
cation. Such an opportunity, where the state has
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must
be made available to all on equal terms.”*'0

Today, education is highly valued by society and is
very important to people concerned about their careers
and professional progress in life.

applies to handicapped children.

The same, of course,
If, as in Hoffman v.

Board of Education, 1 7Q
'7 a child is removed from the heter-

ogeneous mainstream of society and the educational system
for negligent reasons, a denial of the right to education
has occurred.

177 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565-76 ( 1975); Milliken
v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 ( 1977); Mills v. Board of Educa
tion, 348 I. Supp. 866-75, D.D.C. (1972); Arthur v.
Nyquist, 573 F. 2d 134, 2d Cir., cert. denied, 439 U.S. 860
(1978); Hobson v. Hausen, 269 F'. Supp. 401, D.D.C. ( 1967).
178 347 U.S. 493 (1954).
179 64 App. Div. 2d 369, 410 N.Y.S. 2d 99 (1978), 49
N.Y. 2d 121, 400 N.E. 2d 317, 424 N.Y.S. 2d 376 (1979).
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The court in Brown v. Board of Education stated that

a child could not reasonably be expected to succeed in
life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.

‘The court also noted:

"Such an opportunity where the

.state has undertaken to provide it; is a right which must
Ibe made available to all on an equal basis" (emphasis

supplied) . 180

Thus, one could argue that when a student

is promoted to a class level substantially below or above
his competency level, as in Hoffman v. Board of

Education, he is in effect deprived of an equal educa-1 O -1

tional opportunity.101
Pauley v. Kelly

The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Pauley
v . Kelly even held that education was a fundamental

right. 182

There f ore, in West Virginia, it is reasonable

to argue that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals

began to frame a fundamental right out of the constitutional standard of a
free schools . 183

thorough and efficient" system of

Although the case arose on issues of

fair taxation, Pauley v. Kelly (255 S.E. 2d 859, decided

180 See note 178 supra.
181 See note 132 supra.

182 255 S.E. 2d 859 (1979).

183 W. V. Const. Art. XII, S 1.
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in 1981 by the West Virginia Supreme Court) enumerated a

constitutional requirement for a ’’thorough and efficient”
education.

In the course of its opinion the court stated

that the constitution in requiring a ’’thorough and effi-

cient’1 education was making education a fundamental con
stitutional right in that state.

The court also found

that the ” thorough and efficient” clause in Art. XII, § 1
of the West Virginia Constitution requires the legisla-

ture to develop a high quality statewide education
system. 184

Arthur M. Recht, Special Judge of the Circuit

Court of Kanawha County, Charleston, West Virginia, on

remand from the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals,

developed a set of high quality standards.

Judge Recht

noted that n the role of the trial judge in this case is

just that--a trial court judge trying a lawsuit upon

remand from West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals.

.

h185

He continued with the following

opinion and rationale for his ’’Opinion, Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law and Order”:
After all the rhetoric subsides, this is a law
suit, where extensive testimony was heard, thou
sands of exhibits introduced, and the law of the
State of West Virginia applied. From the testi
mony and exhibits certain findings of fact were
made.
From the Constitution, statutes and case

184 See note 182 supra.
185 ’’Opinion, Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and Order, West Virginia Law Library, L.L.S. 6.
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law of the State of West Virginia, certain con
clusions of law based upon those facts were also
made .

That is the unique role of the trial judge in a
non-jury trial, whicn this was.
These findings of fact were based upon what this
trial judge determined to be the clear and con
vincing evidence whicn was introduced during the
some forty days of trial.
The conclusions of law were a result of this
trial judge’s interpretation of the Constitution
of West Virginia, certain West Virginia statutes
and existing case law, particularly the case
decided by the West Virginia Supreme Court of
appeals in Pauley et al v. Kelly et al decided
February 20, 1979, and cited as 255 S.E. 2d 859.
In order for there to be a clear understanding of
the Opinion, Findings, Conclusion and Order in
this case, that is Pauley et al v. Bailey et al,
it is imperative—no — indispensable, that one
reads and comprehends what the West Virginia
Supreme Court has said in Pauley et al v. Kelly
et al which is recited in the most precise,
unequivocal terms, as to the development of this
case on remand. In other words, the West
Virginia Supreme Court in 1979 in Pauley et al v.
Kelly et al established the definitive guidelines
and direction for the trial of the matter just
concluded, which this Court-was bound to follow
in order to discharge the oath of office as a
trial court judge.

First, in regard to the development of the high
quality educational standards, and the relation
ship of that development to the role of the com
missioner who is to work with the representatives
of the Legislative and Executive branches and all
otherqinterested parties, to prepare a master
plan'°° for consideration by the Legislature and
other state and local boards of education:

186 Master plan drafted and implemented by West
Virginia State Department of Education 1984-85 school
year. See also note 175 supra.
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I want to emphasize that everything contained in
this Opinion, Findings, Conclusion and Order
regarding high quality educational standards was
nothing more than what was required by the
explicit mandate of the West Virginia Supreme
Court in Pauley et al v. Kelly et al, supra.

Having said that, let me quote directly from that
opinion in relation to the matter of standards
and why they were included in the Opinion,
Findings, Conclusion and Order with the precision
and specificity that they were:

"We also have determined that the thorough and
efficient clause requires the development of
certain high quality educational standards, and
that it is in part by these quality standards
that the existing educational system must be
tested.
Directly related to this is the fur
ther finding that if these values are not cur
rently met, it must be ascertained that this
failure is not a result of inefficiency and
failure to follow existing school statutes....

"Here the trial court (the original trial
court, Judge Smith) was asked to decide whether
the state financing system was so deficient
that in certain counties, such as Lincoln, it
failed to provide a thorough and efficient
system of education. On the record before us
we (West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals)
choose to make no definitive judgment on this
point.
The trial court (Judge Smith) was
unable to make any judgment either, because it
lacked any suitable standards to set the core
values of any thorough and efficient educa
tional system.
"However, given the legally recognized compo
nents of thorough and efficient school systems
it is obvious from the Circuit Court’s (Judge
Smith’s) findings about Lincoln County schools
that they are, to say the least, woefully inad
equate by those standards, and we (Supreme
Court of Appeals) would frankly be surprised if
the school system will meet any thorough and
efficient standard that may be developed on the
remand.

"Of course, when we (Supreme Court of Appeals)
talk of setting standards for a thorough and
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efficient education system, we (Supreme Court
of Appeals) recognize that expert testimony
will be needed. Mere rote comparison with
other more affluent counties does not neces
sarily serve to define the values of such a
system”
Also, let us examine what the West Virginia
Supreme Court in Pauley et al v. Kelly et al
concerning the definition of a thorough and effi
cient system of schools and within which defini
tion the standards are to be developed:

"It develops, as best the State of Education
expertise allows, the minds, bodies and social
morality of its charges to prepare them for
useful and happy occupations, recreation and
citizenship, and does so economically."

"Legally recognized elements," continues the
West Virginia Supreme Court, "in this defini
tion are development in every child to his or
her capacity of:
1.

Literacy;

2.

Ability to add, subtract, multiply and
divide numbers;

3.

Knowledge of government to the extent that
the child will be equipped as a citizen to
make informed choices among persons and
issues that affect his own governance;

4.

Self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her
total environment to allow the child to
intelligently choose life work—to know his
or her options;

5.

Work-training and advanced academic train
ing as the child may intelligently choose;

6.

Recreational pursuits;

7.

Interests in all creative arts, such as mu
sic, theatre, literature and the visual
arts;

8.

Social ethics, both behavioral and
abstract, to facilitate compatibility with
others in this society."
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The Supreme Court continues:
"Implicit in the above elements are supportive
services:

1.

Good physical facilities, instructional
materials and personnel;

2.

Careful state and local supervision to
prevent waste and to monitor pupil, teacher
and administrative competency."

Therefore, on remand and during the trial of the
suit which began on August 10, 1981, and finished
with oral arguements on January 6, 1982, based
upon these guidelines:

1.

Expert testimony was received defining the
high quality educational standards. Some of
these expert witnesses were as follows:

ART

William J. Thomas and
Richard Layman
Also Comprehensive Educa
tional Program, 1975

EARLY CHILDHOOD

Dr. Margaret Campbell
Also Comprehensive
Educational Program, 1970

FOREIGN LANGUAGE

Robert J. Elkins and
Robyn C. Wills

HEALTH EDUCATION

John M. Cavendish

INDUSTRIAL ARTS,
HOME ECONOMICS

LANGUAGE ARTS

MATHEMATICS

Paul W. DeVore, David L.
McCory, Judy Edwards and Lucy
Busby

— David England and Jenny
Bechtold
Randall Charles and Patricia
Pockl
(Recommendations for mathema
tics education final report
of the task force, mathe
matics achievement in Wood
County Schools, Randall
Charles)
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MEDIA

— Carolyn Skidmore, Walter
Filty and Evelyn Kovalick

MUSIC

— Reginald Goeke, Patricia
Hannah, and Thomas Bowen
Allen Canonico and Elmer
Freese
Planning Facilities for
Athletics, Physical Education
and Recreation published by
American Association of
Health, Physical Education,
Recreation, and Dance,
Kanawha County Curriculum
Guides

PHYSICAL EDUCATION

SCIENCE

— Robert Seymour, James
McGlumphy, and Phyllis
Barnhart.

SOCIAL STUDIES

— Lydia McCue and Vicki Wood

VOCATIONAL EDUCATION— Dennis Davis

SPECIAL EDUCATION AND
REMEDIAL PROGRAMS

GUIDANCE AND
COUNSELING SERVICES

Edward Necco, Kate Long, and
Douglas Smith
William Mullet

EDUCATIONAL
HEALTH PROGRAMS

Jean Morris and John M.

Cavendish

(Thus it is clear that the standards which were
included in the findings of fact were not those
of the West Virginia Supreme Court or of this
Court, but were the conclusions and opinions of
well-recognized experts in the field of educa
tion . )

2.

A comparative analysis was then made of these
standards established by the experts to
existing conditions;

3.

A determination was made based upon the evi
dence that the developed values and standards
based upon expert testimony are not being
currently met;

■
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I
4.

A determination was made, based upon the
evidence, that the failure was not a result
of inefficiency and failure to follow
existing school statutes;

5.

A determination was made, based upon the
evidence, that the failure was a result of
the current method of financing free public
schools.

Therefore, findings 19-90, which established the
standards, were nothing more than a recitation of
what expert witnesses testified the components of
high quality educational standards as required by
the West Virginia Supreme Court. Nothing moi?e,
nothing less.

No real attempt was made by the State defendants
to offer any direct testimony to refute these
standards .

Therefore, this Court had no other choice than to
consider and adopt the standards set forth in
this opinion and findings as being based on the
only credible, clear and convincing proof offered,
during the trial.
I want to also emphasize that this Court on
remand was required to give legislatively estab
lished existing standards great weight. However,
as noted on pages 92 through 99 (findings 92110), there existed no current valid legislative
values which established a high quality educa
tional standard based upon the testimony offered.

Interestingly, however, many ingredients of the
standards referred to in this Opinion were ac
tually a product of the Comprehensive Educational
Program adopted by the State Department of Educa
tion under West Virginia Code Ch. 18, Art. 2,
Sec. 23However, as recited in Finding 103, the
State Department of Education has retreated from
these standards, and have elected to allow them
to remain without implementation.

The exact standards which are delineated in the
opinion and findings are not necesarily those
which should be included in the master plan to be
developed pursuant to this opinion.

120

This master plan, which is designed to be the
product of the combined, cooperative efforts of
the* representatives of the Legislative and Execu
tive branch, together with appropriate state
agencies and educational organizations, should
contain:
1.

SUGGESTED suitable high quality standards to
set the core values of a thorough and effi
cient educational system;

2.

SUGGESTED time tables when these standards
should or could be in effect;

3.

SUGGESTED methods by which the resources to
guarantee the delivery of these standards
will be provided.

The testimony in this case developed the stand
ards set forth herein—representatives of the
Legislative and Executive branches and/or various
agency representratives and/or other interested
parties, working with the commissioner to develop
the master plan, may modify or embellish the
standards as they may deem appropriate, so long
as they retain the high quality as required by
the West Virginia Supreme Court and as testified
to by the experts in this case (emphasis in the
original and supplied).
I wish to make it crystal clear that the master
plan is a proposal, a suggestion, which will
conform to the guidelines established at the
request of the West Virginia Supreme Court as
expressed through this Court based upon the tes
timony (emphasis in the original).
HOWEVER, this Court cannot and does not have the
power—authority--or jurisdiction to DEMAND that
the West Virginia Legislature adopt this partic
ular plan or, for that matter, any single piece
of legislation—to do so would violate the tradi
tional concepts of the separation of power—
specific legislation is exclusively a legislative
function (emphasis in the original).
What this Court has held is that what now exists
in the public schools in West Virginia, in terms
of the absence of high quality educational stand
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standards and the resources to deliver those
standards, does violate the thorough and effi
cient clause of the West Virginia Constitution as
interpreted by the West Virgina Supreme Court in
Pauley et al v. Kelly et al, and as developed by
the testimony on remand, as well as the equal
protection clause, and this Court will suggest
through the master plan certain legislation for
standards, time tables, and ways and means to
provide the resources to deliver those standards.
However, it is ultimately a legislative function,
as to whether to adopt the master plan, and what
ever the Legislature does do, can only and will
only be measured by the existing constitutional
standards when the matter is again considered.
It is a constitutional imperative that the Legis
lature provide for a thorough and efficient
system of free schools by general law.

It is a judicial function to determine if this
legislative responsibility is being exercised in
conformity with the language of the Constitution.

"Our basic law makes education funding second
in priority only to payment of the state
debt, ahead of every other state function."
And in State ex rel. Board of Education v.
Rockef eller:

"In final analysis . . . our Constitution .
gives a constitutionally preferred status to
public education in this State."

Lastly, there was also no evidence that the adop
tion of statewide high quality educational stand
ards and the resources to deliver those standards
will require business to move from the State of
West Virginia, instead the effect of all testi
mony, and the definitions established by the West
Virginia Supreme court, is that the delivery of
high quality standards will provide a more edu
cated citizenry, and thus a more educated labor
force.
Thus not only retaining the existing
businesses, but serving as one of the essential
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elements in attracting new industries.^7
What is expressed in this Supplemental Opinion is
contained in various protions of the original Opinion,

but is offererd in a condensed version .so there will be

no misunderstanding as to the intent and scope of this
opinion and why it was reached.

Nationwide, however,

education is not yet a basic right for all.
Since education is a fundamental right in West

Virginia, a duty of care rests upon the educators and

responsible administrators of that state.

Judge Recht’s

established "standard of care" at this point is only an

opinion.

Because of the separation of powers, the court

cannot in any way demand that the legislature adopt these

standards and plan.

It would take specific legislation

to develop standards to be implemented in the school

system and against which the the courts, if needed, could
measure educational performance, delivery and procedures.
Lacking these, all West Virginia has now is the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals1 ruling that education
is a fundamental right, which has emerged from the West

Virginia Constitution, Art. XII, § 1 .
Plaintiff-students seeking educational equality

through the federal 14th Amendment equal protection

187 See note 185 supra.
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rights will fail, as held in Rodriguez^^ since the
states are responsible for examining their own constitu
tions to determine their education responsibility.

That is just what happened in West Virginia through the
ruling of the Supreme Court of Appeals in Pauley v.

Kelly. 190

In footnote 7 of that case, it is noted that

’’equal protection applied to education must mean an

equality in substantive educational offerings and

results, no matter what the expenditure may be." 1Q37 1

So

far, so good, but despite these positive statements,
opinions, and so forth, West Virginia at this point does

not have standards for education that would carry weight.
If an educational malpractice suit would be tried right

now in West Virginia, there would be no standards against
which to measure performance.

However, since education

is a fundamental right in West Virginia, there is an
established "duty of care."

The 'judge in such a case

could say that the needed standards were not available

and that the school district should develop such in order
for the court to alleviate the problem.

The court would

188 San Antinio Independent School District v.
Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 935 Ct. 1278, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16
(1973).
189 See note 182 supra at 864.

190 Id. at 859.
191 Id. at 865.
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not have to accept developed standards if they did not

help alleviate the problem.

However, it is doubtful that

the court would get involved to such a degree as long as
the legislature did not enact special legislation in this
area.
A plaintiff-student otherwise could actually bring a
suit of educational malpractice based on education being
a fundamental right.

He could argue that the school

district did not provide his equal education opportunity,

which violated his equal protection rights.

Thus if

Donohue ^2 and Ppt-.pr
had been tried in West
Peter w.^93
W.

Virginia, the plaintiffs probably would have had more
success than they did in their own states. Although West

Virginia does not have professional standards of education, it nevertheless has "a duty of care” and Judge
Recht ’ s established general standard following the Pauley

v. Kelly case. 194

These standards have been adopted by

the West Virginia State Board of Education, whose
recently developed "Master Plan" (based on expected

192 See note 141, supra.

193 see note 140, supra. Pauley v. Kelley 255 S.E.
2d 859, W.Va. ( 1979) Supreme Court of Appeals of W. Va.
(February 20, 1979).

194 Pauley v. Kelley 255 S.E. 2d 859, W.Va. (1979)
Supreme Court of Appeals of W.Va. (February 20, 1979)
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results) began to be implemented during the 198*1-85
school year ,195

Hoffman 1^6 especially is arguable by these West

Virginia standards that the plaintiff-student may have
been able to frame a successful case, claiming that the

school district had the duty to provide him with an equal
education.

He could have claimed that his equal protec

tion right had been violated since he was not retested
and was left in a class with mentally retarded children

where he was kept below the level of his intellectual

ability to learn, decreasing his opportunities to receive

a thorough and efficient education that would enable him
to lead a productive, happy life.

However, we must ask

if the West Virginia courts also would be reluctant and

invoke public policy considerations as was done in Peter
W. and Donohue.

The court might find and accept a com-

pelling state interest, such as, for instance, financial
exigency, such as, for instance, financial exigency

(strict scrutiny test applies).

195 west Virginia State Department of Education,
’’Master Plan for Public Schools”--to be obtained
through:
1. West Virginia State Department of Education,
2. Local Boards of Education, 3« Respective
Superintendents, 4. Local Public Libraries.

196 See note 88 supra.
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Negligence

Common Law Negligence

In order to successfully create a liability for
educational malpractice under the theory of common law

negligence, a legal duty of care owed by the educator to
the respective students would need to be established.

In

the cases of Peter W. and Donohue, as well as Hoff man,
the courts clearly noted that in the final analysis, a
legally cognizable duty of care could not be found.
•

These cases could be termed ordinary educational malprac

tice suits since they involved only a general failure of

the school district to educate adequately and the prac

tice of social promotion.197

The New York courts spelled

out the very factors to be taken into account when analyzing a cause of action under the common law tort of

negligence.

These factors are:

1.

The existing relationship between a plaintiff
and the respective defendant;

2.

The existence of a standard of care in order
to measure the defendant’s conduct;

3-

The proof that the plaintiff has suffered an
injury;

4.

The establishment of a causal link between

197 peter W. v. San Fancisco Unified School Dist.,
60 Cal. App. 3d at 817, 131 Cal. Rptr. 855; Donohue v.
Copiague Union Free School Dist., 347 N.Y. 2d 442, 391
N.E. 2d at 1353, 418 N.Y.S. 2d 376.
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the plaintiff’s injury and the defendant’s
conduct.'9°
The California Court of Appeals in Peter W. very

emphatically displayed maximum resistance to a cause of
action in educational malpractice, holding that school

districts have no legal duty to educate their students
properly.1^9

It mentioned the great difficulties in

establishing the necessary elements of a cause of action
in common law tort, which are a workable standard of
care, a measurable injury and a causal relationship be-

tween such injury and the defendant’s conduct. 200

Finally, public policy considerations were involved which
prevented the court from recognizing any cause of action

in these two cases.

These public policy considerations

were based on two major points:

(1) the heavy social

202
burdens and (2) the economic burdens.201. 202

203_

The

court also said that ’’the creation of a standard with
which to judge our educators’ performance (would not)

198 Comment, ’’Hoffman v. Board of Education N.Y. n
2d 121, 400 N.E. 2d 317, 424 N.Y.S. 2d 376 (1979); 10
Hofstra L. Rev. 279-309 (.1981 ).
199 Id. at 825 and 131 Cal. Rptr. 861.
200 Id.

201 Id.

(concern about public image of schools).

202 47 N.Y. 2d 444, 391 N.E. 2d 1354, 418 N. Y.S.- 2d
377-78.
203 Id. at 443, 391 N.E. 2d 1353, 418 N.Y.S. 2d 377.
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pose an insurmountable obstacle. ”20^

The court in

Donohue also recognized a cognizable injury, since the
plaintiff-student was incapable of comprehending simple

English.205

It even conceded that causation might in

fact be established, although the ’’many outside factors
qnA
involved in the learning process”^UD were seen as a prob-

lem in establishing a cause of action.

Not quite clear is the Court of Appeals’ stance in
the Hoffman case.

Even though Hoffman did not allege

educational malpractice, the above court noted that
’’although plaintiff’s complaint does not expressly so

state, his cause of action sounds in educational
malpractice. h207

However, Hoffman is quite different

from the other two cases, since specific acts of negli-

gence had been committed which ruined the plaintiff’s
chances in life.

These acts are also distinguishable

insofar as they could not be termed ’’frequently

204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 49 N.Y. 2d 125, 400 N.E. 2d 319, 424 N.Y.S. 2d
378. Diamond, Education Law, 29 Syracuse L. Rev. 103,
150-56 (1978).
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reoccurable" as they were in the other two cases.^0$

Hoffman also involved a clear and specific affirmative

act of negligence where the necessary elements could be
established easily .

One can speculate that the court

saw these facts too, but nevertheless did not accept a

cause of action in either educational malpractice or in
tort, being very convinced of the detrimental impact such

actions might have on the schools and on society as a
whole (effects of misplaced children). ^9

This is an

indication that educational malpractice suits might lead
to too many detrimental side effects without getting at

the root causes of the problem.
Elements of Negligence
Duty.

In tort, no recovery is possible except a

duty of due care can be legally imposed upon the defendant.

Therefore, a court would first have to be

Legal
McClung, "Competency Testing Programs:
and Educational Issues," 47 Fordham L. Rev. 651-54
(1979). The Department of Health, Education and Welfare
published a study estimating that about one million
youths between the ages 12-17 could not read at a fourth
grade level and could be considered illiterate; this
would justify the courts1 concern about a flood of
litigation overflooding the courts, bringing in their
wake financial burdens for school districts.

209 Larry P. v. Riles 343 F. Supp. 1306-08’ (N.D.
Cal., 1972) aff'd, 502 F. 2d 963, 9th Cir. (1974) (a
child misplaced in a class for retarded children may
suffer irreparable harm over a short period of time).
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convinced that the educator has a duty to provide
efficient instruction.

Standard of Care.

Furthermore, the court will be

looking for a standard of care against which to determine
if that duty has been breached.

There are two choices

available, depending on the origin of the duty:

(1) the

reasonable person standard of care, or (2) the professional standard of care.

For instance, such a standard

probably could be derived from an occupational standard
of care, which would measure the educator's acts against

the profession's standards and customs. 210
however,

The problem,

is that such standards and customs cannot be so

easily found, due to a lack of specific goals and a wide
range of approaches to pedagogy and pedagogical problems.
For instance ,

just consider the problem of getting educa-

tors to agree on "the primary goal of education."

The

goal might be to teach basic skills, to socialize human

beings, to develop creative capacity, or perhaps all
three .

We must ask if experts could testify to a clear-

cut educational standard as is possible in medicine.

The

court in Otero v. Mesa county Valley School District, No.
51, had the following to say:

210 Comment, "Hoffman v. Board of Education," 10
Hofstra L. Rev. 279-309 (1981).
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Certainly, if the expert testimony proved any
thing, it proved that educational theory is not
an exact science, and an expert can be found who
will testify to almost anything. Listening to
these experts causes one to conclude that if
psychiatrists’ disagreements are to be compared
to differences between educators, psychiatrists
are almost of a single mind.

In the case of Hoffman, however, a clear or par
ticular educational theory would not have been
necessary to accept the argument that the school
district in Hoffman failed to meet a comprehen
sible, measurable, spelled-out standard of due
care. '
A plaintiff in negligence must show an

Injury.

injury and it also must be a legally compensable one.

The court in Peter W. stated that it could not find
with ’’any reasonable degree of certainty that . .

plaintiff suffered injury within the meaning of the law

of negligence.

9 19

The Supreme Court, Appellate

Divisionin Donohue took the same stance, relying on

Peter W..2^

The court in Donohue said that ’’the law was

not intended to protect against the ’injury’ of

211 408 F. Supp. 162-64, D. Colo. (1975), vacated on
prodedural grounds, 568 F. 2d 1312, 1th Cir. (1978).

212 Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School
District, 60 Cal. App. 3d 814-25, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854-61
( 1976).

213 Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School district,
64 Aoo. Div. 2d 29-36, 407 N.Y.S. 2d 874-80 ( 1978) (see
also note 200 supra).
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ignorance, for every individual is born lacking

knowledge, education and experience. »214
But in Donohue the court rejected the Peter W.

court’s stance and held that one could not in good faith

deny that a student who upon graduation from high school

cannot comprehend simple English . . . has not in some
fashion been injured.2^

If this is so, how much easier

to find an injury in the case of Hoffman. 216

A very stern stance should not be left out here,
which the court took in Gregory B. 217

Gregory B. claimed

unconstitututional confinement (compulsory school atten

dance) since he received inadequate education:

How is such inadequacy to be measured? Against
the inadequacy of nothing, that is to say, not
going to school? ... A court may reasonably
assume that a student, even in a school which
falls below the median ... is educationally
betterserved than without an education at
all.218

Causation.

It does not seem- so difficult to estab-

lish the aforementioned elements of duty of care,
standard of care, and injury, as required in a suit of

214 Id.

215 Id.
216 See note 211 supra.

217 In re Gregory B., 88 Misc. 2d 313-18, 387 N.Y.S.
2d 380-84, Fam. Ct. (1976).
218 Id.
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negligence.

More difficult, it seems, to establish is a

nexus between the injury caused by faulty or negligent
educational approaches and the failure of a student to
learn.

It is a very difficult or even the most difficult

task to tackle.21^

The problem is that there are a num-

ber of causes leading to nonlearning.

Most of them are

not well understood nor is their interaction or main
fixation.

Thus, the courts feel that as a matter of law,

a causation cannot be proven.22^

Causation, also called

culpability, comes with a characteristic of proximate
and/or direct cause requirement.

A plaintiff-student in

tort must prove that the defendant’s educational conduct
was in fact the direct cause of his nonlearning or in-

jury. 221

Then he also has to prove that it is the

Comment, ’’Educational Negligence: A Student’s
Cause of Action for Incompetent Academic Distinction,” 58
N.C.L. Rev. 596 ( 1980); Generally: W. Page Keeton, Dan
B. Dobbs, Robert E. Keeton, David G. Owen, Prosser and
Keeton on The Law of Torts, 161-66, 5th ed. (1984) ;
Comment, ’’Educational Malpractice: When Can Johnny
Sue?” 7 Ford U.R.B. L.J. 1 17-32 ( 1979); Note,
’’Educational Malfeasance: A New Cause of Action for
Failure to Educate,” 14 Tulsa L.J. 383-401 (1978).
220 "Suing for Not Learning,” Time, at 73 (March 3,
1975); ’’Suing the Teacher,” Newsweek, at 101 (October 3,
1977); Stull, ’’Why Johnny Can’t Read—His Own Diploma,”
10 Pac. L.J. 647 (1979).
221

Prosser and Keeton, supra note 219 at 236-45.

I
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proximate cause of that harm as well. 222

The test for

cause in fact is the "but for" rule; where it can be

proven that such would not have happened "but for" the
tortious conduct .

.

. plaintiff is entitled to full

damages.
This test could have been applied in Hoffman, where
a clear negligent act was committed. 224

In the cases of

Peter W. and Donohue^2^ a multiplicity of factors might

be claimed as variables affecting a student’s learning,

because there is no clear understanding of how these
variables affect the learning process.

Some of those

variables include emotional, social, economic, cultural,
psychological (student-teacher relationship), and intel

lectual variables, peer pressure, attitude, etc.^6

The

court in Peter W. was cognizant of this fact and held:
(l)he achievement of literacy in the schools or
its failure are influenced by a host of factors
which affect the pupil subjectively, from outside
the formal reading process; and beyond the con
trol of its ministers. They may be physical,
neurological, emotional, cultural, environmental.

222 Id.

at 245-70.

223 Restatement of Torts § 912, Comment f at 586
( 1939) .
224 See note 211 supra.

225 See notes 212 and 213 supra.
226 Sprinthall and Sprinthall, Learning and the
Classroom in Educational Psychology, 159-65 ( 1969) .
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They may be present ^ijyt not perceived, recognized
but not identified.

Because of the interaction of these many variables,
the "substantial factor" test may be more appropriate.

Here liability remains with the defendant if it can be
proven that his conduct was a material factor in causing

the injury—in our case, the illiteracy.

nn Q

Expert tes

timony would be required which probably would contested

due to the aforementioned disagreements concerning educa-

tion and its pedagogical approaches.

This may lead to

almost an absence of scientific evidence and/or theoretical consensus in regard to the best teaching method

and, process. 2297

It was also proposed to use the "compar

ative method" of proof. 230

The plaintiff using this

method would try to prove that the class of which he was

a member performed significantly poorer than did

227 See note 217 supra.

Note, "Educational Malpractce: Can the
Judiciary Remedy the Growing Problem of Functional
Illiteracy?" 13 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 27-32 (1979) Comment,
"Educational Malpractice: When Can Johnny Sue?" 7 Ford
U.R.B. L. Rev. 117 ff (1979).
2^9 Funston, "Educational Malpractice:
A Cause of
Action in Search of a Theory," 18 San Diego L. Rev. 743812 (1981 ) .

230 Comment, "Educational Malpractice," 124 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 755-82 (intentional tort) 783-90 (mandamus)
(1970).

I
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identical classes (identical in all major aspects except
for the defendant-educator).231

The general problem here is that it is so dJ.fficult
to prove whether the student himself, other variables, or
the teacher caused the academic liability to perform at a

twelfth-grade level.

The court in Donohue expressed it

as follows:
(T)he plaintiffs complaint must be dismissed
because of the practical impossibility of demon
strating that a breach of the alleged common law
and statutory duties was the proximate cause of
his failure to learn. . . . (l)t is virtually
impossible to calculate to what extent, if any,
the defendant acts or omissions proximately
caused the plaintiff’s inability to read at his
appropriate grade level.
But in Hoffman233 no SUCh insecurity and diffi-

culties existed.

Duty, injury and proximate cause could

have been established.

Hoffman’s miplacement over a

twelve-year period because the school did not retest him

after the psychologist’s recommended period of two years

was indisputable.

However, Hoffman is not a case of

educational malpractice as such, but a situation where a
school district had set up a rule—that is, to retest its

231 Id. at 750-91.
232 Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 64
App. Div. 2d 29-35, 407 N.Y.S. 2d 874-81 (1978).

233 Hoffman v. Board of Education, 64 A.D. 2d 36976, 410 N.Y.S. 2d 99-104, 49 N.Y. 2d 121, 400 N.E. 2d
317, 424 N.Y.S. 2d 376 (1979).
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students based on the psychologist’s recommendation--

which it violated.

Thus, Hoffman was a pure case of

plain negligence (nonfeasance).

In Larry P. v. Riles^34

the court noted that improper placement in education is a
permanent stigma on a student’s record.

Thus, it is

clearly recognized that misplacement does cause injury

regardless of any other factors.
But Hoffman’s cause of action was denied because of

policy considerations,235 adding the argument of a

court ’ s impropriety to judicially interfere in educa
tional matters;236 similar concerns were expressed in
In deciding all three cases
Donohue 2?7
3 ' and Peter W.^38

the court relied mainly on policy considerations.

234 343 F. Supp. 1306, N.D. Cal. (1972) aff’d, 502
F. 2d 963, 9th Cir . ( 1974).
235 noo N.E. 2d at 319.
236 Id.

237 407 N.Y.S. 2d at 878-79, 47 N.Y. 2d at 444-45,
391 N.E. 2d at 1354-55, 418 N.Y.S. 2d at 378.
238 60 Cal. App. 3d at 825, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
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CHAPTER FIVE

Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions

1.

To this point the courts have steadfastly refused to

recognize a cause of action for educational malpractice.
The judiciary seems to be motivated by two different

policy concerns, one internal and the other pertaining to
external matters.

The internal concerns deal with the

impact that recognition of educational malpractice would

have on the courts, such as being swamped by a flood of
litigation, much of which would be frivolous, preten-

tious, and so forth.

The external or public policy concerns center on the
consequences of such litigation, such as increased finan-

cial burdens on an already burdened school system,

teacher shortages, stifling of creativity, and encouragement of defensive teaching.
2.

The quite extensive legal and general literature on

educational malpractice that has emerged says that educa

tional malpractice should be accessable to all students

and families; and that such actions are bound to occur in
the immediate future.

Another surprising point is that
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most of the commentaries, legal notes, and related
literature are unanimously enthusiastic for the judiciary

to solve the problem of non- and/or undereducation.
3.

Noninterference in day-to-day academic operations of

schools is the prevailing judicial course of action.

The

courts feel that they should not get involved in the

daily management of schools.

4.

West Virginia is different from other states in

regard to educational malpractice.

The situation can be

summarized as follows.

West Virginia’s constitution has a standard of a
’’thorough and efficient" system of free schools” (W. V.

Const.

XII . § 1).

The West Virginia Supreme Court of

appeals in Pauley v. Kelley, 225 S.E. 2d 859 ( 1979) ,
formed a fundamental right out of this constitutional

standard.

Thus the Pauley case enumerated a constitu-

tional requirement for a ’’thorough and efficient” educa-

tion in West Virginia.

The court in its opinion noted

further that the West Virginia Constitution in requiring

a ’’thorough and efficient” education was making education
a fundamental right in that state, establishing a ’’duty
of care.”

This has been followed by a Master Plan devel

oped by the State Department of Education.

Due to this

unique situation in West Virginia, educational malprac

tice litigation may be viewed with a

certain optimism
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for success.

So far, West Virginia does not have any

statutory provisions regarding educational malpractice.
5.

"Public policy" considerations were important in the

educational malpractice cases.

The court in Peter W.

stated that "The ultimate consequences in terms of public

time and money would burden them (the courts)—and

society--beyond calculation."
6.

Public policy considerations conflict with indi

vidual injuries.

Many authors regret this stance of the

courts because they see a remedy in educational malprac
tice suits for the deserving student, who gets lost in

the system and loses out just like Hoffman.

Thus a twofold dilemma emerges.

On the one hand

policy considerations seem to be justified to a large
degree, but on the other hand there is the unremedied

tragedy of an individual student.

7.

Educational malpractice cases probably have only a

small chance of success in the immediate future.

A judge

may, however, become convinced of the need for educational malpractice litigation and pick up on the Hunter

and Hoffman cases as well as the West Virginia Pauley v.
Kelley case and its legal ramifications.
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Recommendations

Recommendations for Implementation

Based on the research conducted and the emerging
conclusions , it is the author’s opinion, that the courts
are not necessarily the proper forums for dealing with

noneducation or undereducation.

It seems at least ques

tionable that the solution to the problem of educational

malpractice should rest solely with the judiciary due to
the nature of the academics dispute and its likelihood of
being a social problem.

Courts in themselves are not

reform forums, but rather forums to interpret the law and

to review rules, regulations, procedures, and applica
tions and/or violations of statutes.

Thus, a different, more comprehensive approach needs
to be considered.

1.

Development of a Professional Standard for Educators

In order for courts to determine that a duty of care
has been breached, a standard is essential.

It is there

fore recommended that the lack of a professional standard

of care be remedied through the development of such by

the profession (educators).

Such a standard could be

derived from an ocupational standard of care, measuring

an educator 1s acts against the standards and customs of

the profession.
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2.

Administrative Relief
Damages in the traditional sense of tort law should

not be granted since such awards might not further the

improvement of the educational process or remedy a
student’s academic deficiencies at the time of gradua
tion .

However, remedial training could be awarded in.

combination with a monetary award and other necessary
remedies that would improve the educational situation for

an individual student through an internal process similar

to a grievence procedure.
3.

Establishment of an Educational Law Administrative
Agency
An independent quasi judicial system should be estab

lished that would function as an administrative agency,

when the administrative relief is not deemed adequate.
Educational law judges with a necessary staff of educa

tional researchers and investigators would investigate,
review, and rule in cases and situations such as Hoffman,
Peter W. , and Donohue, and the courts would have only an

oversight role through a review process if necessary.

The democratic process of input into the situation
by educators and educational administrators would be

guaranteed and desirable.
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Recommendations for Further Studies
Due to a variety of inconsistencies and the diverse
variables involved in educational malpractice, further
clarification is needed.

The following further studies

are therefore suggested:
1.

Research in education sciences to determine the root
causes of educational malpractice.

2.

Synthesis of legal writing on educational malprac-

tice to develop consistent definitions.

APPENDIX

ABSTRACTS OF CASES
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Case
Negligent Supervision of Extracurricular Activity
of Students

Bradshaw v. x7awlings , 464 F. Supp. 17d, United States
District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania (1979).

Facts:

Bradshaw and Rawlings, two sophomore students
at Delaware Valley College, attended a sophomore
class picnic at a grove operated by the
Moennerchor Society. Attendance was free of
charge and draft beer was served in unlimited
quantity.
Involved in the program planning was a faculty
member of the college (sophomore class advisor)
who also disbursed the money to purchase the
alcoholic beverages.
The college administration provided flyers
notifying the sophomores of the upcoming
event, date, time and place. The flyers
contained pictures of beer mugs. They were
displayed throughout the campus. This event
took place in spite of the published regulations
of the college prohibiting the use of alcoholic
beverages by students under the age of 21 years.

Rawlings attended the party for several hours
and was observed drinking 5-6 mugs of beer.
He—at the end of the party—was seen to drive
his vehicle at a high speed and in a circle on
a grassy field, He was asked to leave immediately. Rawlings did so with Bradshaw being
his passenger. On the way back to the college
he lost control of his vehicle, smashed into
a parked car, totaling both vehicles.

Bradshaw suffered a cervical fracture which
caused quadraplegic paralysis.
Bradshaw and his parents brought action in
the United States District Court seeking
damages based upon the alleged negligence
of:
(1) Rawlings, (2) the College, (3) the
Borough of Doylestown, Pennsylvania, and
(4) the beer distributor who sold the beer
consumed at the class picnic.

145

Issue(s) :

Under Pennsylvania law, is a college subject
to liability based upon negligent supervision
of a student activity, when the college
participates in the planning of the event
involving the consumption of beer—by persons
under the legal drinking age—assists in the
purchase of the beer and advertises the event
as well, but does not supervise the event?

Answer:

Yes .

Seasoning of the Court

Court noted that a college administration does not need
to supervise sophomores in all circumstances and instances.
However, in this instance a faculty member had been
involved in the planning of the event where beer was
served, assisting in the disbursement of funds for pur
chasing it but failed to attend the picnic or to ask a
faculty colleague to attend. The advertising clearly
implied (by the drawings) that beer would be available.
In addition, the Court noted, the institution’s rules
indicated the institution’s knowledge of the danger of
the use of alcohol by immature students. Under these
circumstances and where the activity was contrary to the
institution’s own rules and no supervision was afforded
the college may be held liable for negligence.

The Court said:
. .the College was permitted to
argue to the jury that it was not negligent because
it was powerless to control the habits of college
sophomores in regard to drinking beer. The jury rejected
the College’s defense that it acted in a reasonable manner
under the circumstances."
All four cited defendants were found liable for damages
in excess of one million dollars.
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Professor fails to perform a duty.

Butler v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 331 So.
2d 192, Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit
(1976) .
Facts:

A biology professor allowed a student to
conduct an experiment which required the
extraction of blood from other student
volunteers.
One of the coed volunteer students fainted
after the extraction of blood, while being
walked to a table. She fell forward (on
the ground) and broke and damaged six teeth
in the process.
While the experiment was conducted, no
wheelchair, bed or other readily available
place for lying down was available.

The coed student (plaintiff) charged that
the professor was negligent for not having
properly instructed the experimenting
student as to the procedures to be followed
in such a situation and for not providing
equipment such as a stretcher, bed, etc.,
for just such an emergency.
Issue(s) :

When a student obtains permission from the
professor to perform an experiment requiring
a medical function, does that professor owe
a duty to the volunteer student in such an
experiment insofar as to take the same safety
precautions for a person’s welfare as would
be taken by licensed medical doctors in that
locality?

Answer:

Yes .

Reasoning of the Court
"The law is well settled that
The court stated that:
nurses and medical technicians who undertake to perform
medical services are subject to the same rules relating
to the duty of care and to liability as are physicians
in the performance of professional sendees. The sarr.e
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rule applies to a university professor. . .who approves
and undertakes to supervise a project which includes
the performance of a medical function such as the with
drawal of blood from volunteer students. If he allows
a student to perform that medical function then he owes
a duty to the volunteer patient or blood donor to see
that the same precautions are taken for the safety and
well being of that patient as would be taken by licensed
This constituted "a
medical doctors in that locality,
proximate cause of the accident.”
Note:

1.

The professor had failed to properly
instruct the student who conducted the
experiment.

2.

The professor had failed to provide for
the necessary safety facilities.
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Case

Maryland does not recognize cause of actions for
’’Educational Malpractice” based on public policy.
Doe v. Board of Education of Montgomery County, Md. ,
Cir. Ct. 48 U.S.L.W. 2077 (1979).

Summary of Facts, I ssues , Reasoning of the Court
(See following quoted U.S.L.W. summary.
WVU Law Center.)

Case not at

"Educational Malpractice--Maryland does not recognize
cause of action for ’educational malpractice’ brought
against county school board by public school student
who claims that, as result of school officials’ mis
diagnosis of mental ability, he is virtually illiterate.
"The court refuses to recognize educational malpractice
as a cause of action in Maryland. Before any plaintiff
can recover in a negligence action, he must show a breach
of either a common-law duty or statutory duty of care
resulting in an injury to the plaintiff. The trial
courts are free to find new causes of action, or that
there is a new duty arising to some person through
new law or social change. However, the question of
whether or not there is a duty arising here so that
an individual student can bring a suit for damages
to correct an inadequacy in the school system is one
that is better dealt with procedurally as in Peter W.
v. San Francisco Unified School District, 60 Cal. App.
2d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr 854, and Donohue v. Copiague
Union Free School District, 407 N.Y. Supp. 2d 874. Both
held that no duty to provide an adequate education existed
toward the individual student. While other types of suits
might be brought to enforce the duties of educators to
provide a meaningful education for the youth of the state,
those cases ruled that an action for damages by an indi
vidual student was not available for an alleged failure
to reach certain educational objectives. It would be
a sad state of affairs if juries were able to decide
whether or not the school system had functioned properly,
and dole out taxpayers’ money with the idea that this
might in some way correct the situation. I do not believe
that it is in the public interest to adopt this type of
cause in this state.
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"One case recognized negligence or misfeasance as
compared to nonfeasance as the basis for a cause of
action for 0educational malpractice.* I do not think
that either misfeasance or nonfeasance should give
rise to that cause of action in this state. Finally,
the fact that a school board purchases insurance to
protect itself from this type of suit does not
necessarily give rise to any cause of action.
--Miller, J.

"Md. Cir. Ct. , Montgomery Cty; Doe v. Board of Education
of Montgomery County, Maryland, 7/6/79."
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Case

Educators owe no legal duty of care to their students to
base a negligence action for "educational malpractice."
Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District, 407 N . Y. S .
2d 874, New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division (1978).

F acts:

A former high school student brought action
against his former school to recover damages
for ’’educational malpractice" or for breach
of statutory duty to educate. He had received
failing grades in various subjects and although
he lacked basic reading and writing skills, he
was allowed to graduate.

Agter graduation he needed to acquire those
skills through tutoring.
In his suit he alleged that the school "gave
passing grades and/or minimal or failing
grades in various subjects. Failed to eval
uate the plaintiff’s mental ability and
capacity to comprehend the subjects being
taught to him at said school; failed to
take proper means and precautions that they
reasonably should have taken under the cir
cumstances; failed to interview, discuss,
evaluate and/or psychologically test the
plaintiff in order to ascertain his ability
to comprehend and understand such subject
matter; failed to provide adequate school
facilities, teachers, administrators,
psychologists, and other personnel trained
to take the necessary steps in testing and
evaluation processes insofar as the plaintiff
is concerned in order to ascertain the learn
ing capacity, intelligence and intellectual
absorption on the part of the plaintiff;
. . .failed to advise his parents of the
difficulty and necessity to call in psychi
atric help; that the processes practiced
were defective and not commensurate with a
student attending a high school within the
county of Suffolk; failed to adopt the
accepted professional standards and methods
to evaluate and cope with plaintiff’s
problems which constituted educational
malpractice."
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Issue(s) :

Do the Courts of the State of New' York
recognize a cause of action to recover
for so-called ’’educational malpractice, •r
or for breach of a statutory duty to
educate?

Answer:

No .

Reasoning of the Court
This court held that educators owe no legal duty of
care to their students upon which a negligence action
for educational malpractice could be based. The
educators’ failure to evaluate the ’’under-achiever
student’’ as set forth in the New York statute, the
court found, did not give rise to-"action sounding
in tort." The last point made was that education
was surrounded by a multitude of factors affecting
it and the learning processes as well; therefore
making it impossible to prove that acts or omissions
by teachers were the actual proximate cause(s) of a
student’s lack in basic skills.
Justice Suozzi (dissenting)

Because of the significance and depth of this dissent
ing opinion, it will be reproduced here in full:
"In my view, the complaint states a valid cause of
action.

’’The first cause of action sounds in negligence and
malpractice and alleges, interalia, that the defendant,
school district was under a duty to educate the plaintiff
and qualify him for a high school graduation certificate
and that the defendant failed to properly perform that
duty.
"As a second cause of action, plaintiff alleges the
breach of a constitutional duty under section 1 of
article XI of the State Constitution. This provision
of the Constitution states:

’The legislature shall provide for the maintenance and
support of a system of free common schools, wherein all
the children of this state may be educated. '
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"In dismissing the first cause of action, the Special
Term and the majority rely on a decision of an appellate
court in California which dismissed a very similar cause
of action (Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist.,
60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854). . An examination
of the decision in Peter W. reveals that the cause of
action was dismissed because of two distinct policy
considerations (Peter W., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 824-25,
131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 861, supra):

1.

’[Tjhat the achievement of literacy in the schools,
or its failure, are influenced by a host of factors
which affect the pupil subjectively, from outside
the formal teaching process, and beyond the control
of its ministers. They may be physical, neuro
logical, emotional, cultural, environmental; they
may be present but not perceived, recognized but
not identified.

2.

’To hold [schools] . . . to an actionable duty of
care, in the discharge of their academic functions,
would expose them to the tort claims—real or
imagined—of disaffected students and parents
in countless numbers. . . . The ultimate consequences, in terms of public time and money, would
burden them—and society—beyond calculation. ’

"In dismissing the second cause of action for breach of
a constitutional duty, the Special Term relied primarily
on two New York Court of Appeals cases (Steitz v. City
of Beacon, 295 N.Y. 51, 64 N.E. 2d 7C4 and Moch Co. v.
Rensselaer Water Co., 247 'N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896).
"In Moch, the defendant, a waterworks company, contracted
with a city to supply water for various needs, including
service at fire hydrants. During the period that the
contract was in force, a building caught fire, spread
to plaintiff’s warehouse and destroyed it. Plaintiff
brought suit against the water company for failing to
supply adequate water pressure and failing to stop the
spread of the fire before it reached plaintiff's ware
house .
"In dismissing a cause of action for breach of a statutory
duty (as well as for breach of contract and for common-law
tort) , the court stressed that the statutory duty was
merely one to furnish water and that there was nothing
in the statutory requirements to 'enlarge the zone of

i
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liability where an inhabitant of the city suffers
indirect or incidental damage through deficient
pressure at the hydrants’ (Noch, supra, p. 169, 159
N.E. p. 899).
"In Steitz, supra,
supra, 295 N.Y. , p. 54, 64 N.E. 2d p. 705,
plaintiff brought an action against the defendant city
to recover for damage to property from fire, based on
a City Charter which provided that the city ’may con
struct and operate a system of waterworks* and that * it
shall maintain fire, police, school anti poor departments. *
In dismissing the cause of action, the Court of Appeals
stated (p. 55, 64 N.E. 2d p. 706):
"’Quite obviously these provisions were not in terms
designed to protect the personal interest of any
individual and clearly were designed to secure the
benefits of well ordered municipal government enjoyed
by all as members of the community. There was indeed
a public duty to maintain a fire department, but that
was all, and there was no suggestion that for any
omission in keeping hydrants, valves or pipes in repair
the people of the city could recover fire damages to
their property.

" ’An intention to impose upon the city the crushing
burden of such an obligation should not be imputed
to the Legislature in the absence of language clearly
designed to have that effect.’
"Finally, Special Term noted that the commencement of
this action had received substantial attention in
educational circles and the news media and that this
factor, coupled with the recent adoption of 8 NYCRR 3.45
by the Board of Regents, effective June 1, 1979, indi
cated that this case posed a grave policy question which
should be passed upon by appellate courts. The regulation
adopted by the Board of Regents states:

"'3.45 Diplomas. No high school diploma shall be con
ferred which does not represent four years or their
equivalent in grades above grade eight, and no such
diploma shall be conferred upon a pupil who has not
achieved a passing rating in each of the basic competency
tests established by the commissioner. ’

"Initially, it must be emphasized that the policy con
siderations enunciated in Peter W,, supra, do not mandate

154

a dismissal of the complaint. Whether the failure of the
plaintiff to achieve a basic level of literacy was caused
by the negligence of the school system, as the plaintiff
•alleges, or was the product of forces outside .the teaching
process, is really a question of proof to be resolved at
a trial. The fear of a flood of litigation, perhaps much
of it without merit, and the possible difficulty in
framing an appropriate measure of damages, are similarly
unpersuasive grounds for dismissing the instant cause of
action. Fear of excessive litigation caused by the
creation of a new zone of liability was effectively
refuted by the abolition of sovereign immunity many
years ago, and numerous environmental actions fill our
courts where damages are difficult to assess. Under the
circumstances, there is no reason to differentiate between
educational malpractice on the one hand, and other forms
of negligence and malpractice litigation which currently
concest our courts.

"Over and above these preliminary observations, there
are additional reasons which dictate against dismissal
of the complaint at this stage and which were not dis
cussed by Special Term or by the majority.
’’The complaint herein is not drafted solely in terms of
educational malpractice, i.e., the failure of the school
system to successfully teach plaintiff at a certain Level.
The complaint also charges the following:

1,

’That the plaintiff failed various subjects;

2.

’That the defendant was aware of these failures;
and

3.

•That the defendant failed in its duty to ascertain
the reason for these failures and to prescribe
appropriate corrective measures, if necessary.’

"The language of the complaint is illustrative:

"*[T]he defendant. . .gave. . .failing grades in
various subjects; failed to evaluate the plaintiff’s
mental ability and capacity to comprehend the subjects
being taught to him at said schoo; failed to take
proper means and precautions that they reasonably
should have taken under the circumstances; failed to
. . .psychologically test the plaintiff in order to
ascertain his ability to comprehend and understand
such subject matter.’

I
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"That the plaintiff was failing various subjects is readily
demonstrable from his high school transcript, which is part
of the record and which has numerous course failures
(grades below 65, the listed passing grade) designated
thereon, including two in English. Nor can the defendant
claim that these failing grades did not violate any
educational standard. It is true that the regulation of
the Board of Regents establishing competency tests and
passing grades thereon as a requirement for receipt of a
diploma (8 NYCRR 3.45) will not be effective until
June 1, 1979.
However, it should be emphasized that at
present, and during the plaintiff’s four years at the
defendant’s high school, the State Commissioner had a
regulation in effect which provided (8 NYCRR 103.2);
"'103.2 high school diplomas. In order to secure a
State diploma of any type the following requirements
must be met: The satisfactory completion of an approved
four-year course of study in a registered four-year or
six-year secondary school, including English, social
studies including American history, health, physical
education and such other special requirements as are
required by statute and [regents regulations] established
by the Commissioner of Education. ’
"Anyone reading the plaintiff’s high school transcript
would be hard pressed to describe his work as a
'satisfactory completion' of a course of study.
"Having established that the plaintiff was failing
numerous courses, which fact was known to school
authorities, the crucial question to be resolved is
whether the school had a duty under these circumstances
to do more than merely promote this plaintiff in a
perfunctory manner from one year to the next.
n
In this regard, former section 4404 of the Education
Law, which was in effect at the time the plaintiff was
attending defendant’s high school, is crucial. Sub
division 4 of that statute provided, in pertinent part:

"’The board of education of each school district shall
cause suitable examinations to be made to ascertain the
physical, mental and social causes of. . . under
achievement of every pupil in a public school, not
attending a special class, who has failed continuously
in his studies or is listed as an under-achiever.
Such
examinations shall be made in such manner and at such
times as shall be established by the commissioner of
education, to determine if such a child is incapable
of benefiting through ordinary classroom instruction,

IJ
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and whether -such child may be expected to profit from
special educational facilities. The commissioner of
education shall prescribe such reasonable rules and
regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the
provisions of this paragraph. *
’’Section 203.1 of the commissioner’s regulations provides:
"’Children who fail or under-achieve.•

"’A pupil who has failed continuously in his studies
within the meaning of subdivision 4 of section 4404
of the Education Law is one who has failed in two or
more subjects of study for a year. ’

"An examination of the plaintiff’s transcript indicates
that he came within the definition of a pupil who failed
continuously. Despite this fact, the complaint alleges
that the defendant failed to. . .psychologically test
the plaintiff in order to ascertain his ability to com
prehend and understand such subject matter, which was in
direct contravention of the mandate of former section 4404
(subd. 4) of the Education Law.
"The plaintiff has, therefore, shown the existence of
a mandatory statutory duty flowing from the defendant
to him personally and has alleged the breach thereof
by the defendant. To dismiss the complaint, as the
majority proposes, without allowing the plaintiff his
day in court, would merely serve to sanction misfeasance
in the educational system.

"In my view, the negligence alleged in the case at bar
is not unlike that of a doctor who, although confronted
with a patient with a cancerous condition, fails to
pursue medically accepted procedures to (1) diagnose
the specific condition, and (2) treat the condition,
and instead allows the patient to suffer the inevitable
consequences of the disease. Such medical malpractice
would never be tolerated. At the very least, a complaint
alleging same would not be dismissed upon motion.. In
the case at bar, the plaintiff displayed, through his
failing grades, a serious condition with respect to his
ability to learn. Although mindful of this learning
disability, the school authorities made no attempt,
as they were required to do, by appropriate and educa
tionally accepted testing procedures, to diagnose the
nature and extent of his learning problem and thereafter

157
to take or recommend remedial measures to deal with
this problem.
Instead, the plaintiff was just pushed
through the educational system without any attempt
made to help him. Under these circumstances, the
cause of action at bar is no different from the analogous cause of action for medical malpractice and, like
the latter, is sufficient to withstand a motion to
dismiss.
’’Finally, it should be noted that even in Peter W. v.
San Francisco Unified School District, 60 Cal. App. 3d
814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, supra, the California appellate
court recognized that a cause of action for intentional
and fraudulent misrepresentation, if properly pleaded,
could withstand a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, even
though the majority has chosen to affirm the dismissal
of the complaint, that affirmance should be without
prejudice to replead a cause of action for intentional
misrepresentation.

"For the reasons heretofore set forth, I dissent and
vote to deny that branch of the defendant’s motion
which sought to dismiss the complaint for failure to
state a cause of action. It should be noted that the
defendant also moved to dismiss the complaint based
upon the plaintiff’s failure to file a timely notice
of claim pursuant to section 3813 of the Education
Law. Since the Special Term dismissed the complaint
for failure to state a cause of action, it did not
deal at all with the second branch of the defendant’s
motion, i.e., the plaintiff’s failure to serve a timely
notice of claim. Accordingly, I would remand to
Special Term for determination of that issue.”
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Case

Actions for damages could not be maintained against
school district for negligent classification, placement,
or teaching of ^students who were suffering from
dyslexia.

D.S.W., by his next of friends, R.M.W. and J.K.W. ,
v. Fairbanks North Star Borough School District
and
L.a.H. , by his next of friends, L.H. and V.H. ,y.
Fairbanks North Star Borough School District, Alaska,
628 P. 2d 554 (1981), Supreme Court of Alaska (cases
were joined by the court) .

Facts:

L.a.H. , seventeen years, now suffers from a
learning disability known as dyslexia. He
attended Borough School District schools from
kindergarten through sixth grade. During
these years the school district failed negli
gently to diagnose that he was suffering
from dyslexia. Finally at the last day of
L.A.H. *s second year in the sixth grade,
the district did determine that he was
dyslexic.

After that the district gave him special
education for a time to assist him in
overcoming the effects of this disability.
However, these educational efforts (courses)
were negligently terminated, despite the
district’s awareness that L.a.H. had not
overcome his dyslexia.
The complaint stated that L.A.H. had
suffered damage caused by these negligent
acts and omissions including loss of
education, loss* of opportunity for employ
ment, loss of opportunity to attend college
or post high school studies, past and future
mental anguish and loss of income and income
earning ability.
D.W.S.’s claim is very similar. He, too,
suffers from dyslexia. Here, the school
district discovered this condition in the
first grade but did not induce assistance
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to him in order to overcome it until
the fifth grade. He received a
special education program during
fifth and sixth grades which was
negligently discontinued in the
seventh grade 5 well knowing that
he had not been adequately trained
to compensate for dyslexia. Never
theless, nothing was being done any
more for D.S.W.

D.S.W. claims money damages against
the school district naming the same
injuries as claimed by L.A.H.
Issue(s) :

Can actions be brought against a
school district for negligent
classification, placement and
teaching of a student suffering
from dyslexia?

Answer:

No.

Reasoning of the Court

The full opinion of the court is given due to its compre
hensive use ’(summary of the issues in Peter W., Donohue
and Hoffman):

’’Although this is a claim of first impression in Alaska,
two other jurisdictions have considered the question
whether a claim may be maintained against a school for
failing to discover learning disabilities or failing to
provide an appropriate educational program once learning
disabilities are discovered. In neither of these juris
dictions has a claim for damages been permitted.
"The earliest case is Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified
School District, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, Cal. App. (1976).
There the plaintiff alleged, among other claims, that he
suffered from reading disabilities and that the School
District was negligent both by failing to disco- er the
disabilities and by placing him in inappropriate classes,
ihe court defined the problem as whether an actionable
duty of care existed, which is essentially a public policy
question involving the following considerations:
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"The foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff,
the degree of certainty that the plaintiff
suffered injury, the closeness of the connection
between the defendant’s conduct and the injury
suffered, the moral blame attached to the defen
dant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future
harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant
and consequences to the community of imposing a
duty to exercise care with resulting liability
for breach, and the availability, cost and
prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.”
1J1 Cal. Rptr. at 859-60.1 The court noted that the
defendant's conduct, the degree of certainty that the
plaintiff suffered injury, and the establishment of a
causal link between conduct and injury were all highly
problematical in educational malpractice claims:

"Unlike the activity of the highway or the
marketplace, classroom methodology affords
no readily acceptable standards of care, or
cause, or injury. The science of pedagogy
itself is fraught with different and conflicting
theories of how or what a child should be taught,
and any layman might—and commonly does—have
his own emphatic views on the subject. The
injury claimed here is plaintiff’s inability
to read and write. Substantial professional
authority attests that the achievement of
literacy in the schools, or its failure, are
influenced by a host cf factors which affect
the pupil subjectively, from outside the formal
teaching process, and beyond the control of its
ministers.
They may be physical, neurological,
emotional, cultural, environmental; they may be
present but not perceived, recognized but not
identified.

"We find in this situation no conceivable work
ability of a rule of care against which defendants’
alleged conduct may be measured, no reasonable
’degree of certainty that. . .plaintiff suffered
injury’ within the meaning of the law of negligence,
and no such perceptible 'connection between the
defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered’ as
alleged which would establish a causal link between
them within the same meaning (citations and foot
notes omitted).

1This court applied a similar list of factors in deter
mining whether a cause of action for negligent misrepre
sentation should exist in Howarth v. rfeifer, 443 P. 2d
39, 42, Alaska (1968).
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Id. at 860-61. The court also believed that much burden
some and expensive litigation would be generated if such
lawsuits were allowed, stating:
’’Few of our institutions, if any, have aroused
the controversies, or incurred the public dis
satisfaction, which have attended the operation
of the public schools during the last few decades.
Rightly or wrongly, but widely, they are charged
with outright failure in the achievement of their
educational objectives; according to some critics,
they bear responsibility for many of the social
and moral problems of our society at large. Their
public plight in these respects is attested in the
daily media, in bitter governing board elections,
in wholesale rejections of school bond proposals,
and in survey upon survey. To hold them to an
actionable ’duty of care,’ in the discharge of
their academic functions, would expose them to
the tort claims—real or imagined—of disaffected
students and parents in countless numbers. They
are already beset by social and financial problems
which have gone to major litigation, but for which
no permanent solution has yet appeared. The ultimate
consequences, in terms of public time and money,
would burden them—and society—beyond calculation
(citations omitted).

In Donohue v. Coniague Union Free School District, 47 I;.Y.
2d 440, 418 N.Y.S. 2d 375, 391 K.E. 2d 1352 (1979), the
New York Court of Appeals was faced with a claim similar
to that presented in Peter W. The court concluded that
the claim should not be entertained because it would
involve an unjustifiable encroachment by the judiciary
in the administration of public education:
’’Recognition in the courts of this cause of
action would constitute blatant interference
with the responsibility for the administration
of the public school system lodged by Constitution
and statute in school administrative agencies
(citation omitted)."
Id. 418 N.Y.S. 2d at 378, 391 N.E. 2d at 1354.
Hoffman v. Board of Education of the City of New York,
49 N.Y. 2d 121, 424 N.Y.S. 2d 376, 400 N.E. 2d 317 (1979)
presented the problem in a different, and more sympathetic,
context.
Hoffman, a person of normal intelligence, was
negligently diagnosed to be mentally retarded, and was
placed for virtually his entire school career in classes
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for the mentally retarded. A jury had awarded Hoffman .
damages of $750,000. The Appellate Division affirmed
Hoffman’s right to recover (64 A.D. 2d 369, 410 N.Y.S.
2d 99, 1978).
The Court of Appeals reversed, based on
Donohue and in doing so rejected any distinction between
claims involving misfeasance and nonfeasance (424 N.Y.S.
2d at 379, 400 N.E. 2d at 320).

Smith v. Alameda County Social Services Agency, 90 Cal.
App. 3d 929, 153 Cal. Rptr. 712 (1979) involved as one
of the plaintiff’s claims an allegation^ that he had been
negligently placed in a class for the mentally retarded
when the school district knew or should have known that
he was not retarded, The court ruled that no cause of
action was stated, relying on its earlier decision in
Peter W.
”We agree with the results reached in these cases and
with the reasoning employed by the California Court of
Appeal in Peter W. and Smith. In particular we think
that the remedy of money damages is inappropriate as a
remedy for one who has been a victim of errors made
during his or her education. The level of success
which might have been achieved had the mistakes not
been made will, we believe, be necessarily incapable
of assessment, rendering legal cause an imponderable
which is beyond the ability of courts to deal with in
a reasoned way.

"Ho different result is mandated under the Alaska statutes
to which appellants have referred us, AS 14.30.180-350,
the so-called Education for Exceptional Children Act.
Nothing in the Act either expressly or impliedly authorizes
a damage claim. The same considerations which preclude a
damage claim at common law for educational malpractice
preclude inferring one from the Act.
Similar statutory
claims were also presented, and rejected, in Peter W.
v. San Francisco Unified School District, 131 Cal. Rptr.
at 862, and Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District.
64 A.D. 2d 29, 407 N.Y.S. 2d 874, 880-81, App. Div. (1978)’
aff’d, 47 N.Y. 2d 440, 418 N.Y.S. 2d 375, 391 N.E. 2d
1352 (1979).
"Our conclusion does not mean that parents who believe
that their children have been inappropriately classified
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2
or placed are without recourse. AS 14.50.191(c)
provides that any parent believing classification or
placement to be in error may request an independent
examination and evaluation of the child, and for a
hearing before a hearing officer in the event of a
substantial discrepancy. Further, that section pro
vides that the proceedings so conducted are subject
to the Administrative Procedure Act, which in turn
expressly provides for judicial review (AS 44.62.560).

”In our view it is preferable to resolve disputes
concerning classification and placement decisions by
using these, or similar, procedures than through the
mechanism of a tort action for damages. Prompt
administrative and judicial review may correct
erroneous action in time so that any educational
shortcomings suffered by a student may be corrected.
Money damages, on the other hand, are a poor, and
only tenuously related, substitute for a proper
education.
We recognize, of course, that there may
be cases when a student in need of a special placement
is negligently not given it by the school district,
and the student’s parents, having no reason to know
of the need, do not initiate an administrative review
proceeding.
In such cases there are authorities sug
gesting that corrective tutorial programs may be
appropriately mandated. 5 However, we need not reach
that question here.”
2

AS 14.50.191(c) provides: if a parent or guardian
believes that the educational assessment of his child
is in error, he may request an independent examination
and evaluation of the child. If a substantial dis
crepancy exists between the educational assessment of
the school district and the independent evaluation,
and if the parent or guardian so requests, a hearing
shall be held before a hearing officer in order to
resolve the discrepancy between evaluations and to
determine the appropriate educational program placement
for the exceptional child. The Department of Education
shall adopt regulations for the conduct of hearings
authorized by this section and for the appointment and
qualifications of the hearing officer. Regulations
adopted and proceedings conducted under this section
are’ subject to the Administrative Procedures Act.
See J. Elson, ”A Common-Law Remedy for the Educational
Harms Caused by Incompetent or Careless Teaching,” 75
K.W.L. Rev. 64'1
64*1 , 762-68 (1978)
(1978);; Kote, ’’Implications of
Minimum Comnetencv Legislation: A Legal Duty of Care?”
10 Pac. L.J‘. 947/ 967 (1979).
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Case
Since student was not denied the process, by virtue
of university procedures made available, and he did
not exhaust his administrative remedies he was thus
not entitled to have his grades corrected.

Hill v. Trustees of Indiana University, 537 F. 2d 248
(1976).

Facts:

A student (plaintiff) brought action
against the Indiana University, its
trustees, and professor who had given
him failing grades in two classes
based upon the determination that the
student had committed plagiarism.

Issue(s) :

-j

Are plaintiff’s assertions that due
process had been denied to him,
because he had received the two
failing grades without any prior
hearing or opportunity to present
his defense, valid?

2.

Boes it constitute a due process
violation (14th Amendment) that
professor did not comply with the
new code?

t> •

Did plaintiff who was neither expelled
nor suspended and failed to exhaust
the available administrative remedies
give rise to the deprivation of a
constitutionally protected interest
with a necessary prior hearing?

(D

No; (2) No; (3) No.

Answer:

Reasoning of the Court
Plaintiff was neither expelled nor suspended from the
university as a result of his grades. Nor did he incur
any other form of disciplinary action. In fact, he
remained a student in good standing with the full
onnortunity of enrolling in Indiana University during
the fall of 1970.

165

rr , on the
The requirement of a hearing depends, in pc rr
nature of the penalty imposed (Black Coalition v.
Portland School District No. 1, 484 F. 2d 1040, 1044).
Plaintiff has alleged no facts which would show that
his failing grades gave rise to the deprivation of a
constitutionally protected interest, while such interest
was protected Dy the university’s effort to stay any
consequence of the charge until plaintiff’s exercise
of the procedures set forth in the Student Code of
Conduct. Held for the defendants.
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Case
New York’s policy against recognizing ’’educational
malpractice” suits bars negligence action against
city board of education for improperly classifying
and placing student, without re-evaluating him as
suggested by clinical psychologist.

Hoffman v. Board of Education of City of New York,
400 N.E. 2d 317 , Court of Appeals of N.Y. (1973) .

Facts:

The plaintiff was tested by a clinical
psychologist while in kindergarten. He
suffered from a severe speech defect,
which created some doubts about the true
assessment of his level of intelligence.
The psychologist suggested placing the
student in a class for retarded children
since he showed an IQ of 77, but to retest
him within two years of the placement.

The student, Hoffman, was never re-evaluated
and remained for about 12 years in the class
for children with retarded mental development,
due to the result of the first test and
"presumably because his teachers’ daily
observations confirmed his lack of progress"
(48 L.tf. 2459, 1979).
After 12 years the student was transferred
to a shop training center for retarded
youths.
There he was retested within a year, The
results of the test showed that he was not
retarded. Therefore, he could not stay any
more in the shop training center.
Thus, the action was brought about by the
student alleging that the school board was
negligent in not re-evaluating him as sug
gested by the clinical psychologist, which
allegedly resulted in severe injury to
plaintiff's intellectual and emotional
well being and reduced his ability to
obtain employment.
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At trial, the jury awarded plaintiff S75O,0C0
damages.

The Appellate Division affirmed this judgment.
Two justices were dissenting, as to liability,
but would have reversed this judgment and
required plaintiff to retry the issue of
damages had he not consented to a reduction
from $750,000 to $500,000.
The Appellate Division based its affirmance
upon defendant’s failure to administer a
second intelligence test to plaintiff as
recommended by the clinical psychologist.

The Appellate Division of New York charac
terized defendant's failure to retest plaintiff
as an affirmative act of negligence, actionable
under New York law. This court; said there
should be a reversal.
Issue(s):

Answer:

1 o

Even though the student was not retested
as suggested, were public policy con
siderations still precluding recovery
from alleged failure to re-evaluate his
intellectual capacity?

2.

will courts intervene in the administra
tion of the public school system in rhe
most exceptional circumstances involving
gross violations of such defined policies?

3.

Are the court systems the proper forum
to test the validity of an educational
decision to place a particular student
in one of the many available educational
programs offered by the schools?

4.

Are disputes concerning the proper- place
ment of a child in regard to educational
programs best resolved by seeking review
of such professional educational judgment
through the administrative processes
provided by statute?

(1) Yes;

(2) Yes; (3) Ko; (4) Yes.
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Reasoning of the Court

Although the student Hoffman did not expressly so state,
the court held that his cause of action sounds in educa
tional malpractice. The recitation of specific acts of
negligence, the court noted, is in essence an attack
upon the professional judgment of the board of education
grounded upon its alleged failure to properly interpret
and act upon the psychologist’s recommendations.
Citing Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District,
47 N.Y. 2d 440, the court held that such a cause of
action should not, as a matter of public policy, be
entertained by the courts of New York.

Only in the most exceptional circumstances, involving
gross deviation from defined public policy, will courts
in New York intervene in the administration of the
public school system.
The court continued to say that the lower court’s dis
tinction of Donohue upon the ground that the negligence
alleged there was a failure to educate properly or
nonfeasance from the present case which involved an
affirmative act of misfeasance was not valid! But even
if this court would accept such a distinction it would
still reach the same result. The court maintained that
the policy considerations that prompted the decision in
Donohue were applying with equal force to educational
malpractice actions based on allegations of educational
misfeasance and nonfeasance.
The court closed its reasoning by holding that the court
system was not a proper forum to test the validity of the
educational decision of the placement of children in any
of the many educational programs offered by the schools.

Any dispute concerning the proper placement of a child
in a particular educational program can best be resolved
by seeking review of such professional educational judgment
through the administrative processes provided by statute.
Accordingly, the court reversed the Appellate Division’s
ruling and dismissed the case.
Judge Meyer (dissenting)

He agrees with the New York Appellate Division, Judge
Shapiro (410 N.Y.S. 2d 199) that this case does not"”
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involve "educational malpractice" as the majority of
the New York Supreme Court suggests, but discernible
affirmative negligence on the part of the board of
education in failing to carry out the recommendation
for re-evaluation within a period of two years which
was an integral part of the procedure by which plaintiff
was placed in a class for retarded students, and thus
readily identifiable as the proximate cause of plaintiff’s
damages.

k
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Case
Proximate causation, resulting injury and damages
suffice to state a cause of action in regard to
negligence.

Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School District,
585 P. 2d 8519 Supreme Court of California (1978 ) .
Facts:

A ten-year-old student-truant left the
school premises of Foster A. Begg School
during summer school hours without permis
sion and was injured by a motorist.
The mother and the student-truant brought
action against the school district.

The trial court held that the school
district was not liable under such
circumstances. The Supreme Court of
California concluded that the trial
court was in error and that if plaintiffs
could prove that the injuries were proxi
mately caused by the school district’s
negligent supervision, the district may
be held liable for the resultant damages.
Can a school district be held liable
for a student’s injuries, if plaintiff
can prove that student’s injuries were
proximately . caused by district’s
allegedly negligent supervision of
said student while on school premises?

I ssu e(s) :

Answer:

2.

Is the determination, whether district’s
alleged negligence proximately caused
student’s injuries, a question of fact
for jury?

3.

Is it proper to discuss mother’s causes
of action for loss of son’s comfort and
society and for the emotional shock
which she suffered when observing her
son’s injuries at the hospital?

(D Yes; (2) Yes; (3) No.
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Reasoning of the Court
The court stated that:

"A school district bears a duty to supervise students
while on the school premises during the school day and
the district may be held liable for a student’s injuries
which are proximately caused by the district’s failure
to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances.”
The court further noted that a school district cannot
he considered an insurer of students’ safety "but it
hears a legal duty to exercise reasonable care in super
vising students for which the district is responsible
and therefore may be held liable.
The court said that:

''California law has long imposed on school authorities
a duty to ’supervise at all times the conduct of the
children on school grounds and to enforce those rules
and regulations necessary to their protection.’"
The court also noted that:

. . (the question of proximate cause) revolves around
a determination of whether the later cause of independent
origin, commonly referred to as an intervening cause, was
foreseeable by the defendant or, if not foreseeable,
whether it caused injury of a type which was foreseeable.
If either of these questions is answered in the affirmative, then the defendant is not relieved of liability
n
toward the plaintiff. .

There is no recovery of damages by Mary Ann Hoyen for
loss of Michael’s comfort and society and for her own
injuries due to the impact of seeing Michael’s injuries
at the hospital. Mrs. Hoyen claimed the Billon Rule
which says:
"Courts should allow recovery to a mother who suffers
emotional trauma and physical injury from witnessing
the infliction of death or injury to her child for which
the tort-feasor is liable in negligence. Beboe did not
extend the Billon Rule; that is, refused to include a
wife who suffered emotional and physical injury when
seeing her husband in the hospital hours after he had
been injured in an automobile accident due to defendant’s
negligence.”

7
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Case

Futile school systems cannot be sued for improperly
educating a child--but individual educators can be
sued for intentional and malicious action to injure
a child, because such actions can never be considered
to have been done in furtherance of beneficient
purposes of educational systems since such alleged
intentional torts constitute abandonment of employment.

Hunter v. Board of Education of Montgomery County, Md. ,
et al, 439 A • 2d 583, Court of Appeals of Maryland (1982).
Facts:

Ross Hunter, acting through his parents,
brought an "educational malpractice” suit
against the board of education of Montgomery
County, the principal of the elementary
school, and a board employee who had tested
the child, Ross Hunter, as well as the boy’s
sixth grade.

The Hunters charged that in 1968 their son,
Ross, now in Westfield State College in
Massachusetts, was placed in second grade
in Hungerford Elementary School in Rockville
(now, after completed consolidation proce
dures, called Hungerford Park Elementary
School) .
They maintained that he was forced to repeat
first grade material although he already had
completed it earlier in a satisfactory manner.
They further complained that the school
system negligently evaluated the child's
learning abilities and therefore required
him to repeat the first grade materials
even though he was placed in second grade.
This practice, the Hunters declared, which
was maintained throughout elementary school,
caused Ross Hunter to experience ’’embarrass
ment” thus developing "learning deficiencies”
at the same time. In addition, the Hunters
stated that he experienced a ’’depletion of
ego strength" and claimed that the defendant
educators were acting intentionally, mali
ciously, and did furnish false information
to Ross Hunter's parents concerning his
learning disability. They further claimed
that they had altered school records to
cover up their actions and thus demeaned
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the boy. Both claims were dismissed by
the lower courts.

Issue( s) :

Answer:

Reasoning: o

1 .

Can an educational malpractice action
against a school board and various
individual employees for improperly
evaluating, placing and teaching a
student be successfully asserted?

2.

Can an action be brought against an
elementary school principal and a
teacher for intentional and malicious
misplacement of a child and claim for
. relief?

(1) No; (2) Yes (reversed and remanded)

the Court:

The court first states that it conceives that the
gravamen of petitioner’s claims were sound in negli
gence, asserting .damages for the alleged failure of
the school system to properly educate Ross Hunter.

The court stated then that all these so-called
"educational malpractice" claims were so far un
animously rejected by those few jurisdictions that
were considering the topic, such as D.W.S. v. Fairbanks
North Star Borough School District, 628 P. 2d 554,
Alaska (1981); Smith v. Alameda County Social Services
Agency, 90 Cal. App. 3d 929, 153 Cal. Rptr. 712 (1979);
Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School District,
60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Gal. Rptr. 854 (1976);
Hoffman v. Board of Education of City of New York,
49 N.Y. 2d 121 , 424 N.Y.S. 2d 376, 400 N.E. 2d 317
(1979); Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District,
47 N.Y. 2d 440, 418 N.Y.S. 2d 375, 391 N.E. 2d 1352
(1979).
The court noted that all these decisions generally
hold that ”a cause of action seeking damages for acts
of negligence in the educational process is precluded
by considerations of public policy, among them being
the absence of a workable rule of care against which
the defendant’s conduct may be measured, the inherent
uncertainty in determining the cause and nature of
any damages and the extreme burden which would be
imposed on the already strained resources of the public
school system to say nothing of those of the judiciary.”
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The court relied here on Peter 7/., supra, and continued
to say that the Lew York court concluded that if action
would be permitted, it would "contribute blatant inter
ference with the responsibility of the public school
system lodged by (state) constitution and statute in
school administrative agencies."

The court then quoted Hoffman v. Board of Education of
City of New York, and noted that the New York Court of
Appeals had declared that "(t)he policy considerations
which prompted our decision in Donohue apply with equal
force to ’educational malpractice' actions based upon
allegations of educational misfeasance and nonfeasance. H

Thus the court felt that it found itself in substantial
agreement with all other decisions in this area,
It
stated further that the award of money damages to
’’represent a singularly inappropriate remedy for asserted
errors in the educational process.” The court continued
to say that "the misgivings expressed in these cases
concerning the establishment of legal cause and the
inherent immeasurability of damages that is involved
in such educational negligence actions against the school
systems are indeed well founded. Moreover, to allow
petitioners1 asserted negligence claims to proceed would
in effect position the courts of this State as overseers
of both the day-to-day operation of our educational
process as well as the formulation of its governing
This responsibility we loathe to impose on
polici es.
our courts.
Such matters have been properly entrusted
by the General Assembly to the State Department of
Education and the local school boards who are invested
with authority over them. ... In this regard we have
stated in another context that 'the totality of the
various statutory provisions concerning the Board (of
Education) quite plainly. . .invests the. . .Board with
the last word on any matter concerning educational policy
of the administration of the system of publ-ic education.'”
The court advised parents not to think that there was no
recourse to them in case they were aggrieved by an act
or actions of public educators that would affect a child.
It suggested that the General Assembly had provided a
reviewing process for placement decisions of handicapped
children with the inclusion of an appeal to the circuit
court—but emphasized to use and exhaust the administra
tive remedies and if necessary to seek the courts through
the Administration Procedures Act.
Regarding the parents; claim that the defendants had acted
intentionally and maliciously the court noted that research
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had revealed that none of the prior cases of educational
malpractice had "squarely” dealt with the question of
whether public educators might be held responsible for
their intentional torts arising in the educational context.
But the court noted that even though it had declined to
entertain educational negligence and breach of contract
suits, it "in no way wants to shield individual educators
of their liability for their intentional torts." The
court emphatically stated:
"It is our view that where an individual engaged in the
educational process is shown to have wilfully and mali
ciously injured a child entrusted to his educational
care, such outrage greatly outweighs any public policy
considerations which would otherwise preclude lia.bility
so as to authorize recovery. It may well be true that
a claimant will usually face a formidable burden in
attempting to produce adequate evidence to establish
the intent requirement of the tort. . . . Thus, the 4
petitioners are entitled to make such an attempt here.

This is not the first time that this Court has recognized
suits 'based on malicious or outrageous conduct in areas
where nubile policy generally precludes liability (see
Lusby v. Lusby 283 Fid. 334, 352, 390 A. 2d 77, 85-86,
1978) (interspousal immunity not aoplied to intentional
; z Mahnke v. Moore,, 19 Md. 61 , 68,
and outrageous acts);
77 a. :2d 923, 926' (: 1951)
.■ : (parent-child
\
- - -- - immunity abrogated

for malicious and wanton wrongs).
We note that petitioners do not allege that any individual
members of the school board acted intentionally and
maliciously toward young Eunter. Under the doctrine of
responsible superios, the Board can only be held liable

4

In Peter W. , the California court dismissed plaintiffs’
claim of intentional misrepresentation for lack of
specificity after plaintiffs failed to amend their com
plaint.
In Donohue and Hoffman, however, the New York
Court of Appeals did imply in dicta that liability might
exist for those charged with educational responsibility
where their actions constituted "gross violations of
defined public policy."
Hoffman v. Board of Education of City of New York, 49 N.Y.
2d 121, 424 N.Y.S. 2d 376, 400 N.E. 2d 317, 320 (1979);
Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District, 47 N.Y.
2d 440, 418 N.Y.S. 2d 375, 391 N.E. 2d 1352, 1354 (1979).
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for the intentional torts of its employees committed while
acting within the scone of their employment (Lepore v.
Gulf Cil Corp., 237 Md. 591 , 595, 207 A. 2d 451 , 453,
1965; Tea Company v. Roch, 160 Md. , 189, 192, 153 A. 22,
23, 1931 ; Westers Union Tel. Co. v. Rasche, 19 Md. , 126,
130, 99 A. 991, 993, 1917; Consolidated Rv. Co. v. Pierce,
89 Md. 495, 502, 43 A. 940, 941-42, 1899).
An intentional
tort is within the scope of employment where it is carried
out in furtherance of the master’s business or is intended
in part for the master’s benefit. Lepore v. Gulf Cil
Corp., supra, 237 Md. at 595, 207 A. 2d at 453; Tea Company
v. Roch, supra, 160 Md. at 192, 153 A. at 23; Evans v.
Davidson, 53 Md. 245, 249, 1880. See also 2 F. Harper and
W.
F. ’James, The Law of Torts, § 26.9 st 1391, 1956:
Prosser, Law of Torts § 70 at 464, 4th ed. (1971 );
1 Restatement (Second) Agency, § 235, comment a at 520,
1958; accord Park Transfer Co. v. Lumbermen’s Hut. Casualty
Co., 142 F. 2d 100 (D.C. Cir. , 1944); Averill v. Luttrell,
44 Tenn. Aon. 56, 311 S.W. 2d 812, 814 (1957); Cary v.
Hotel Rueger, 195 Va. 980, 81 S.E. 2d 421, 424 (1954) ;
Brazier v. Betts, 8 Wash. 2d 549, 113 P. 2d 34, 39 (1941 );
Linden v. City Car. Co., 239 Wis. 236, 300 N.W. 925, 926
(1941).
Where, as here, it is alleged that the individual
educators have wilfully and maliciously acted to injure a
student enrolled in a public school, such actions can never
be considered to have been done in furtherance of the
beneficent purposes of the educational system.
Since such
alleged intentional torts constitute an abandonment of
employment, the Board is absolved of liability for these
purported acts of its individual employees.
Consequently,
we are not called upon here to consider whether or to what
extent the board has another defense available to it under
the doctrine of governmental immunity.
See, however, Md.
Code (1978 and 1981 Cum. Supp.), § 4-105 of the Education
Article which waives governmental immunity to a limited
extent.
Judge Reita Davidson, concerning and dissenting:
The dissent agreed that individuals teaching an educational
system who intentionally insure a child entrusted to their
educational care should he held liable; and plaintiffs are
entitled to pursue the action against these defendants.

The judge dissented, however, to the fact that individuals
teaching in an educational system and who, through mal
practice, negligently injure a child entrusted to their
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educational care, should not be considered liable and
therefore the plaintiffs are not entitled to maintain
an action.
The rest of the dissent is given in its entirety due to
the stance Davidson takes:

"As long ago as 1889 in Cochrane v. Little, 71 Fid. 323,
331-32, 18 A. 698, 700-01 (1889), Chief Judge Alvey
stated the following with respect to actions against
lawyers for their negligent acts:
"'Apart from any mere special or technical objections,
the declaration would seem to contain all the averments
essential to entitle the plaintiffs to maintain their
action.
This is best shown by a brief statement of the
principles upon which the action is maintainable.
It
is now well settled by many decisions of courts of high
authority, both of England and of this country, that
every client employing an attorney has a right to the
exercise, on the part of the attorney, of ordinary care
and diligence in the execution of the business intrusted
to him, and to a fair average degree of professional
skill and knowledge; and if the attorney has not as much
of these qualities as he ought to possess, and which, by
holding himself out for employment he impliedly repre
sents himself as possessing, or if, having them, he has
neglected to employ them, the law makes him responsible
for the loss or*damage which has accrued to his client
from their deficiency or failure of application.
Cr, as
said by Lord Chancellor Cottenham, in delivering the
opinion in Hart v. Frame, 6 Cl. and Fin. 193, 209, a
client who has employed an attorney has a right to his
diligence, his knowledge, and his skill; and whether he
had not so much of these qualities as he was bound to
have, or having them, neglected to employ them, the law
properly makes him liable for the loss which has accrued
to his employer. And in another part of the same opinion
the learned Chancellor said: Professional men, possessed
of a reasonable portion of information and skill, accord
ing to the duties they undertake to perform, and exer
cising what they so possess with reasonable care and
diligence in the affairs of their employers, certainly
ought not to be held liable for errors in judgment,
whether in matters of law or discretion.
Every case,
therefore, ought to depend upon its own peculiar circum
stances; and when an injury has been sustained which
could not have arisen except from the want of such
reasonable skill and diligence, or the afosence of the
employment of either on the part of the attorney, the
law holds him liable. In undertaking the client's
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business, he undertakes for the existence and for the
due employment of these qualities, and receives the
price of them.
Such is the principle of the law of
England, and that of Scotland does not vary from it. .
*

*

*

*

*

» n

*

n

. .In the course of the trial. several exceptions
were taken by the defendant to rulings of the court.
The first two of these were taken to the admissibility
of the testimony of lawyers, examined by the plaintiffs,
for the purpose of proving to the jury, that, in their
opinion, the advice given by the defendant to Korns,
under the facts and circumstances proved by other
witnesses in the case, was not such as a prudent, care
ful lawyer, or ordinary capacity and intelligence, would
have given, or ought to have given. As we understand it,
this was not an attempt on the part of the plaintiffs
to prove to the jury by the lawyers, that the abstract
principle involved in the advice given by the defendant
was not law, for that would have been an usurpation of
the functions of the court; but simply that the advice,
in view of all the circumstances and conditions under
which it was given, was not such as a prudent, careful
lawyer, of ordinary capacity, would have given.
Such
testimony, in this class of cases, is allowed, as
furnishing .aid to the jury, in considering the question
of negligence or want of skill. There are many cases
in which testimony has been received, but iu is nor
deemed necessary to refer to mere than Godefroy v.
Dalton, 6 Hing. 460; Hunter v. Caldwell, 10 Q.E. 69;
Swinfen v. Chelmsford, 5 Hurl, and N. 890, 897. There
was therefore no error in the rulings on these exceptions.1
"As recently as 1974, in Raitt v. Johns Hopkins Hospital,
274 Nd. 489, 498-99, 336 A. 2d 90, 95 (1975), Judge
Levine stated the following with respect to the nature
of the duty of care and the standard of care applicable
in actions against physicians for their negligent acts:

’. . .in Dashiell v. Griffith, 84 bid. 363, 380-81,
35 A. 1094 (1896), our predecessors stated:
. . .The
cases are generally agreed upon the proposition, that
the amount of care, skill and diligence required is
not the highest or greatest, but only such as is
ordinarily exercised by others in the profession
generally. . . . There had been a hint of this
standard in State, use of Janney v. Housekeeper,
70 bid. 162 , 172 , 16 A. 382 (1889), where this court
held that. . .the degree of care and skill required
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is that reasonable degree of care and skill which
physicians and surgeons ordinarily exercise in the
treatment of their patients. . . .
’’This rule, which makes no reference whatever to the
defendant-physician’s community, was consistently
followed prior to 1962 (see, e.g., Lane v. Calvert,
215 Nd. 457, 462, 138 A. 2d 902 (1958) (standard of
care ’such as is ordinarily exercised by others in
the profession generally’ McClees v. Cohen, 158 bld. 60, 66 , 148 A. 124, 1930.) Indeed, it has been noted
occasionally even since 1962 'Nolan v. Dillon, 261 bid.
516, 534, 276 A. 2d 6, 1971) standard of care ’such
as is ordinarily exercised by others in the profession
generally) (Anderson v. John Honkins Hospital, 260 bld.
348, 350, 272 A. 2d 72, 1971) 0 . • .the standard of
skill and care ordinarily exercised by surgeons in
cases of this kind. . . .’); Johns Honkins Hosnital
v. Genda, 255 bld. 616, 620, 258 A. 2d' 595 (1969)
(’. . .the standard of skill and care ordinarily
exercised by surgeons in cases of this kind. . . .’).
"Thus, this Court has consistently recognized, notwith
standing the existence of a myriad of intangibles, a
multiplicity of unknown quantities and a variety of
other uncertainties attendant in any profession, that
a professional owes a duty of care to a person receiving
professional services; that a standard of care based
upon customary conduct is appropriate; and that it is
possible to maintain a viable tert action against a
professional for professional malpractice.
Finally, as
recently as 1379, this Court has recognized that under
certain circumstances there can be recovery for mental
or emotional distress resulting from non-intentional
negligent acts. The application of all of these principles
to this case leads me to the conclusion that there should
be a viable cause of action on the facts alleged here.

"In my view, public educators are professionals.
They
have special training and state certification is a
prerequisite to their employment. They hold themselves
cut as possessing certain skills and knowledge not shared
by non-educators. As a result, people who utilize their
services have a right to expect them to use that skill
and knowledge with some minimum degree of competence.
In addition, like other professionals, they must often
make educated judgments in applying their knowledge to
specific individual needs. As professionals, they owe
a professional duty of care to children who receive
their services and a standard of care based upon customary
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conduct is appropriate. There can be no question that
negligent conduct on the part of a public educator may
damage a child by inflicting psychological damage and
emotional distress. Moreover, from the fact that public
educators purport to teach it follows that some causal
relationship may exist between the conduct of a teacher
and the failure of a child to learn. Thus, it should
be possible to maintain a viable tort action against
such professionals for educational malpractice.
"Here the declaration alleges, in pertinent part, that
the individual defendants ’owed a duty to the minor
plaintiff to comport themselves within the standards
of their profession, and to exercise that degree of
care and skill ordinarily exercised "by those similarly
situated in the profession. . . . ' The declajration
further alleges that the defendants breached that duty
by, among other things, placing the child in the second
grade and requiring him to repeat first grade materials
even though he had satisfactorily completed these
materials in his first year in school, subsequently
placing him in a grade ahead of the material he was
actually studying, testing the child so incompletely
and inadequately as to result in total failure of
evaluation of the problems, and insulting and demeaning
the child in private and public. Finally, the declaration alleges that the defendants’ acts in breach of
their duties were the proximate cause of injuries to
the child which included, among other things, substantial
learning deficiencies, psychological damage and emotional
stress.
This declaration alleges that the defendants
owed a professional duty to the child to act in conformity
with an’appropriate standard of care based upon customary
conduct, that there was a breach of that duty, and that
unforeseeable injuries were proximately caused by that
breach. Manifestly, it states a cause of action that
comrorts with traditional notions of tort law.

’’Unlike my colleagues, I believe that public policy does
not prohibit such claims from being entertained.
It is
common knowledge, and indeed the majority recognizes,
that the failure of schools to achieve educational objec
tives has reached massive proportions.
It is widely
recognized that, as a result, not only are many persons
deprived of the learning that both materially and spiri
tually enhances life, but also that society as a whole
is beset by social and moral problems. These changed
circumstances mandate a. change in the common law.
lew
and effective remedies must be devised if the law is to
remain vital and viable.
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’’Moreover, I do not agree with my colleagues that adequate
internal administrative procedures designed for the achieve
ment of educational goals are available within the educa
tional system.
In my view none of the available procedures
adequately deal with incompetent teaching or provide ade
quate relief to an injured student. A cause of action foxeducational malpractice meets these social and individual
needs.
"In addition, I do not agree with the majority that
recognition of such a cause of action will result in
a flood of litigation imposing an impossible burden
on the public educational system and the courts.
Similar
arguments appearing in cases that recognized the consti
tutional rights of students that have not been validated
by subsequent empirical evidence. See Goss v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565, 600 n.22, 95 S. Ct. 729, 749 n.22, 42 L.
Ed. 2d 725, 1975 (J. Powell, dissenting).

"Finally, I do not agree with the majority that the
recognition of such a cause of action ’would in effect
position the courts of this State as overseers of both
the day-to-day operation of our educational process as
well as the formulation of its governing policies,’
roles that have been ’properly entrusted by the General
Assembly to the State Department of Education and the
local school boards.’ That the Legislature has delegated
authority to administer a particular area to certain
administrative agencies should not preclude judicial
responsiveness to individuals injured by unqualified
administrative functioning. In recognizing a. cause of
action for educational malpractice, this Court would
do nothing more than what courts have traditionally
done from time immemorial—namely, provide a remedy to
a person harmed by the negligent act of another.
Cur
children deserve nothing less.”
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Case

The "doctrine of discretionary immunity" applies only
to those officials who are not involved and engaged in
actual decision making at the planning level (able in
performing ministerial rather than discretionary duties).

Larson v. Independent School District No. 314, Eraham
University, Minn. , 289 I\.W. 2d 112, Supreme Court of
Minnesota (1980).
\

Facts:

Percy Larson brought action against three
defendants, the superintendent, the prin
cipal, and’ the teacher of the Graham School
District on behalf of Steven C. Larson, a.
minor of whom he is the natural guardian.
The action against the three officials was
induced for injuries received by Steven in
an eighth grade physical education class
during teaching the headspring before the
class had participated in the necessary
preliminary progressions of less advanced
gymnastic exercises, progression designed
in part for safety, and that the teacher
Lundquist was improperly spotting the
exercise at the time Steven was injured.

Issue(s) :

1 .

Was student’s injury due in part to
negligence of principal who neglected
to inform, introduce and instruct his
new physical education teacher and in
doing so failed to exercise reasonable
care in supervising the development,
planning and administration of this
curriculum?

2.

Are state officials and employees
absolutely immune from suit under
the doctrine of discretionary immunity?

3.

Are public officials, who are charged
by lav/ with a duty that calls for
exercise of judgment or discretion
personally liable to an individual
for damages, except being guilty of
a wilfull or malicious wrong?
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4.

Answers:

Was (a) the judgment used by the physical
education teacher in determining how
to spot and teach an advanced gymnastic
exercise decision making and entitled
to -protection under the doctrine of
discretionary immunity, and (b) is the
instructor therefore liable for the
negligent spotting and teaching of the
exercise?

(1) Yes; (2) No; (3) No; (4a) i'.o; (4b) Yes.

Reasoning of the Court

”. . .A ministerial duty is one in which nothing is left
to discretion, a simple, definite duty arising under and
because of stated conditions and imposed by law. The
idea has been put in this language:
’Official duty is
ministerial when it is absolute, certain and imperative
involving merely the execution of a specific duty arising
from fixed and designated facts.’ ”
The court further observed:
”It is settled lav/ in Minnesota that a public official
charged by law with duties which call for the exercise
of his judgment or discretion is no-t personally liable
to an individual for damages unless he is guilty of a
wilfull or malicious wrong.
The phys ed teacher Lundquist is not entitled to protection
under the doctrine of discretionary immunity, because the
established evidence shows that he was (a) negligent in
spotting the headspring Steven performed; (b) using judg
ment does not mean to perform a discretionary duty;
(c) Lundquist’s teaching was improper because he allowed
Steven to perform the headspring before he was able to
safely perform the headspring before he was able to safely
perform such an advanced exercise.

The principal was also held liable on the following basis:
”Discretionary immunity must be narrowly construed in
light of the fact that it is an exception to the general
rule of liability. Because of the special protection
that the law affords school children (Spanel v. Moundsview
School District, No. 621, 118 l.W. 2d 795, 802, 1962)
failure by Peterson, in this case, to adequately supervise
the planning and administration by Lundquist of the physical
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education curriculum cannot he considered decision-making
that the doctrine of discretionary immunity is designed
to protect.
We therefore hold that Peterson's liability
is not precluded by the doctrine of discretionary immunity.
Regarding the superintendent's liability, the court held
that since he did not have any knowledge about the fact
that the high school principal had allowed unsafe physical
education curriculum to develop, he also had made an
improper transition from the first physical education
teacher to the new one and that he did not provide proper
supervision.

The court found no liability regarding the super! nt endent
since there was no showing that the superintendent had
lacked in supervision toward the principal and that he
had had knowledge of problems in the physical education
curriculum.
The court found no evidence that a negligent
act of the superintendent had caused the accident in
Question.
The superintendent was too far removed from the actual
scene.
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Case
1.

Doctrine of judicial non-intervention in scholastic
aff airs.

2.

It is in the absolute discretion of the institution
of higher education to dismiss a student—delinquent
in his studies--without due process,

Mustall v. .Rose, 211 So. 2d, Supreme Court of Alabama (1968).
F acts:

A medical student failed two courses in the
Medical College of the University of Alabama
and was subsequently dismissed by the
Promotion Committee without due process
considerations.
The student claimed that the professors
gave him lower grades than deserved and
that the average of various interim grades
indicated a passing grade. The professors
noted that these grades were only tentative
ones and that the final grades were based
on the overall performance of a student
which included in this case oral questions
as well.

The student finally claimed that the
decision of dismissal was not in accordance with due process since he had not
been heard and had been absent while the
decision had been made.
Issue(s) :

Do school authorities (faculty and adminis
trators) have absolute discretion in
determining whether a college student
should be dismissed or not, based on
delinquency in studies without following
due process requirements (notice and
hearing)?

.answer:

Yes--in the absence of bad faith, capricious
ness, arbitrariness and/or unreasonableness.

reasoning of the Court

The court stated that in its opinion there was no evidence
of unfairness in the dismissal of the student and continued
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that the evidence was supporting the failing grades in
the courses.
The court pointed out that the rule of judicial non
intervention in scholastic affairs was particularly
applicable in the case of a medical school, since
courts were not supposed to be learned (educated) in
medicine and were therefore not qualified to pass an
opinion on student achievements.

The court continued saying that there is a difference
in dealing with a disciplinary problem or a standard
of excellence in the academic area and emphasized:
“Even the federal courts have not yet gone so far as
to require the notice and presence of the student when
a decision is being readied to dismiss a student for
failing to meet the required scholastic standards.”
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Case

Education is a fundamental, constitutional right in West
Virginia.
Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E. 2d 859, W. Va. (1979), Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia (February 20, 1979).

F acts:

The plaintiffs, parents of five children
attending public school in Lincoln County,
brought an action on behalf of themselves
and as a class for declaratory judgment,
claiming that the financing system for
public schools was violating the West
Virginia Constitution, Article XII,
Section I, since it denied plaintiffs
the guaranteed "thorough and efficient"
education and by also denying them the
equal protection out-of-balance funding
in property-poor counties as compared
with those in wealthier counties.

The Kanawha County Circuit Court dismissed
the complaint and also denied the plaintiffs’
motion for a summary judgment. The plaintiffs
appealed.
Issue(s) :

1.

If recognized by trial court that
plaintiffs had asserted valid constitu
tional challenges regarding the present
school financing system, so that it was
not their legal theories that were •
deficient, is it then improper to grant
the motion to dismiss the case on grounds
that plaintiffs had not demonstrated,
in their affidavits, admissions and
other documents, that the poor school
system in Lincoln County was a product
of the present school financing system
as alleged?

2.

Does the constitutional requirements of a
"thorough and efficient system of free
schools" make education a fundamental
educational right in West Virginia?

3’.

Does, under equal protection guarantees,
any discriminatory classification in a
state’s educational financing system
require the state’s demonstration of
some compelling state interest to justify
such unequal classification?
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Answer:

4.

Does the ’’thorough and efficient” clause
contained in Article Xii, Section I, of
the West Virginia Constitution require
the legislature to develop a high quality
statewide education system?

5.

Do the provisions of the Constitution of
the State of West Virginia, in certain
instances, require higher standards of
protection than afforded by the Federal
Constitution?

(1) Yes; (2) Yes; (3) Yes; (4) Yes; (5) Yes.

Reasoning of the Court

Federal 14th Amendment equal protection rights are not
available to children seeking educational equality. A
state is also not constrained by the federal constitutional
standard; however, must examine its own constitution to
determine its education responsibilities. Thus, a state
constitution may require higher standards of protection
than are afforded by comparable federal constitutional
standards.
There is, of course, no specific reference
to public education in the United States Constitution,
but education sections in state constitutions can be
classified whether they reasonably may be considered to
require legislatures to provide for:
(a) public school
systems of specified quality, or (b) simply say that
public school or uniform public school systems may/shall
be established. Constitutional mandates, the court
points out, require that the legislatures provide "thorough
and efficient education systems," representing the tradi
tional quality requirement. They are to be found in the
Ohio, Minnesota, Maryland, Pennsylvania, New Jersey,
Illinois (from 1870 until 1970) and West Virginia
Constitutions. Colorado, Idaho and Montana require
"thorough systems," while Arkansas, Texas, Kentucky,
Delaware, Virginia (until 1971) and Illinois (since 1970)
require efficient systems.
The court, having done thorough research of cases and
the debates and dialogues of the Ohio and West Virginia
Constitutional Conventions, states that:
"Each of the
fifteen states’ appellate courts, and some federal courts
applied the ’thorough and/or efficient clauses.’" These
clauses were held to be mandatory upon legislatures,
making education a state, rather than a local, responsi
bility.
Broad legislative authority and discretion have
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been acknowledged, and courts made for themselves guide
lines for testing legislation against this clause.
Although there is judicial deference to legislative
plenary power over education, courts didn’t stop there;
they all intervened when an act ‘by a legislature or a
proceeding by a local school board, as agent of the
legislature, is offensive to judicial notions about what
a "thorough and efficient" education system is. Courts
will not inquire into the reason, wisdom, or expediency
of the legislative policy with regard to education, but
whether the legislation has a reasonable relation to a
"thorough and efficient system of public schools."

The court emphasized that a system of instruction in
any district of the state which is not thorough and
efficient falls short of the constitutional command;
and whatever the cause and/or reason for such a violation,
the obligation is the State’s to rectify.
in case a local
government fails, the State government must compel it to
act; if the local government can’t carry the burden, the
State must itself meet its continuing obligation.

According to the court the terms that are basic to this
case at hand are:
"thorough"; "efficient"; and
"education.” The court’s interpretation given reads
Education is the development of mind, body
as follows:
and social morality (ethics) to prepare persons for
useful and happy occupations, recreation and citizen
ship .

Thorough and efficient systems of schools develop, as
best the state of education expertise allows, the minds,
bodies and social morality of its charges to prepare
them for useful and happy occupations, recreation and
citizenship, and does so economically. The court
continued to say that legally recognized elements in
this definition are development in every child to his
or her capacity of (1) literacy; (2) ability to add,
subtract, multiply and divide numbers; (3) knowledge
of government so that the child will be equipped as
a citizen to make informal choices among persons and
issues that affect his own governance; (4) selfknowledge and knowledge of his or her total environ
ment to allow the child to intelligently choose life
work--to know his or her options; (5) work training
and advanced academic training as the child may
intelligently choose; (6) recreational pursuits;
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(7) interests in all creative arts, such as music,
theatre, literature and the visual arts; (8) social
ethics, both behavioral and abstract, to facilitate
compatibility with others in his society.
Implicit are — according to the court — supportive services
as well:
(1) good physical facilities, instructional
materials and personnel; (2) careful state and local
supervision to prevent waste and to monitor pupil,
teacher and administrative competency.
The educational system must be tested by these high
quality educational standards and since, under West
Virginia’s Equal Protection Clause and because education
here is a constitutionally derived fundamental right,
the more demanding ’’strict scrutiny equal protection
standard” is thrust upon the State.
The Circuit Court’s judgment was herewith reversed and
the case remanded with definite directions in agreement
with the appellate court’s decision.
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Case

California does not recognize cause of action for
"educational malpractice."
Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School District, 131. •
Ca. Aptr. 854 , Court of Appeals, First District,
Division 4 (1976).
Facts :

Plaintiff, an 18-year-old male high school
graduate from the San Francisco Unified
School District, brought action against
the said district, alleging that he had
been inadequately educated through negli
gence on the educators’ part.

He filed the following charges against
the school district, its educators and
agents:
”1 .

Failure to provide him with adequate
supervision, guidance, counseling
and/or supervision in basic academic
skills, such as reading and writing.

”2 .

Failure to use reasonable care in
the discharge of its duties to
provide plaintiff with adequate
instruction ... in basic academic
skills.

”3.

Failure to exercise that degree of
professional skill required of an
ordinary prudent educator under the
same circumstances.”

The plaintiff continued to state five sub
sections where he alleged the following:

“The school district, its agents and
employees negligently and carelessly
in each instance:
”1 .

Failed to apprehend his reading
disabilities.

"2 .

Assign him to classes in which he
could read ’the books and other
materials . '
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”3 .

Allowed him ’to pass and advance from
a course or grade level’ with knowledge
that he had not achieved its completion
of the skills 'necessary for him to
succeed or benefit from subsequent
courses.•

4.

Assigned him to classes in which the
instructors were unqualified or which
were not ’geared’ to his reading level.

”5 .

Permitted him to graduate from high
school although he was ’unable to read
above the eighth grade level, as
required by Education Code Section 8573
. . . therefore depriving him of
additional instruction in reading and
other academic skills.’”

Plaintiff further alleged that "as a direct and
proximate result of the negligent acts and
omissions by the defendant School District, its
agents and employees . . . plaintiff has suffered
a loss of earning capacity by his limited ability
to read and write and is unqualified for any
employment other than . . . labor which requires
little or no ability to read or write. ...”

The trial court dismissed the case.

The California Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment of dismissal, and the appellant’s
petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court
was denied (September 29, 1976).
Issue(s) :

Answer:

1.

May a person who claims to have been
inadequately educated, while a student
in a public school system, state a
cause of action in tort against che
public authorities who operate and
administer the system?

2.

Did plaintiff show sufficient facts to
prove that defendants owed him a ’’duty
of care”?

(1) No;

(2) No.
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.xeasonincr of the Court
In muskopf v. Corning Hospital District, 359 P. 2d 457,
the doctrine of governmental immunity from tort liability
was abolished; this case also clearly established that
"governmental liability for negligence is the rule, and
immunity the exception.” A provision of the 1963 Tort
Claims Act makes the defendant school district extremely
"liable for any tortious act of its employees which would
give rise to a cause of action against them personally.”
This is Gov. Code, § 815.2, Subd. (a). However, this
would only come to bear if—as Muskopf holds--”negligence”
is there.

’’According
At this point the court continued to note:
to the familiar California formula, the allegations
requisite to a cause of action for negligence are:1.

Facts showing a duty of care in the defendant;

2.

Negligence contributing a breach of the duty;

3.

Injury to the plaintiff as a proximate result.

The court declared the plaintiff’s cited authorities
as irrelevant since they did not address the question
of whether the school authorities owed students a
"duty of care" in the process of their academic educa
tion .

The court noted that although a ’’duty of teachers to
exercise reasonable care in instruction and supervision
of students is recognized in California,” the cited
decisions in the state here were inapplicable because
they address only "that public school authorities have
a duty to exercise reasonable care for the physical
safety of students under their supervision.” 5

The court acknowledged that a "duty of care
care" was
existent considering the "commanding importance of
public education in society."
5

A public entity is liable for injury proximately
caused by an act or omission of an employee of the
public entity within the scope of his employment
if the act or omission would, apart from this section,
have given rise to a cause of action against the
employee or his personal representative.
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However, the court distinguished between "duty of care”
as a term of common parlance and a ’’duty of care” as a
legalistic concept.
Only the latter is able to sustain
liability for negligence in its breach.
Thus, the court says, there are several constants to be
considered:
”1.

The concept itself is still an essential factor 6
in any assessment of liability for negligence.

"2.

Whether a defendant owes the requisite ’duty of
care’ in a given factual situation presenta a
question of law which is to be determined by the
courts alone. 7

"3.

Judicial recognition of such duty in the defendant,
with the consequence of his liability in negligence
for its breach, is initially to be dictated org
precluded by considerations of public policy.”

The court cited Rowlands where the Supreme Court defined
various ’’public policy” considerations. The court
declared that "the foundation of all negligence liability
in this state was Civil Code Section 1714,paraphrased
the section in terms of duty of care (as expressing the
principle that ”[a]ll persons are required to use ordinary
care to prevent others being injured as the result of their
conduct”) , and stated that liability was to flow from this
"fundamental principle” in all cases except where a depar
ture from it was "clearly supported by public policy.”
The court then continued to state the important factors
of public policy and their pertinent role.
The balancing of a number of considerations can be the
only justifier for a departure from these basic principles:

'1.

The foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff;

2.

The degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered
injury;

3.

The closeness of the connection between the defendant’s
conduct and the injury suffered;

4.

The moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct.

Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified School District, 470 P.
2d 36C/ (1970) .
"^United States Liability Insurance Company v. Haidinger-

Hayes, Inc., 463 P. 2d 770 (1970).
g
Raymond v. Paradise Unified School District,
App. 2d 1 .
^Rowlands v. Christian, 443 P. 2d 561 (1968).

218 Cal.
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The policy of preventing future harm;
6.

The extent of the burden to the defendant and the
consequences to the community of imposing a duty
to exercise care with resulting liability for breach;

7.

The availability, cost and prevalence of insurance
for the risk involved. 10u

The court suggested that the concept of "duty” may
perhaps focus upon the rights of the injured plaintiff
instead of upon the defendant’s obligations. Neverthe
less, the sarnie principles would apply and control whether
a cause of action may be stated or not.
The court further elaborated, saying that the Supreme
Court, when occasionally opening a new area of tort
liability, said that ’’the wrongs and injuries involved
were both comprehensible and assessable within the
existing judicial framework.”
The court here maintained that this was simply not true
cf ’’wrongful conduct and injuries allegedly involved in
educational malfeasance.” And it elaborated as follows:

"Unlike the activity of the highway or the marketplace ,
classroom methodology affords to readily acceptable
standards of care, or cause, or injury. The science of
pedagogy itself is fraught with
different and conflicting
theories of how or what a child should be taught , and any
layman might--and commonly does--have his own emphatic
views on the subject.” The "injured” claimed here is
plaintiff’s inability to read and write. Substantial
professional authority attests that the achievement of
literacy in the schools, or its failure, are influenced
by a host of factors which affect the pupil subjectively,
from outside the formal teaching process, and beyond
the control of its ministers. They may be physical,
neurological, emotional, cultural, environmental; they
may be present but not perceived, recognized but not
identified.

ihus, the court finds no cause of action recognizing
the state’s policy considerations.
"Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of
his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned by
another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the
management of his property or person. . .
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The plaintiff’s other five causes of action are based
on the theory that "it states a cause of action for
breach of a ’mandatory duty* under government code
section 815.

However, the court notes that no cause(s) of action
was stated (act causing injury); the court reasoned
that this was so because "the statute imposes liability
for failure to discharge only such ’mandatory duty’ as
is ’imposed by an enactment that is designed to protect
against the risk of a particular kind of injury* . . . .
the failure of educational achievement may not be
characterized as an ’injury within the meaning of tort
law'"12
furthermore the court continued:
"It
appears that the several 'enactments’ have been con
ceived as provisions directed to the attainment of
of optimum educational results, but not as safeguards
against ’injury* of any kind; i.e., as administrative
but not protective."

Thus , their violation imposes no liability.
The alleged misrepresentation of plaintiff’s achievements
to his mother and natural guardian was also not success
ful. The court stated that for the public policy reasons
and with respect to the first court, no cause of action
was stated for negligence in the form of the misrepresen
tation alleged.
The court also notes that "a cause of
action for intentional misrepresentation is assisted by
judicial limitations placed upon the scope of the go'-ernmental immunity which is granted, as to liability for
’misrepresentation.’ But a cause of action was not stated
for intentional misrepresentation because it alleges no
facts showing the requisite element of reliance upon the
’misrepresentation’ it asserts."

"Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed
by an enactment that is designed to protect against the
risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity is
liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its
failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity
establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to
discharge the duty."
^Prosser, Law of Torts, 4th ed. , pp. 1-33 (1971).
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Case
Defendant school district had to pay tuition for one year
at the nonpublic facility.

In RE Peter H., 323 N.Y.S. 2d 302, Westchester County
Family Court (1971).
F acts:

A mother had had her son—suffering from
organic brain syndrome--3-1/2 years in
public school where he made practically
no educational progress, although he had
been in special classes with children
suffering other types of disability. When
the child was put into a nonpublic special
educational facility he had made remark
able progress. The Family Court of
Westchester County ordered the City and
the State to pay the child’s full tuition
at the nonpublic facility rather than
leaving to attend a yet to be established,
and thus unproven, public school program
for brain damaged children.

Issue(s) :

1.

Is the court empowered to exercise
discretionary power in-advancing a
child’s well being?

2.

Can a child progressing in a nonpublic
school while formerly not progressing
in a public school remain in that school,
while the public school district and
the state have to pay the tuition
accruing in the nonpublic school?

Answer:

(1) Yes; (2) Yes.

Reasoning of the Court
In a case entitled .ReVasko, 263 N.Y.S. 552, the Appellate
Division stated:
”. . .Manifestly, it was the intent of
the legislature to invest the court with wide power of
discretion, to be exercised on the advice of competent
medical . . . authority ... in advancing the well being
of the child.”
The court -was favorably impressed with the testimony
concerning the excellent progress the child had made.
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"It has been shown to the Court’s entire satisfaction
that if this child is ever to be permitted to develop
his intellectual potential and succeed in the academic
area, it can be accomplished only in a special educa
tional setting.
It has been similarly shown that the
Adams School can meet these needs. Whether or not the
public school system in Mt. Vernon can do likewise in
the coming year remains to be determined.

"realizing that the Family Court is under a mandate to
act in the best interests of this child, the Court
cannot permit his entire future to be further jeopardized
by gambling on a special educational system that has yet
to prove itself. Unfortunately, three and a half precious
years have already been wasted, which fact serves to
further the Court’s resolve not to switch educational
horses at this time. A year hence, upon a similar
application, and after considering the conclusions
and recommendations of a professional evaluation of
this special educational program, it may well be that
the Court would decide this question against the
petitioner. At this time, however, there appears no
reasonable alternative to opting in favor of the child
continuing his education in the school setting which
is at hand and presently achieving good results.

"Accordingly, the Court sustains the petition and
directs that the cost of providing for the special
education of said child be paid pursuant to the
provisions of Section 4403 of the Education Law. .
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Case

Public policy bars educational malpractice suits of
a student and/or parent against a private school for
failure to educate child.
Pietro v. St. Joseph’s School, 48 U.S.L.W. 2229, New
York Supreme Court, Suffolk City (1979).

F acts:

The student attended a private school from
1970 to 1978 during which time the school
allegedly failed to ascertain whether the
student was capable of .learning. The
plaintiff (parent) also claimed that the
school failed to'evaluate the student,
to provide him with special educational
facilities and to teach him in a way'so
that he could understand.

Issue(s):

Does public policy bar recognition in New
York of students' and/or parents/ "educa
tional malpractice" suits against school
authorities and officials?

Answer:

Yes.

Reasoninc of the Court
In quoting Donohue v. Copiague, 4 7 N.Y. 2d 440, which
held that New York courts should not as a matter of
public policy entertain "educational malpractice" claims,
the court noted that parochial schools and public school
districts were sharing the same problems regarding the
consideration of "educational malpractice" claims.
Here, the parent seeks to recover the tuition paid the
school.

The court felt that there could be a case where a
parent might recover tuition if an express contract
existed or an agreement had been made between the
school and the parents, to the effect that the student
would reach a certain proficiency after pursuing cer
tain studies, which was not the case here in Pietro.
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Case
Actions were brought (1) against a county social services
agency and school district alleging, interalia, that the
social services agency negligently or intentionally failed
to take reasonable actions to bring about his adoption and
(2) against the school district for negligently placing
the boy in classes for mentally retarded children under
circumstances where the school district knew or should
have known that he was in fact not retarded; both actions
were dismissed by the Superior Court; the Court of Appeals
held, interalia, that no valid claim for recovery of .
damages was stated.
Dennis Smith, etc., v. Alameda County Social Services
and Hazard Unified School District,
Agency et al,_____________
153 Cal. Hptr. 712 (1979).
Facts:

Shortly after Dennis was born—who at the time
of this action was 17 years old—his mother
relinquished him to the custody of the before
named agency for the purpose of adoption.
This was done according to a Civil Code section,
which sets up a procedure by which a "father or
mother may relinquish a child to a licensed
adoption agency for adoption."

Dennis was placed in a series of foster homes,
but was never adopted. The agency then left
him with one set of foster parents for many
years without asking them whether they wanted
to adopt him.
The agency never attempted to find a proper
pre-adoptive home for Dennis. Thus, he spent
his entire childhood in a series of foster
and group homes. He therefore was deprived
of a stable home environment, parentual
nurturing, continuity of• care and affection,
a secure and homelike family environment and
proper and effective parental guidance. This
caused Dennis various damages, primarily
mental and emotional suffering and grave
interference with his psychological develop
ment. This, then, is the heart of Dennis’*
first and main cause of action.
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Issue(s):

1.

[main issue] is a social services agency
liable in damages to a 17-year-old boy
on the allegation that said agency
negligently or intentionally failed to
take reasonable actions to bring about
his adoption, but instead left him for
many years with foster parents when it
knew or should have knoTO that such
foster parents never intended to adopt
him?

2.

Is a social services agency liable in
damages to a child placed in its custody
on the theory that, failing to procure
child’s adoption, agency failed to carry
out mandatory duties imposed on it by
statute to administer procram to encourage
adoption of "hard-to-place” children?

3.

Can such statutory provisions reasonably
be construed as designed to ’’protect”
”hard-to-place" children from ’’injury”
of not being adopted?

4.

Can boy recover damages from county
social services agency and its con
sulting clinical psychologist on the
theory that latter negligently
construed tescs which indicated
that hoy suffered from mental retarda
tion, which resulted in discouraging
adoptive parents from adopting him?

□ .

Does there lie a cause of action on
behalf of the boy against the school
district on allegations that the
district negligently placed the boy
in classes for the mentally retarded,
when district knew or should have
known that he was in fact not retarded?

6.

Is there a cause of action for the
child on the theory that he was the
express beneficiary of agreement
between his mother and the social
services agency, whereby the mother
relinquished him to the agency and
the agency promised that he would
be adopted or that the acencv would
make reasonable efforts to that end,
but agency failed to make such
efforts?

■I
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Answe r:

(1) No; (2) No;

(3) No;

(4) No;

(5) No;

(6) No.

Reasoning of the Court

The court noted that analytic confusion had to be avoided
and it therefore would not treat the question primarily
as one whether there is or is not immunity under the
California Tort Claims Act (Gov. Code, s 810 et. seg.).
Under that act, the court stated, the inquiry would be
whether the conduct here alleged involved ’’basic policy
decisions” (Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of
California, 551 P. 2d 334, 1976).
The court felt that before the issue of governmental
immunity can be dealt with, the more fundamental question
of whether there is any liability for damages under these
circumstances at all had to be faced.

The court declared:
’’Decisions as to whether to tighten
or enlarge ’the circle of rights and remedies’ are often
phrased in terms of a ’duty of care, * The existence or
absence of a duty cannot be determined by mechanical or
formal tests. Rather, ’judicial recognition of such duty
in the defendant, with the consequence of his liability
in negligence for its breach is initially to be dictated
or precluded by considerations of public policy” (Peter W.
v. San Francisco Unified School District, 131 Cal. Tptr. 854,
859, 1979; Dillon v. Legg, 441 P. 2d 912, 1968; Raymond
v. Paradise Unified School District, 31 Cal. Rptr. 847,
1963).
The court continued to say that "duty is not sacrosanct
in itself but only an expression of the sum total of these
considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the
particular plaintiff is entitled to protection” (Prosser,
Law of Torts, 2d ed. , 333, quoted with approval in Dillon
v. Legg, supra).
The court noted that invasion of protected interest had
replaced duty of care on the Restatement’s delineation of
the essentials for a negligence cause of action (Peter W.,
131 Ca. Rptr. 854); however, the court felt that the
nature of the inquiry here was the same as in Peter W.,
regardless if viewed from the perspective of
oz duty of care
or of protecting a particular interest.

The court felt that the inquiry was not significantly
affected by phrasing it in terms of recognizing a new
set of rights and duties or in terms of departing from
the basic principle of liability for negligence (Rowlands
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v. Christian, 443 P. 2d 561, 1968). Regardless of how
the question was going to be approached, said the court,
the inquiry would turn upon policy considers!ions, and
quoted:

In Rowlands v. Christian, supra, the court stated the
”[T]he foreseeability
major factors to be considered:
of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that
the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the
connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury
suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s
conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent
of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the
community of imposing a duty to exercise care with result
ing liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and
prevalence of insurance for the risk involved" (69 Cal.
2d at p. 113, 70 Cal. Rptr. at p. 100, 443 P’. 2d at p. 564).

Similarly, in ?;aymond v. Paradise Unified School District,
supra, 218 Cal. App. 2d at p. 8, 31 Cal. Rptr. at p. 851,
852, the court said:
"The social utility of the activity
out of which the injury arises, compared with the risks
involved in its conduct; the kind of person with whom the
actor is dealing; the workability of a rule of care,
specially in terms of the parties' relative ability to
adopt practical means of preventing injury; the relative
ability of the parties to bear the financial burden of
injury and the a\ailability of means by which the loss
may be shifted or spread; the body of statutes and judicial
precedents which color the parties’ relationship; the pro
phylactic effect of a rule of liability; in the case of a
public agency defendant, the extent of its powers, the role
imposed upon it by law and the limitations imposed upon it
by budget; and finally, the moral imperatives which judges
share with their fellow citizens—such are the factors which
play a role in the determination of duty" (Citations) .
The court noted that the duty sought to be imposed did not
present a reasonably clear or manageable standard for assess
ing the wrongfulness of the agency’s conduct. A trier of
fact, the court said, ’’would hate to exercise hindsight over
17 years of social work involving difficult and at least
partially subjective decisions.
Social work does not provide
a readily acceptable standard of care."

The court continued saying that in considering foresee
ability of harm, degree of certainty of injury and the
closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct
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the injury, it does not follow that a foster child would
suffer more damage than an adopted one.

The type of injury here, the court felt, is necessarily the
result of a host of causative factors other than the above
stated. The court stated:
"A trier of fact would face
inscrutable problems of trying to relate injury to viola
tion of duty and in determining at what point or points
in the long history in the relationship between appellant
and the agency violations occurred. In short, harm is not
easily foreseeable, let alone certain, nor closely connected
to the assertedly wrongful conduct and damages cannot be
ascertained with any reasonable degree of certainty. The
reasons for denying liability here are even stronger than
in cases such as Borer v. American Airlines, Inc. (1969) ,
19 Cal. 3d 441, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302, 563 P. 2d 858 and Suter
v. Leonard (1975), 45 Cal. App. 3d 744, 120 Cal. Rptr. 110,
which held that minors may not sue for the loss of companion
ship, affection and guidance resulting from conduct of a
defendant who negligently injured the minor’s parent. There
is less foreseeability of harm, less certainty of injury and
a far more remote connection between the assertedly wrongful
conduct and the injury in the situation before us than in
Borer and Suter. Those cases declined to let minors recover
for losses of consortium which, prior to the parents’ injury,
the minor had enjoyed; here the parental consortium never
came into existence, although appellant did have, as we noted,
the care, companionship and guidance of foster parents.
’[Njot every loss can be made compensable in money damaces,
and legal causation must terminate somewhere.* (Suter v.
Leonard, supra, 45 Cal. App. 2d at p. 746, 120 Cal. Rptr.
at p. 111-12).
"We doubt that the proposed liability would reduce future
harm.
If anything, it would be more likely to impede the
proper functioning of adoption agencies.
It is doubtful
that the liability here involved can be insured against,
let alone insured at reasonable cost. This factor, while
not decisi'e, is worth noting in light of the budgetary
restraints on public social service agencies, especially
in the wake of the recently passed constitutional limitation
on property taxes, Proposition 13. Finances aside, we do
not believe that the placement process or the children,
foster parents and social workers involved in it would be
helped by trying to reconstruct events that necessarily are
heavily tinged by considerations of judgment, discretion
and a host of personal factors — events that occurred long
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ago and over an extended period of time—and by passing
judgment on these events in a courtroom.
In short, we view
judicial intervention under these circumstances as neither
useful nor workable,"

The decisions of Courts II - V are basically decided on
the same principle as have been Courts I and II.
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ABSTRACT

This is a study of the current legal theories,
elements, and courts’ stances affecting educational mal-

practice litigation.

General and legal issues were re

searched as a basis to identify court attitudes and

general public pressures.

The study also took a look at

the question of possible avenues for dealing with prob
lems of educational malpractice.

Should the courts

decide why Johnny can’t read and award monetary damages?

Should the legislature deal with the problem of faulty
education, or should a totally different agency become
involved in such an undertaking?
Related fields, such as medical malpractice, torts,
contract theory, and responsiblities and obligations of

students in the educational system, were examined as
well.

Will suites of educational malpractice succeed?

Should they succeed?

The question of the likelihood of

educational malpractice suits to succeed is also dealt

with, based on the decided cases of Hoffman v. Board of
Education, Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School
District, Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School

District, Pauley v. Kelley, and related holdings.

Sug

gestions for alternative approaches to educational mal
practice are proposed.

